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ABSTRACT 
 
THE FLOURISHING SELF IN ARISTOTLE AND THE AUTHENTIC SELF IN 
HEIDEGGER 
 
 
 
By 
Jacob N. Graham 
May 2012 
 
Dissertation supervised by Dr. Michael Harrington 
This dissertation explores Aristotle’s concept of human flourishing, or eudaimonia, 
through the lens of the flourishing self. Connections will be made with Heidegger’s 
concept of authenticity, as seen through the lens of authentic selfhood. It is argued that 
there is some type of authenticity or self-appropriation already present in Aristotle’s 
ethical thought. For both thinkers, however, the particularized self is subsumed into a 
type of universality—the universality of excellence or care.  
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Preface 
Since their publication in the Gesamtausgabe, Heidegger’s lectures on Aristotle have 
received more and more attention. Possible connections between Aristotle’s practical 
philosophy and Heidegger’s Being and Time have been suggested. Heidegger’s apparent 
appropriation of Aristotle has been questioned. Whatever the case, Aristotle’s influence 
on Heidegger’s thought is undeniable. As always, scholars draw connections between the 
two based upon their interpretations of each thinker’s work. More often than not, 
Heidegger’s interpretations of Aristotle have already influenced the way Heidegger 
scholars view Aristotle. This sometimes results in an overly Heideggerian version of 
Aristotle. Or sometimes scholars critique Aristotle on a Heideggerian basis, without 
having properly understood Aristotle’s thought. While drawing connections between 
Heidegger and Aristotle is not unwarranted, one must be careful to understand each 
thinker on his own terms, to the degree that this is possible.  
 In comparing Heidegger and Aristotle’s thought, I do not intend to reduce one to 
the other. Efforts are made here to treat each thinker fairly and on his own turf. Having 
said so, there is an unabashed effort to look at and past the differences in thought between 
the two. While I will highlight differences between Aristotle’s thought and Heidegger’s, I 
argue that these differences are not enough to preclude a dialogue between these thinkers. 
But such arguments are just means toward a greater end. 
 This project is not an attempt to see how Aristotle may have prefigured 
Heidegger. The task at hand is to see in what way there is some sort of ‘authenticity’ or 
self-appropriation in Aristotle’s thought. This theme is not immediately apparent in the 
Nicomachean Ethics, and to my knowledge, has received little to no attention. Heidegger 
  x 
paves the way for such an idea in his lectures on Aristotle’s Ethics, but the interpretations 
offered here will move beyond Heidegger’s interpretations. In doing so, I fully 
acknowledge the fact that much of what is said here about the possibility of self-
appropriation in Aristotle is not explicitly found in the Nicomachean Ethics. However, 
we should see that this idea is not only compatible with Aristotle’s practical thought, but 
even encouraged by it. 
 To accomplish this goal, we will compare Aristotle’s concept of eudaimonia, or 
human flourishing, to Heidegger’s concept of authenticity or self-appropriation. More 
precisely, we will be comparing the flourishing with the authentic life through the lens of 
the self who might live such a life. Although Aristotle says little about it, he does give us 
some hints as to his notions of selfhood. This comes primarily in Books VIII and IX of 
the Ethics where he tells us that the self is most nous, or mind. I will directly address this 
idea in the fourth chapter of this project. Until then, we will gather shades of the meaning 
of the ‘self’ in our discussion of the character excellences. For Heidegger, selfhood is 
mentioned explicitly in Being and Time, and will be addressed as such.  
 We will come to see that both the authentic life and the life of excellence offer us 
a way beyond most common concepts of selfhood. Not only this, but we shall also see 
that these ways of living offer us a way beyond a particularized self, or a self primarily 
characterized by the ‘me’ or ‘I’. The movement beyond particularization does not, 
however, utterly leave behind particularization. Rather, it reinforces particularity by 
raising it to a new meaning. We will see that for both Aristotle and Heidegger, although 
in different ways, the flourishing or authentic life offers a way for self-appropriation. 
This self-appropriation is not a process of grabbing hold of and possessing a thing called 
  xi 
‘self’, but rather of freeing the self from objectification in particularity. Both the 
flourishing and authentic life, then, involve a movement beyond a particularized “me”, 
toward a universalized self. 
 The first chapter will introduce us thoroughly to the project by elucidating 
Aristotle’s concept of excellence, and by addressing Heidegger’s early lectures on this 
concept. The second chapter will offer a reading of Heidegger’s concept of authenticity. 
It will be shown that authenticity does not entail an existentialist, ‘me versus them’ battle, 
but rather, a sublimation of the they-self into the being of human being—into care. The 
third chapter suggests ways of self-appropriation through the particular character virtues 
Aristotle names. We shall give the most attention there to the virtue of courage, which as 
a virtue dealing properly with death, will show affinities to Heidegger’s concept of 
authenticity. The fourth chapter discusses Aristotle’s concept of friendship, and 
Heidegger’s concept of being-with. We will see here what selfhood is in Aristotle, and 
open a dialogue between being-with and friendship. The last chapter explores the topic of 
contemplation in Aristotle, addressing again Heidegger’s early lectures on this topic. We 
will see how contemplation completes human flourishing, and offers the ultimate venue 
for a movement beyond the particularized self.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
As the scholarship on Heidegger’s relationship with Aristotle grows, little has been said 
about the possible connections between authenticity and human flourishing, or 
happiness.1 Heidegger himself prepared the way for such connections in his 
interpretations of Aristotle’s thought. We will explore the possibilities of such a 
connection through the lens of selfhood. The flourishing and authentic self will guide our 
comparison of the flourishing and authentic life. First, however, we must understand 
some of Aristotle’s basic ethical concepts. This chapter, then, will offer us a way into the 
discussion of the flourishing and authentic life. We will explore just what the flourishing 
life is for Aristotle by gaining an understanding of some basic ideas in the Nicomachean 
Ethics: the human work or function (ἔργον), character excellence, and prudence 
(φρόνησις). We will then explore Heidegger’s interpretations of these phenomena. This 
will prepare us for the next chapter’s discussion of authenticity and authentic selfhood. 
Aristotle’s Basic Ethical Concepts 
Aristotle’s concept of happiness rises or falls with his argument for a human function. 
Without it, the concept of happiness would be a mere assumption or common notion. 
That there is a highest human good has already been established.2 This good is generally 
taken to be happiness. Aristotle dislikes straying too far from generally accepted truths. 
However, philosophy must look for what really is the case, and not what merely appears 
to be the case. As such, he recognizes that the concept of happiness as the highest good 
                                                
1 Although commentaries have noted this many times, it is worth repeating. Our translation “happiness” 
hardly captures the richness of eudaimonia. I will at times use “human flourishing,” or simply 
“flourishing.” I will also employ the traditional “happiness.” Either way, we must see in “happiness” more 
than what is colloquially there. My exegesis will bring to light some of the richness in eudaimonia. 
2 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. W.D. Ross, as found in Aristotle’s Complete Works, ed. Jonathan 
Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995) 1097a36. Greek: Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984). See the first two chapters of the Nicomachean Ethics. 
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must be reasonably supported lest we fall prey to “platitude” (1097b22). Aristotle says 
the risk of platitude may be dispelled “if we could first ascertain the function of man” 
(1097b25). Interestingly, Aristotle seems first to assume that there is a human function; 
all we seek now is what the function is. But, as is well known, he continues as though we 
have not yet determined that there is any such function for human beings, and that this 
still needs proving. Why does Aristotle operate this way?  
 Let us look at the passage in question to see exactly what Aristotle said. 
Following the above quoted sentence, Aristotle says: 
For just as for a flute-player, a sculptor, or any artist, and, in general, for all things 
that have a function or activity [καὶ ὅλως ὧν ἔστιν ἔργον καὶ πρᾶξις], the good 
and the ‘well’ is thought to reside in the function, so would it seem to be for man, 
if he has a function. Have the carpenter, then, and the tanner certain functions or 
activities, and has man none? Is he naturally functionless? Or as eye, hand, foot, 
and in general each of the parts evidently has a function, may one lay it down that 
man similarly has a function apart from these? What then can this be? (NE, 
1097b25-32) 
 
Before determining what the human function is, Aristotle seems to begin and end this 
discussion with the assumption that there is a human function. Why begin and end this 
way? Would it not have been more prudent to start by proving that there is a function? 
Aristotle begins (and ends) this way because the human function or work is a first 
principle. It is the first principle of our being human. The human function is a life of 
activity involving logos. Since this is a first principle, it cannot be demonstrated. We 
must rather assume it or, at best, inductively indicate it. Failing that, the best route to take 
is a reductio ad absurdum. Since we are merely describing the way things are, we use a 
reductio (for those still in doubt) to show how absurd it would be not to accept that this is 
how things are.  
  3 
 Let us first be sure about the meaning of ergon in this passage. As C.D.C. Reeve 
has shown, Aristotle identifies the function of something with what that thing is, or its 
essence.1 A vase, for example, is a vessel made for holding liquid. In order to fulfill this 
end, the vase must function or work as a vase. If the vase is broken, it does not work or 
fulfill its function. As Aristotle would have said, it is then a vase only nominally.2 That is, 
we still call it a vase, but it is one that does not work properly so that it is “not much of a 
vase,” or “not as much a vase as that one which works.” It is quite literally out of order. It 
does not work, and this means it cannot fulfill its end. So, as Reeve says, “the essence is 
function as act; the end is function as result.”3  
 This need not mean, as has been suggested, that whatever has a function must be 
an instrument.4 Although being an instrument may be a sufficient condition for having a 
function, it is not a necessary condition. It is true that the vase has a function, and that it 
is an instrument, but its instrumentality is granted it only on the condition that it has a 
function. What such an objection seems to fear is that human being, if it is to have a 
function, must be viewed as an object designed for some use. But there need be no fear of 
intelligent design or the objectification of human beings. If the function is most what a 
thing is, i.e., the activity5 of the essence, and the function is also the end, then a thing 
fulfilling its function is a thing being itself.  
                                                
1 C.D.C. Reeve, Practices of Reason, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 123.  
2 Reeve, Practices, 123. As quoted in Reeve, from Aristotle’s Meteorologica, “What anything is is defined 
by its function: a thing really is what it is when it can perform its function, for example when an eye can 
see. When something cannot perform its function, it is that thing in name only, like a dead eye or one made 
of stone” (309a10-12). 
3 Reeve, Practices, 123. 
4 See W.F.R. Hardie’s Aristotle’s Ethical Theory, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), 23, where Hardie 
makes just this claim. Cf. also Rachel Barney’s rebuttal of this idea in, “Aristotle’s Argument for a Human 
Function,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, vol. 34 (2008): 293-322. The rebuttal can be found on 
pages 298-302. 
5 Joe Sach’s rendering of energeia as “being-at-work” fits this context in a pronounced way. 
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 As has already been suggested, Aristotle’s argument is not so much for a human 
function as it is to a human function. That is, Aristotle cannot demonstrate the human 
function, but can only indicate it. He can argue that there is a human function only upon 
the basis of the sorts of things for which the human function allows. Notice that his 
examples are limited to the human realm. As Rachel Barney notes, “The builder and the 
shoemaker are human beings, identified qua practitioners of a particular craft [technê].”6 
While Aristotle adds to his human examples “all things that have a function or activity,” 
he mentions none of these other things explicitly. Aristotle keeps the examples in the 
human realm to gear us to accept the human function—a function which allows for all of 
these particular human crafts—more easily than we otherwise might.  
Aristotle also keeps his examples in the human realm by his mention of body 
parts. While some of the body parts Aristotle mentions need not be human body parts, it 
is likely that Aristotle intended us to think this way, especially with his mention of the 
hand.7 There is no danger here of the fallacy of composition.8 Aristotle does not say that 
the human as a whole must have a function since the human’s body parts have functions. 
First, this would restrict the human function to something biological, which it clearly is 
not. Moreover, Aristotle asks whether the human has a function similar to these organs, 
but apart (παρά) from them.9 Aristotle is not arguing from parts to whole, but is rather 
suggesting a likeness between the two. That is, he does not say that there is a function of 
the human being because the body parts have functions. Rather, the human seems to have 
                                                
6 See Barney, “Aristotle’s Argument,” 297. While Barney recognizes this as well, her recognition is to a 
different end.  
7 Barney, “Aristotle’s Argument,” 297. Barney cites Aristotle as having said that the hand is “distinctively a 
human part.”  
8 Contra David Bostock’s suggestion in Aristotle’s Ethics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 16.  
9 Reeve treats this para as “over and above.” See Practices, 124.  
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a function as do the parts of the body. Neither is the argument properly an argument from 
analogy. This would lead us to believe that the argument is function as an induction, 
which, as we shall see below, is not the case. 
In fact, the whole argument seems to be a kind of reductio ad absurdum. As 
Reeve states, it “is not so much a direct argument that human beings have a function as 
an indirect one, which relies on the implausibility of the view that they lack a function.”10 
This is indicated by Aristotle’s question, “is [the human being] naturally functionless 
[ἀργόν]?” Barney notes that the use of argon is etymologically a-ergos, a standard term 
of disparagement denoting idleness or laziness. She goes on: 
On the one hand, Aristotle is simply specifying the logical alternative to his 
proposal that human beings have a natural function; but on the other he is using 
the pejorative connotations of argos to suggest, with a strong hint of reductio, that 
this would amount to claiming that human beings are by nature lazy or 
unemployed. That is, he suggests that the rival view is committed to a degrading 
conception of human nature.11  
 
While this is a plausible interpretation, there is something more than a mere rhetorical 
device at play. Aristotle meant argos to suggest more than “lazy,” “unemployed,” or even 
a degraded human nature. Aristotle is urging us to see that a functionless human being is 
not properly a human being. A functionless human being is a being without the human 
essence. Such a being would not be human. Even if such a being were physically 
identical to the human being, we could not call it human without that which makes it 
specifically human. 
 What exactly is the human function? Aristotle arrives at the answer by a process 
of elimination. Aristotle’s elimination rests on the assumption that in searching for the 
human function we are searching for a kind of life (1097b30-1098a5). The function 
                                                
10 Reeve, Practices, 124.  
11 Barney, “Aristotle’s Argument,” 308. 
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cannot be mere nutrition, because even plants have this kind of life. The function cannot 
be mere perception, because even the horse and ox have perception. Aristotle is searching 
for what is peculiar to human beings. He concludes that it must be “an active life of the 
element that has a rational principle [πρακτική τις τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος]” (1098a3-4). 
Aristotle has established that human life, simply speaking, is not merely nutritive or 
perceptive. He has not yet stated the nature of this life having logos. Aristotle adds 
parenthetically that this logos, or rational principle, has two parts: “one part has such a 
principle in the sense of being obedient to logos [ὡς ἐπιπειθές λόγω], the other in the 
sense of possessing one and exercising thought” (1098a4-5). This tells us that we need 
not take the rational principle to mean something strictly theoretical; it is simply an active 
life of logos (1098a6). 
 The typical translations of logos as “reason” or “rational principle” are not to be 
taken, in this context, as treating logos as something prestigious or honorific.12 The 
human function, or the active life involving reason, is simply what makes specifically 
human living possible. It is what distinguishes us from plants and other animals, but it is 
also what produces the rich array of human activity. This would include our crafts, arts, 
and emotions; in short, anything specifically human.13 There is also textual evidence that 
this is the case. It is noteworthy that Aristotle again uses an example from the human 
                                                
12 This interpretation, and largely my interpretation of the function argument, comes from Ronald 
Polansky’s lecture notes on the Nicomachean Ethics, 2009. 
13 Even something as basic as using a bathroom and toilet would fit into this frame. Our sexuality, with all 
its variations and fantasies, would also be made possible by logos, or the human function. One may take as 
a sign the fact that someone could either be stimulated or turned off by more or less “animal” sexual 
behavior (implying that human sex is different). This answers Sarah Broadie’s objection in Ethics With 
Aristotle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991). She claims that the function argument “throws into the 
background aspects of human nature not capable of standing up for themselves in logical argument, since 
that is not their way. Besides being rational, we are spiritual beings, responsive to beauty, imaginatively 
creative, capable of humour, pride and compassion…” (36). Broadie would be correct only if we were to 
restrict logos or “reason” to lofty rational activity.  
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realm when pushing us toward a definition of the human good. The function of the lyre-
player is to play the lyre, of a good lyre-player to do so well (1098a11-12). Likewise, the 
function of the human being is to be human, and of a good human being to be excellent. 
The human good turns out to be an “activity of the soul in conformity with excellence,” 
but this activity of the soul will “imply the rational principle” (1098a13-15). The rational 
principle is implied because it is what allows for the activity of the soul in accordance 
with virtue. 
 Moreover, Aristotle has already told us that the function of man is activity of the 
soul in accordance with, or not without (ἄνευ λόγου), a rational principle (1098a8). This 
should make clear that we are not to restrict logos here to something lofty, although it 
will also encompass discursive theoretical activity. If it were activity of the soul without 
logos, or alogos, then we would not have something peculiar to human being.  
 Aside from textual evidence, we may also consider the richness and array of 
meanings of the word logos. This is not to say that logos ought not here be translated as 
“reason” or “rational principle.” Rather, we must keep in mind that these translations 
cannot, in this context, be restricted to a lofty realm. I suggest that we should bear in 
mind the various meanings of logos when considering the human function.14 This can 
help us avoid the narrowing down of “reason” or “rationality.” For example, Sarah 
Broadie finds the “rational animal” definition problematic, since there are other animals 
exhibiting some degree of rationality.15 But with a broader interpretation of logos, this is 
                                                
14 For starters: word, statement, assertion, speech, language, discourse, story, fable, narrative, position, 
ratio, thought, reason, and principle. 
15 Sarah Broadie, Ethics With Aristotle, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 35.  
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not a problem.16 The human being is the being having logos, or reason, speech, or 
reasoned speech. The human being has logos as its function, and this allows for all the 
particularly human things we do. We do not know yet of any other animal that could be 
said to have logos, construed in this way, as its function. For other animals exhibiting 
rational activity, their degree of rationality is not to be included in something as rich, 
varied, and particular as logos. 
From Function to Flourishing 
We have seen that the fulfillment of the human function is the activity of the soul—an 
activity implying, or not without, reason—in accordance with excellence. Aristotle also 
adds that this activity must run its course in a complete life (1098a17), since it would be 
strange to consider a short life to be flourishing. What constitutes a short life? Aristotle 
says, “one day, or a short time, does not make a man blessed and happy” (1098a18-19). 
“One day” seems to serve as a limit principle. That is, it seems absurd to think of 
someone’s happiness,17 or flourishing and cultivation, being encompassed in only one 
day. Aristotle then leads us into generality with “a short time.” While one day seems an 
almost certain candidate for the impossibility of human flourishing, it is difficult, or even 
impossible, to say just how long is needed. For this, one must turn to experience. Perhaps 
some can achieve a good life in a shorter time than others, but what exactly too short a 
                                                
16 None of this is to say that ‘reason’ as a translation is insufficient. It is difficult, and possibly faulty, to 
stray from this translation of logos in an Aristotelian context. But even reason can be broadly construed. 
Reason extends over into religious ritual, i.e., it must follow a reasonable course, even if this kind of 
reasoning plays out in its own closed circuit of meaning. Emotions, too, can be displayed appropriately, or 
have the proper context. It may be strange (unreasonable), for example, to see someone crying while 
blowing out candles on a birthday cake.  
17 This is a prime instance of the translation of eudaimonia as “happiness” being particularly troublesome. 
Using happiness colloquially, we could imagine someone being happy—expressing emotions of pleasure, 
joy, and perhaps contentment—for one day. The reader should be reminded that this conception of the 
word does not encompass Aristotle’s concept of eudaimonia.      
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time is we cannot set down without jeopardizing our account’s integrity. This is 
corroborated by Aristotle’s following proviso: 
Let this serve as an outline of the good; for we must presumably first sketch it 
roughly, and then later fill in the details…And we must also remember what has 
been said before, and not look for precision in all things alike, but in each class of 
things such precision as accords with the subject-matter, and so much as is 
appropriate to the inquiry. (1098a20-29) 
 
Aristotle is recalling the prefatory remarks of chapter three that we must not seek the 
same amount of precision in all inquiries. It is the mark of someone experienced and 
thoughtful that she will not demand more precision than is necessary for the inquiry. This 
is especially the case in a practical science, which must, as any science, accord with its 
subject-matter (ὑποκειµένην ὓλην). Here, the subject matter is concrete living, with all its 
diversity of circumstances and situations. Therefore, we cannot pretend to predetermine 
the entire realm of ethics. 
 This proviso is also applicable to the human function argument itself; for, it too 
was part of the outline of the good. Aristotle continues: 
Nor must we demand the cause in all matters alike; it is enough in some cases that 
the fact [τὸ ὅτι] be well established, as in the case of the first principles; the fact 
is a primary thing or first principle [ἀρχή]. Now of first principles we see some 
by induction, some by perception, some by a certain habituation and others too in 
other ways. But each set of principles we must try to investigate in the natural 
way [ἣ πεφύκασιν], and we must take pains to determine them correctly, since 
they have a great influence on what follows. For the beginning [ἀρχή] is thought 
to be more than half of the whole, and many of the questions we ask are cleared 
up by it. (1098a33-b8) 
 
For Aristotle, establishing the human function is pointing to the fact, the this, of human 
being. The human function, as the process of elimination established, cannot be this (the 
nutritive life), or this (the life of mere perception), but logos: reason, speech, word, 
argument, rationality, etc. How did Aristotle arrive at the human function? Was it 
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induction, perception, habituation, or in some other way? We cannot look at the argument 
as mere induction, lest we be left with an atrocious one.18 The argument seems to take the 
form of an induction, but it really is a pointing to things we perceive to be the facts. It 
points out things we simply see to be the case, and things about which we are habituated 
to think in certain ways. The cobbler has the work or task of making shoes, and the good 
cobbler does this well. Need we move past our day-to-day experience and observations to 
make this point? The point, in fact, is made by pointing to this, i.e., what is all around 
us—not only what we perceive using senses, but all the things to which we are culturally 
and socially habituated. We then shift to the thought that the human being, upon 
observation, similarly seems to have an ergon, something that is peculiar to her.  
Virtue 
Aristotle begins his inquiry into excellence with a sharp distinction. There are intellectual 
(διανοητικάς) excellences, and character (ἠθικάς) excellences (1103a4-5). Philosophic 
wisdom (σοφία) and practical wisdom, or prudence (φρόνησις), are examples of 
intellectual excellences, while temperance and liberality are examples of character 
excellences. “For in speaking of a man’s character we do not say that he is wise or has 
understanding but that he is good-tempered or temperate; yet we praise the wise man also 
with respect to his state; and of states we call those which merit praise excellences” 
(1103a7-10). Let us notice Aristotle’s use of “we say” (λέγοµεν) and “we praise” 
(ἐπαινοῦµεν). Aristotle does not want to stray far from what we generally accept to be 
                                                
18 Cf. Barney’s comments in “Aristotle’s Argument”. If it is read as an induction, Barney claims it may be 
Aristotle’s “worst induction ever” (296). She goes on to say, “But on closer examination, it seems unlikely 
that an induction is really intended here at all. If it were, we would expect Aristotle to cite 
uncontroversially function-bearing objects, such as tools and other [artifacts]; or perhaps beings relevantly 
like human beings, such as other animals and natural substances. In fact, he does neither” (296). This 
should also refute the misconception of the argument as one of analogy. 
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the case. Whatever we say here in practical science must not clash with the way things 
are (1098b9-11). If what we say clashes with experience or the best opinions, then our 
practical science begins to lose credibility. If we are to maintain credibility, our account 
must tally with our experiences and the way human beings generally are. 
 Aristotle then says that intellectual excellence comes about by teaching, and 
character excellence through habit. Aristotle evokes the etymology of “character” to 
reinforce this idea. Êthikê, character, is rooted in ethos, or habit (1103a14-19). Thus, we 
cannot be born with character excellence, but it must be developed. If character 
excellence were by nature, we could never habituate ourselves to act otherwise than we 
do, in the same way that stones cannot be habituated to move upward. Instead, says 
Aristotle, we are “adapted by nature to receive [character excellence], and are made 
perfect by habit.” We see again that Aristotle’s ethics involves practice. It is directly 
situated in the world of action. 
 Aristotle begins the second chapter of Book II in the way that we might expect, 
given what he has already said about excellence. 
Since, then, the present inquiry does not aim at theoretical knowledge like the 
others (for we are inquiring not in order to know what excellence is, but in order 
to become good, since otherwise our inquiry would have been of no use), we must 
examine the nature of actions, namely how we ought to do them; for these 
determine also the nature of the states that are produced (1103b27-31). 
 
Aristotle does not wish merely to talk about excellence, or merely even to determine what 
it is. We will talk about excellence and figure out what it is with the goal of becoming 
good. Practical science, for Aristotle, is directly practical, i.e., oriented toward actions 
(πράξεις). Our actions produce our dispositions, and excellence will be determined to be 
a dispostion (ἕξις). Aristotle has already said in chapter one of Book II , “excellences we 
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get by exercising them, as also happens in the case of the arts as well” (1103a31-32). Our 
practical science is directed toward action because action is both the goal (becoming 
good) and the sphere in which human excellence plays out.  Aristotle continues: 
But this must be agreed upon beforehand, that the whole account of matters of 
conduct must be given in outline and not precisely, as we said at the very 
beginning that the accounts we demand must be in accordance with the subject-
matter; matters concerned with conduct and questions of what is good for us have 
no fixity, any more than matters of health. The general account being of this 
nature, the account of particular cases is yet more lacking in exactness; for they 
do not fall under any art or set of precepts, but the agents themselves must in each 
case consider what is appropriate to the occasion. (1104a1-8) 
 
This strong reminder of the preface given in the third chapter of Book I, says Aristotle, 
must be born in mind, and it must be assumed and agreed upon from the very beginning. 
Aristotle again insists that we cannot give a perfect account when we are dealing with 
matters of action. Ultimately, it comes down to the agents (πράττοντας) to survey and 
consider (σκοπεῖν) what to do according to the given moment (καιρόν). 
 How is this to happen? Aristotle tells us, before the above quoted proviso, that 
right reason (ὀρθὸς λόγος) is the standard for action (1103b33). That this is the case 
must be assumed, and Aristotle will later tell us what this is and how it relates to other 
excellences. He has already told us that character is developed through habit. Habit may 
seem to clash with right reason, since habit (good or bad) is often taken to be what is 
done without thinking. However, Aristotle has not said that we ought to act according to 
right reasoning,19 but rather to right reason. We need not think through every situation as 
it is given to us, nor should we consider habits to be originally thoughtless, especially 
good habits. We may habituate ourselves to exercise or healthy eating, but this initially 
                                                
19 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Christopher Rowe, commentary by Sarah Broadie (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), 297. Sarah Broadie argues, “ ‘Right reason’ is misleading if it invites the 
interpretation ‘right reasoning’, since ‘logos’ here means, as often, a product of reasoning such as a formula 
or articulate declaration.” 
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may take much planning and work. We would thus be acting out of habits originally 
informed by right reason and hard work. So, acting according to right reason is not in 
conflict with acting out of habit, since the excellent habit may originally be informed by 
reason.  
 Yet, there may be occasions when our generalized ethical reflections will not 
inform us of what to do. This is where the agent must consider what is appropriate. This 
does not mean that the agent will be completely uninformed or at a loss. Habituation to 
certain types of action (and here we think particularly of good action) is always with us. 
We may nevertheless need to consider what is appropriate in the given moment. This is 
not agential relativism. One can act appropriately, as the moment demands, while acting 
in accordance with one’s general principles. It is also possible that one’s principles 
cannot cover the severity of a situation, and one must adapt accordingly. Here, this 
adaptation will involve surveying and considering the situation, and acting accordingly.20  
 As we come closer to the definition of excellence, Aristotle tells us we must 
consider pleasure and pain along with excellence. “For [character] excellence is 
concerned with pleasures and pains; it is on account of pleasure that we do bad things, 
and on account of pain that we abstain from noble ones” (1104b9-11). If actions are 
accompanied by pleasures and pains, and we do bad things because they are pleasurable, 
and abstain from good things because they pain us, then it is difficult to be excellent. But 
Aristotle tells us more: 
…it is by reason of pleasures and pains that men become bad, by pursuing and 
avoiding these—either the pleasures and pains they ought not or when they ought 
not or as they ought not, or by going wrong in one of the other similar ways that 
reason can distinguish. (1104b21-24) 
 
                                                
20 I will argue in more detail against the relativism claim when dealing with the doctrine of the mean. 
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The great difficulty lies in perceiving when, where, and in what ways to experience 
pleasures and pains. One can feel pain and pleasure rightly or wrongly, according to 
Aristotle, and this “has no small effect on our actions” (1105a6-7). The difficulty of 
ethics is not attempting to adhere to the categorical imperative, but being able to act 
appropriately.  
 How is it that we become excellent by doing excellent things? Does this not mean 
we are already excellent? It does not, and Aristotle answers this difficulty by highlighting 
a distinction in our experience. It is possible for one to do a just act while not being a just 
person. This is not an uncommon occurrence. It is quite possible for someone who is 
typically stingy to give a generous gift. The act is a generous one, but this is not sufficient 
evidence that the person is generous. He must still prove himself to be generous. Aristotle 
offers a formula for the truly excellent person and the acts proceeding from this 
excellence. The agent must have knowledge, he must choose the acts for their own sake, 
and his action “must proceed from a firm and unchangeable character” (1105a31-b1). 
Just as someone may write grammatically without knowledge of grammar, i.e. by 
accident, so too may someone do a just, temperate, or liberal act without doing it as or in 
the way (ὡς) the excellent person would. The conditions Aristotle sets forth coincide 
with the idea that character virtue comes to be from habit. The knowledge could come 
from experience or thought. The choice need not happen with every act. On the contrary, 
one could choose to do just things, and then become habituated to doing just things. A 
firm and unchangeable character is created by habitual action.  
 At the start of chapter five, Aristotle says excellence is one of three things: 
emotion (πάθη), capacity (δύναµις), or a disposition. If we see these as kinds, they are 
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respectively, acts, undeveloped powers for acts, and developed powers for acts. Since we 
are doing practical science, and the goal is action, it is likely that this is why Aristotle 
chooses these three things for his process of elimination.21 Since we are not called good 
based upon emotion or passion, this cannot be the locus of excellence (1105b30). We are 
not good or bad, or praised or blamed, simply because we have the capacity to feel 
certain ways, so neither can capacity be the home of excellence (1106a7-10). The only 
option is that excellence is a disposition. 
Virtue and the Mean 
Aristotle will soon reveal to us the definition of virtue or excellence. Aristotle appeals 
again to the human function to let us know that excellence makes human beings good by 
making the work or function of human beings good. How does excellence make human 
beings good? His answer is famous and controversial.  
In everything that is continuous and divisible it is possible to take more, less, or 
an equal amount, and that either in terms of the thing itself or relatively to us [ὴ 
κατ᾽αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγµα ἤ πρὸς ἡµᾶς]; and the equal is an intermediate [µέσον] 
between excess and defect. By the intermediate in the object I mean that which is 
equidistant from each of the extremes, which is one and the same for all…by the 
intermediate relatively to us that which is neither too much nor too little—and this 
is not one, nor the same for all. (1106a25-33) 
 
I suggest, along with Leslie Brown, we should understand “relatively to us” as “relative 
to the situation,” rather than relative to the particular agent.22 Although there is relativity 
here, there is not relativism. Aristotle does not mean that it is up to each person to decide 
what is excellent and what is not, or that what is decided to be excellent will be 
                                                
21 Broadie says otherwise in her commentary. “[Aristotle] relies on his audience to remember that 
excellence in general belongs in the category Quality,” and the three things named by Aristotle are three of 
four subdivisions of Quality (301). 
22 Leslie Brown, “What is the ‘mean relative to us’ in Aristotle’s Ethics?” Phronesis, Vol. 42, No. 1 (1997): 
77-93. 
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something different for each person.23 While the agent may need to decide what is 
appropriate in a given situation, the decision of the excellent person will be one informed 
by reason, not whim or wish—and it is the excellent person who sets the standard.24 
There is no doubt that ethical decisions play out in varied situations, demanding different 
courses of action. However, the relativity involved here is not that which is relative to the 
agent, but what is relative to the situation. As Brown says, “the mean is not relative to 
agents over and above the situation.”25  
Different situations, it is clear, will demand different actions. Thus, the temperate 
action in one situation will perhaps look different from the temperate action in another. 
This does not mean, however, that you or I have arbitrarily determined what temperance 
is (qua excellence). This is because the standard of excellence is in place. Temperance 
may play out differently for me than for you because we are situated differently, or 
disposed differently to different feelings or pleasures. What this means is that our 
temperate actions may look different (or they may look quite similar), but what 
temperance is as a character excellence is determined by the way the temperate person is 
temperate.26 This provides a limit principle.  
 Aristotle’s concept of the mean is not strictly quantitative, and thus is not 
tantamount to moderation.27 We can say that someone not only drank too much, but also 
                                                
23 Section II of Brown’s article deals well with various arguments claiming Aristotle promotes agent 
relativism (81-86). 
24 Brown, “Mean,” 80. “Accordingly we have the famous definition of excellence of character (NE 
1106b36) as a disposition to choose, being in a mean state (a mesotes) which is mean relative to us, 
determined by reason, i.e. by that reason by which the phronimos, the person of practical wisdom, would 
determine it.” 
25 While Brown does well to make this point (86), I would like here to expand upon it. 
26 In an Aristotelian context, I suppose we could look to an actual temperate person, or the ideal of a 
temperate person based upon someone who approximates temperance. 
27 J.O. Urmson, “Aristotle’s Docrtine of the Mean,” in Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, ed. Amelie Oksenberg 
Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 157-170. Urmson addresses this issue (160-162). 
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too quickly, or too soon, or not in the right way. Moderation seems to be aimed at an 
arithmetical number (e.g. never drink more than two beers per day), while the mean state 
goes for what is appropriate. For example, we might consider how one approaches beer 
and feels about it, how much to drink in this setting, how much delight one takes in it as 
opposed, say, to philosophical discussion, etc. Moreover, we see here that this example 
does not show us agential relativism, but relativity to the situation. 
What Excellence Is 
We now arrive at the complete definition of excellence. We should notice that this 
definition comes after Aristotle reinforces the difficulty of excellence. We can go wrong 
in many ways, but we can be good only in one way (1106b35). In other words, it is easy 
not to hit the mark of excellence. Having said so, Aristotle now defines excellence. 
Excellence, then, is a state concerned with choice, lying in a mean relative to us, 
this being determined by reason and in the way in which the man of practical 
wisdom would determine it. (1106b36-1107a2) 
 
This makes clear the point made earlier. That excellence lies in a mean relative to us does 
not make excellence determinable by just anyone. The phronimos, or practically wise 
person, determines just what this mean is. Excellence relates to two extremes of vice. For 
example, rashness (the extreme) is less opposed to courage (the mean) than is cowardice 
(the deficiency). Aristotle names two reasons for this phenomenon. First, it seems to be 
the thing itself that gives rise to this type of opposition. Second, the opposition is based 
upon us, “for the things to which we ourselves more naturally tend seem more contrary to 
the intermediate” (1109a1-15). The example given for the first is rashness, which is least 
opposed to courage. It appears rashness itself tends more toward courage than cowardice. 
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The example for the second is that we more naturally tend toward pleasures, so self-
indulgence is more contrary to temperance than insensibility (1109a4-19). 
 But since hitting the intermediate in action is so difficult, Aristotle suggests that 
we must “take the least of the evils” and aim for the vice that is less opposed to the virtue. 
We do this in order to come closer to the intermediate “by drawing well away from error” 
(1109a33-b6). Aristotle’s ethics, though difficult, tends to be forgiving. If I am normally 
cowardly, I may want to aim at a rash action here and there in order to train myself 
toward courage. I do so not to become habituated to rashness, but in order to push myself 
more in the direction of courage. Once I do the rash action(s), I may become more 
inclined to see the goodness and worth of doing things courageously. This is not 
inconsistent with Aristotle’s system, for at least two reasons. First, a rash action will not 
make a rash person, just as a just action will not make a just person. Moreover, as 
Aristotle says, hitting the mean is difficult. For example: 
…it is not easy to determine both how and with whom and on what provocation 
and how long one should be angry; for we too sometimes praise those who fall 
short and call them good-tempered, but sometimes we praise those who get angry 
and call them manly. The man, however who deviates little from goodness is not 
blamed, whether he do so in the direction of the more or of the less, but only the 
man who deviates more widely. (1109b14-20)  
 
We do not blame the one who strays only a little from the good because it is often 
difficult to tell just what motivates an action (or reaction), and in just what way the 
(re)action should have taken place. For instance, anger seems the proper reaction when 
one suffers a grave injustice. Yet even here we would not want to prescribe anger as the 
proper reaction. It rather seems to tally with experience, and we would not blame 
someone for being angry in this sort of situation. 
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 If we are looking for criteria upon which we can confidently place blame or not, 
we are out of luck. 
But up to what point and to what extent a man must deviate before he becomes 
blameworthy is not easy to determine by reasoning, any more than anything else 
that is perceived by the senses; such things depend on particular facts, and the 
decision rests with perception. (1109b20-23) 
 
We can only be dissatisfied by this if we forget our position—we are thinkers reflecting 
upon matters of practical science. If we honestly reflect upon the way of experience, we 
see that Aristotle is prudent to say what he said. But what does it mean to say, “the 
decision rests with perception” (ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις)? To say that our judgment rests 
with perception is to say perception judges. The one who strays far from the good, says 
Aristotle, does not fail to be noticed (1109b20). Here, it is as though we simply perceive 
the bad action; our judgment seems to require little to no thought. We just see that the 
action was a bad one. While not all actions can be judged in such a way as this, this 
seeing will play no small part. The seeing is an informed seeing; it is informed by logos, 
and the practical wisdom of the one seeing. Thus, even when there is a more obvious 
(thoughtful) reflection upon the nature of an action, the judgment depends upon what was 
seen at the time and place, and must take into consideration all of the circumstances.  
Phronêsis 
There is still one necessary type of virtue to discuss before we address Heidegger’s 
appropriation of Aristotle. Character excellence is not possible without reason, since 
choice may inform how we act, and choice involves deliberation. It is phronêsis that 
informs choice. The one excellent in character is prudent, or practically wise.28 We 
already saw the practically wise person mentioned in Book II. The phronimos sets the 
                                                
28 I will hereafter use “prudent,” “practically wise” and their variations interchangeably. 
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standard of excellence. By her practical wisdom, the prudent person establishes the mean 
disposition, which is excellence.  
It is not enough for us to know what the practically wise person does, but we must 
also know what practical wisdom is. Aristotle tells us what practical wisdom is in the 
fifth chapter of Book VI. What is noteworthy in Aristotle’s account is that it begins not 
with a definition of practical wisdom, but by “considering who are the persons we credit 
with it” (1140a24-25). Since practical wisdom deals with particular actions, it will be 
difficult to grasp it without pointing to how it plays out. Therefore, perhaps the best way 
to find out what prudence is, is to see it in action. We must look at prudence embodied 
since it is found only within practical situations. 
First, we see that the practically wise person deliberates well about what is good 
for him. This good is not particular, but refers to the good life as a whole (1140a25-29). 
We must also understand that one deliberates neither about necessary things, nor about 
impossibilities. Thus, practical wisdom is not knowledge, since the objects of knowledge 
are necessary (cannot be otherwise). Practical wisdom is also not art because art deals 
with making and practical wisdom with action (making having its end outside itself in the 
product, and acting having its end in itself). What is left is “that [practical wisdom] is a 
true and reasoned state of capacity to act with regard to the things that are good or bad for 
man [ἕξιν ἀληθῆ µετὰ λόγου πρακτικὴν περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπῳ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά]” 
(1140b4-5). Notice Aristotle’s phrase, “true and reasoned state.” Practical wisdom will 
not only reach the truth, but it is itself true. Practical wisdom is a disposition operating 
truthfully—not in the sense of “honestly,” but in the sense that it is within truth. Practical 
wisdom operates within truth—a truth established according to logos or reason—and 
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from that locus has the capacity to act with regard to good and bad things. The spatial 
language employed here (in, within) is akin to saying someone is in love. The person in 
love acts out of love. The phronimos acts from within and out of truth. 
Aristotle notes that temperance (σωφροσύνη) is called by its name because it 
saves or preserves (σῴζει) phronêsis. Temperance is closely linked with practical 
wisdom because the practically wise person is not distracted by pleasure and pain.  
For the principles of the things that are done consist in that for the sake of which 
they are to be done; but the man who has been ruined by pleasure and pain 
forthwith fails to see any such principle—to see that for the sake of this or 
because of this he ought to choose and do whatever he chooses and does; for vice 
is destructive of the principle. (1140b15-19)  
 
Temperance preserves practical wisdom since it allows the practically wise person to 
make good judgments about what is good in action. But there must be a necessary 
circularity at play here. Practical wisdom, as necessary for the character virtues, must also 
in some sense preserve temperance. A lack of distraction from pleasure and pain provides 
an easier basis upon which to make good decisions about the good life. Good decisions 
made about the good life will likely increase security from the distraction of pleasures 
and pain. Each logically and practically entails the other.  
 There is, however, no excellence in practical wisdom (1140b23). One either is or 
is not practically wise. If one is practically wise, then this is already good or excellent 
(practical wisdom is, after all, an intellectual virtue). As Broadie explains, “one can say ‘a 
good doctor’ etc., but not ‘a good wise person’ (as if there could be bad ones).”29 
Moreover, practical wisdom, says Aristotle, cannot be forgotten as specifically reasoned 
states can be. The linguist, through lack of practice of a foreign language, may forget 
some of the rules, vocabulary, or syntax of that language. One cannot, on the other hand, 
                                                
29 Broadie, 369. 
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forget the disposition allowing for choosing good action. Practical wisdom is simply 
there when one has it. One cannot forget how to make good decisions about the good life. 
One may be able to shirk it or ignore it willfully, but one cannot forget it. 
Heidegger’s Interpretation of Aristotle’s Ethics 
Three years before the publication of Being and Time, in the summer semester of 1924, 
Heidegger gave a lecture series that we now see published under the title, Basic Concepts 
of Aristotelian Philosophy.30 The first half of this text deals broadly with Aristotle’s 
work; key concepts from the Rhetoric, Politics, Metaphysics, and Nicomachean Ethics 
are all included in Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle. Robert D. Metcalf and Mark B. 
Tanzer, in the translator’s preface to the English edition of this lecture series, suggest that 
Heidegger’s Marburg lectures, of which Basic Concepts was part, “typically examined 
historical figures in the context of the main issues treated in Being and Time.”31 
Moreover, Metcalf and Tanzer suggest that the Marburg lectures involve traditional 
philosophical interpretations reworked through the lens and determination of 
phenomenology, and these reworked interpretations inform the development of 
Heidegger’s key concepts in Being and Time.32 While Ι do not intend to demonstrate this 
latter point, this section will prepare us for the later discussion of how Aristotle may have 
some version of authenticity already present in his formulation of the good life. 
 
 
                                                
30 Martin Heidegger, Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie, in Gesamtausgabe, Band 18 (Frankfurt 
Am Main: Vittorio Klostermann). 
31 Martin Heidegger, Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy, trans. Robert D. Metcalf and Mark B. 
Tanzer (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009) xi. I have made slight typographical changes to the 
translated text. 
32 Translator’s Preface, xi. 
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Heidegger and the Human Ergon 
Let us take a look at Heidegger’s initial interpretations of Aristotle’s ethical thought. 
“Aristotle defines the [Dasein] of human beings as a ζωή πρακτική τις τού λόγον 
ἔχοντος, ‘a life [Leben], specifically one that is πρακτική, of such a being as has 
language [Sprache]’” (BC, 31). Aristotle’s definition here comes from the Nicomachean 
Ethics (1098a3-4). Heidegger translates logos as language for the remainder of the 
lecture. This allows for a broad, ontological interpretation of logos. Heidegger recognizes 
that the zoê praktikê is determined as psychês energeia—that is, as Aristotle says, the 
practical life directed toward happiness is an activity of the soul—and so sets out to 
interpret these key concepts in tandem. 
Heidegger says, “ἐνέργεια is perhaps the most fundamental being-character 
[Seinscharakter] in Aristotle’s doctrine of being.” Heidegger takes note also of 
energeia’s root word, ergon. Heidegger sees the human ergon as a “definite limitation” 
of human being—it is the “genuine achievement [eigentliche Verrichtung]” or “concern 
[Besorge]”. The peras of being is constituted by the agathon. From this, we are led to 
eudaimonia as the telos of human being, “to the determination of that which beings with 
the character of life [Lebens] carry within themselves as their basic possibility 
[Grundmöglichkeit].” At first sight, we notice the inaccuracy of calling eudaimonia a 
determination of beings with the character of life. Aristotle does not see humans as 
merely having life, but also and essentially as having logos. But Heidegger goes on to 
say: 
Life is (1) a way of being characterized by its being-in-a-world [Sein-in-einer-
Welt] and (2) a being for whom, in its being as such, this very being is a question, 
a being that is concerned with its being [das um sein Sein besorgt ist]. The 
genuine [eigene] being of life is posited in a certain way in its ἔργον as τέλος. 
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Aristotle seeks basic possibilities within this concrete possibility of [Dasein], 
according to which every concrete [Dasein] decides itself. We designate as 
existence [Existenz] the ultimate basic possibility in which [Dasein] genuinely is 
[in Der Dasein eigentlich ist]. (BC, 31) 
 
For Heidegger, the only sort of being for whom being is a question is Dasein. A similar 
formulation becomes a sort of definition of Dasein in Being and Time.33 Being-in-the-
world is also characteristic of, and peculiar to, Dasein. In short, the only sort of being 
who could have life as he here characterizes it is a human being. So while Heidegger’s 
talk of “life” may not be ideal in the above context, it seems what Heidegger has in mind 
is a distinctly human life. Heidegger goes on to claim that Aristotle designates the life of 
the polis, “being-in-the-πόλις,” as the genuine life of human beings. Human beings have 
logos (speech), and this means that, as speaking, human beings are with-one-another. 
Thus, Heidegger calls “being-with-one-another” a fundamental character of human 
being-there, determined by having logos (BC, 32).  
 We notice here many future key concepts for Being and Time. We are not here 
concerned with what influence these lectures on Aristotle may have had on Being and 
Time. Rather, we notice that Heidegger uses the language from Being and Time to 
interpret Aristotle. We want eventually to know what significance this may have for 
Aristotle’s thought. We can say for now that Heidegger saw the human function as the 
“authentic carrying-out [eigentliche Verrichtung]” of human being. The human function 
is where human being comes into its own [eigen]. The human function gives human 
being its own being. It is the concern (Besorgen) of human being, and that which gives 
rise to the human way of being-in-the-world. 
                                                
33 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Mcquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper-
Collins Publishers, 1962), 32. Dasein “is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that 
Being is an issue for it [um dieses Sein selbst geht].” The German text: Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Max 
Niemeyer Verlag, 2006). 
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 We have already seen at least a hint that Heidegger’s interpretation of logos is 
broad. He goes on to say: 
For Aristotle, the disclosedness [Erscholssenheit] of the being of the world has its 
genuine [eigentliche] basic possibility in λόγος, in the sense that, in λόγος, what 
is living-in-a-world appropriates the world, has it there, and genuinely is and 
moves in this having-it-there. (BC, 37) 
 
Here, Heidegger understands logos as what makes possible a disclosure of the world in 
its being. We must remember that, for Heidegger, the act of disclosure is not primarily a 
process of reason.34 “Disclose” is a technical term Heidegger uses to indicate the pre-
theoretical or pre-thematic way in which we move about in our world. The world in 
which I am situated is disclosed to me to some degree as a world already having meaning 
for me—there is some context in which I find myself.35 Disclosure is the mode in which 
the world is laid open or already has been laid open for me (B&T, 105). I do not 
thematically recognize the desk by which I work while I work, yet it is part of the work-
world disclosed to me. So, the being that lives-in-the-world (and here we can understand 
“being-in-the-world” for “living-in-the-world” based upon the above definition of life) 
has its world in a meaningful way through disclosure. Heidegger interprets logos as 
something that allows for basic ways of human being in the world. We may see room 
here for a similar interpretation of the human function argument to the one already 
discussed in our section on Aristotle. Logos, as the genuine possibility for disclosure, 
would allow for theoretical disclosure, in addition to pre-theoretical disclosure. 
 
 
                                                
34 Being and Time, 105. Disclosure “never means anything like ‘to obtain indirectly by inference.’” 
35 See Heidegger’s discussion of disclosure in relation to understanding and meaning, 193. 
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Heidegger and the Good 
Heidegger’s lectures are peppered with his interpretations of the good. However, we 
should here focus on Heidegger’s discussion of the good in the context of the 
Nicomachean Ethics. Heidegger says: 
The being of human beings is determined as concern [Besorgen]; every care 
[Sorgen] as concern has a definite end, a τέλος. Insofar as the being of human 
beings is determined through πρᾶξις, every πρᾶξις has a τέλος; insofar as the 
τέλος of every πρᾶξις, as πέρας, is ἀγαθόν, ἀγαθόν is the genuine [eigentliche] 
being-character of human beings. The ἀγαθόν is a determination of the being of 
human beings in the world. (BC, 46) 
 
It is care as concern that is aimed toward an end. The good is indeed the end of every 
action. However, as Aristotle states at the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics, the good 
is also the end of every choice, inquiry, and art. Heidegger does indeed go on to talk 
about the agathon in technê. Perhaps Heidegger’s translation and interpretation of the 
first sentence of the Nicomachean Ethics will shed some light on his conception of the 
good. 
It appears that every τέχνη (knowing-one’s-way-around [Sichauskennen] 
something, in a definite mode of concern; the shoemaker understands how one 
makes a shoe, he knows his way around in it), every knowing-one’s-way in a 
concern, every µέθοδος, every pursuing-of-a-matter, being-on-the-way after a 
matter (yet again, a mode of being-oriented, a knowing-one’s-way-around)—in 
the same way, the concern and the occupying oneself with something that is to be 
settled, that is to be brought to an end through concern—all these modes of 
knowing-one’s-way-around and of concern about something, appear to be after 
some good. (BC, 47) 
 
First, Heidegger’s parenthetic interpretation of technê is seemingly inadequate.36 If I am 
the working artist, I am unquestionably in a definite mode of concern. I concern myself 
with the artwork in progress. But this mode of concern is not simply a knowing-my-way-
                                                
36 Francisco J. Gonzalez, “Beyond or Beneath Good and Evil? Heidegger’s Purification of Aristotle’s 
Ethics,” in Heidegger and the Greeks, ed. Drew A. Hyland and John Panteleimon Manoussakis 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), 127-156. Gonzalez thinks this part of the interpretation is 
“unobjectionable” (130).  
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around the work, or a mere “know-how in taking care of something.”37 I can know my 
way around a city, a building, or a textbook. None of this makes me an artist. I can have 
practical know-how in taking care of my health, but this does not make me a nutritionist 
or doctor. Moreover, Heidegger does not even mention Aristotle’s definition of technê, “a 
state of capacity to make, involving a true course of reasoning” (1140a9-10). Heidegger’s 
interpretation of choice—“the concern and the occupying oneself with something that is 
to be settled”—seems no better. To bring something to an end through concern could just 
as well fit his interpretation of technê.38 The artist is concerned with the eventual product, 
but the artist need not be making any real choices about it. Bringing something to an end 
through concern does not necessitate deliberate desire. Let us see how properly to view 
Heidegger’s interpretation. 
 Francisco J. Gonzalez says, “techne becomes the sole and guiding perspective in 
Heidegger’s account of the agathon.”39 The problem with collapsing the meanings of 
praxis and technê is the obvious trouble that praxis has its end in itself, while technê has 
its end outside itself in its product. Thus, the good would no longer be located in genuine 
praxis—something that we can choose for its own sake. Moreover, proairesis loses any 
semblance of the usual (and perhaps, proper) translation, “choice.” The problem is that 
the real relationship to the good is skewed. We are no longer, under Heidegger’s 
interpretation, choosing (having deliberate desire for) the good, but are bringing 
something (whatever it is) to an end through concern, so as to be after the good (hinter 
                                                
37 Gonzalez’s rendering. 
38 Gonzalez says Heidegger has subordinated or assimilated choice and action to techne. 
39 Gonzalez, “Beyond or Beneath,” 130. 
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einem Guten).40 Gonzalez says, for Heidegger, “Our relation to the good is to be located 
in our existing, not in our acting, desiring, deliberating, or choosing.”41 Indeed, none of 
these concepts, as such, seems to show up in Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle. This 
interpretation, says Gonzalez, should not surprise us, “since this is precisely what 
Heidegger must do in order to interpret the agathon ontologically as a way of being.”42 
While the good may be broadly found in our existing,43 the good is located more 
precisely in the how of being, or the way one is. 
 Perhaps, however, we can salvage Heidegger’s seemingly unsatisfactory 
interpretation. Heidegger’s interpretation operates in a phenomenological and ontological 
realm. Thus, Heidegger is attempting to interpret technê, inquiry, choice, and action in 
their most basic forms, i.e., not as what they are thematically, but what they are when 
they are enacted. For Heidegger, the traditional meanings and contexts of these terms are 
already there, and his ontological interpretation need not preclude those meanings. So, for 
the artist, the vague “something” he knows his way around is that upon which he works. 
In choosing, we are indeed concerned and occupied with something that is to be settled, 
and this will involve deliberation. Heidegger is not reducing these phenomena to 
ontology, nor is he pulling them out of context. Rather, he is teasing out the ontological 
elements of these phenomena as they are situated within their respective contexts. When 
keeping in mind a contextual understanding of these terms, Heidegger’s ontological 
                                                
40 This is a rare instance where we see Heidegger using the traditional word Gut, rather than leaving the 
Greek untranslated. 
41 Gonzalez, “Beyond or Beneath,” 131. 
42 Gonzalez, “Beyond or Beneath,” 131. 
43 It may perhaps be troublesome or anachronistic to use ‘existing’ to refer to Aristotle’s concept of the 
good. It is not at all clear that Aristotle would have spoken of existence as opposed to being.  
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interpretations may offer greater insight to their meaning—meanings situated firmly in 
the concrete world of work and action. 
 Here, Heidegger’s interpretation of the good is more understandable. However, 
the problem remains whether or not we are getting Aristotle’s ethics in this interpretation, 
or something only inspired by Aristotle. While Heidegger’s interpretations may be 
helpful, they cannot stand on their own as interpretations of Aristotle’s ethics. This is not 
to fault Heidegger’s interpretations of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Rather, we should 
approach Heidegger’s interpretations with care, remembering that Heidegger’s 
interpretations are ontological in nature, and thus not thorough interpretations of 
Aristotle’s ethics.44 Moreover, we should recall that where Heidegger’s interpretations do 
enter into an explicitly ethical realm, it is because he is working in the context of 
Aristotle’s Ethics. That is, where Heidegger uses ethical terminology that will be used in 
Being and Time strictly ontologically, he uses these terms to interpret Aristotle, not 
necessarily to reveal to us what Heidegger himself actually wants the terms to mean. 
Heidegger and Virtue 
Let us turn to Heidegger’s treatment of the good in relation to excellence or virtue. He 
treats the human function argument to get at the human good, highlighting its connection 
with virtue. First, Heidegger says: 
We know that the being of human beings is determined through ἀρετή, the mode 
of being in which the τέλος is possessed—τέλος as the beyond-which-nothing. 
So…ἔργον is taken in its ownmost being-possibility, namely as fulfilling itself in 
ἀρετή…For example, in the case of the violin player, we distinguish between 
violin players. A bad one is distinguished from one who is σπουδαῖος, a 
“serious” [ernsthaften] κιθαριστής, who has taken his being-possibility seriously 
                                                
44 Although a thorough discussion of this would take us too far afield, it is worth noting that Heiddgger’s 
interpretations may also be a product of his time. That is, he was trying to loosen Aristotle’s thought from a 
tradition in which terms like, “activity,” “reason,” “good,” etc. had for so long been cemented, and for that 
very reason, misunderstood and disallowed from displaying their richness and breadth.  
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[Ernst gemacht hat], who has genuinely put into work his having what he is at his 
disposal. (BC, 69) 
 
Heidegger’s interpretation of aretê as “serious” or “earnest” at first seems problematic. It 
may be that the excellent person is serious or earnest, but his seriousness does not 
constitute his excellence. A lack of seriousness is not what primarily constitutes a bad 
musician, or a bad character. Conversely, seriousness does not primarily constitute a 
good musician or character. There may be a musician who takes his instrument and music 
very seriously, but who does not play with the same spirit and level of proficiency as 
another. Likewise, one may be quite serious about being good, but at the same time be 
incontinent. Moreover, someone with a bad character can be quite serious about being 
bad, e.g. a thief who is serious about what he does.45  
 Again, however, we should keep in mind Heidegger’s phenomenological and 
ontological operation. For Heidegger, the ontological state of seriousness or earnestness 
would likely make a way for a good musician or a good person to be good. That is, 
goodness of character necessarily includes some degree of seriousness. The good or 
excellent person earnestly approaches life and the decisions to be made therein. In other 
words, the excellent life is not one that the excellent person takes lightly. The excellent 
person takes seriously who she is, and puts this to work. By putting her seriousness and 
her own excellence to work, she fulfills the human function. While this reading is fair to 
Heidegger’s interpretation, it must be born in mind that this reading already presupposes 
the more thoroughly ethical context of Aristotle’s excellent person. Heidegger’s 
interpretation does not preclude this context, but perhaps enriches it.  
                                                
45 Gonzalez, “Beyond or Beneath,” 137. 
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 Heidegger goes on to say that the human good is “ζωή itself, living itself. The 
ἔργον is living itself, apprehended in the sense of being-in-the-world µετά λόγου, in 
such a way that it is thereby spoken” (BC, 69). Gonzalez notes, “the human good is such 
a life lived according to virtue. What has become of aretê in Heidegger’s account?”46 On 
Gonzalez’s reading, Heidegger’s ontological interpretation of virtue and the human good 
makes virtue (as excellence) and the human good (as really good, or valuable) disappear. 
The human good, happiness, is no longer a life lived according to excellence, but simply 
living. The living is according to “speaking.” Yet, this reading forgets what is likely 
happening in the background: Heidegger’s interpretation is teasing out the ontological 
aspects from an ethical context.  
 Heidegger says that the human good is living insofar as (Sofern also) “the τέλος 
of human beings does not lie outside itself but rather in itself as its being-possibility” (BC, 
69). Heidegger is not saying that the human good strictly is living, but only insofar as the 
good, as telos, lies within human being as a possibility of human being. Heidegger has 
not transgressed what Aristotle meant by the human good, but has rather interpreted it 
with specific reference to it as a telos—a telos not outside human being (The Good), but a 
telos to be found within our very existence (the good). Although we may not be able to 
conclude from this, as Heidegger does, that the good is then “life itself,” we can at least 
see that Heidegger’s interpretations have not omitted virtue and the good. Thus, 
Heidegger goes on to say that the human good is, as Aristotle says, an activity of the soul 
(which constitutes the being of all living things) in accordance with virtue, and that this 
activity is a putting-into-work of a specific concern. This putting into work is one that has 
                                                
46 Gonzalez, “Beyond or Beneath,” 137. 
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the character of the ‘well’—it is well done—and thus “the ultimate being-possibility is 
grasped in its end” (BC, 69). This ultimate being-possibility is the good. 
Heidegger and the Mean 
What does Heidegger say about Aristotle’s concept of the mean? Heidegger here does his 
best to save Aristotle from moralism, i.e. the type of morality based solely upon duty, and 
prescriptions lacking any flexibility regarding particular situations. Heidegger is right to 
do so. As we have seen, Arisotle’s ethics should not be mistaken for such a moral theory. 
Heidegger, however, maintains a more extreme position. “For our being, characterized 
by particularity, no unique and absolute norm can be given” (BC, 126).47 But, according 
to Aristotle, our being is not thoroughly characterized by particularity. Aristotle’s ethics 
will involve universals, even if we must ultimately answer to particulars, i.e. particular 
situations.48 For example, I may know that eating healthy is good, but not understand that 
this cake here is too much for me to eat at once, even if I can stomach it without feeling 
full or sick. Moreover, one may recall Aristotle’s statement in Book II that not all actions 
or passions admit of a mean. As examples, Aristotle cites spite, shamelessness, envy, 
adultery, theft, and murder. These are in themselves always bad. “It is not possible, then, 
ever to be right with regard to them; one must always be wrong” (1107a9-14). These 
must certainly be taken as norms.  
Heidegger continues, “It depends on cultivating the being of human beings, so 
that it is transposed into the aptitude for maintaining the mean. But that means nothing 
other than seizing the moment” (BC, 126). Gonzalez finds this objectionable, because he 
thinks the mean has here been reduced to “seizing the moment” [den Augenblick zu 
                                                
47 Für unser Sein, charakterisiert durch die Jeweiligkeit, last sich keine einmalige und absolute Norm 
geben. 
48 See Book VII of the Nicomachean Ethics and the discussion of incontinence, particularly 1147a1-9. 
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ergreifen]. While being in the mean and aiming at the intermediate action may involve 
seizing the moment, this cannot be all that it is. Heidegger has, Gonzalez says, drained 
the mean of any “determinate content.”49 While a moment may be seized, for example, 
through the mean of temperance, it is seized in a particular way, viz. temperately. But 
perhaps there is, again, room for this ethical reading in Heidegger’s interpretation. 
As with the difficulties above, this one should be solved, or at least tempered, 
with the reminder that this should not be taken as a strict interpretation of Aristotle’s 
doctrine of the mean. Taken in this way, Gonzalez’s objection stands. But, Heidegger 
goes on to say that the mean is here taken in the sense of a hexis as taxis, or: 
the ‘being-apportioned’ of that which comes up for a decision. Apportioning is a 
matter that arises from the resolution itself: the mean is, here, not a fixed property, 
but is a way of comporting oneself in the world. Aristotle designates ἀρετή as 
τοῦ µέσου στοχαστική; it ‘aims’ as what maintains the mean, as being-oriented 
to the right apportioning, the right seizing of the moment. (BC, 126) 
 
With virtue, we are oriented toward the right seizing of the moment. Thus, Aristotle’s 
doctrine of the mean is not here rendered void of its ethicality, nor is it reduced to 
absolute relativism.50 By suggesting that the mean is a right seizing of the moment, 
Heidegger has here left it in its ethical place. The excellent person does not seize the 
moment in an arbitrary way, but in the right way. The excellent person takes hold of what 
is there in its particularity, and does what needs to be done. 
Heidegger on Phronêsis 
Heidegger’s interpretation of phronêsis is found in his lecture course, Plato’s Sophist. 
This lecture course took place in the Winter Semester of 1924-1925—the same year as 
the course on Aristotle, which we have just discussed. The role of phronêsis as a mode of 
                                                
49 Gonzalez, “Beyond or Beneath,” 141. 
50 As Gonzalez has suggested on page 141. 
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being in the truth (ἀληθεύειν) is important for Heidegger. Thus, phronêsis is first and 
foremost a mode for Dasein’s disclosure of beings in affirmation and denial.51 This leads 
smoothly into Heidegger’s ontological interpretation of phronêsis. Technê is aimed at the 
ergon of its product. “The deliberation of φρόνησις, however, relates to this ἔργον 
insofar as it contributes to the deliberator himself. The ἀληθεύειν of φρόνησις therefore 
contains a referential direction to the ἀληθεθύων himself” (PS, 34). The deliberating and 
choosing of prudence can fulfill the function of the person making the decision. One can 
fulfill one’s function through the processes of phronêsis. This prepares the way for 
Heidegger’s determination of phronesis. 
A person can be concerned with things of minor significance; he can be so 
wrapped up in himself that he does not genuinely see himself. Therefore he is 
ever in need of the salvation [Rettung] of φρόνησις. (PS, 36) 
 
Let us examine this argument to see if it is an accurate interpretation of Aristotle’s 
concept of phronêsis. The premises are based upon Heidegger’s observation that pleasure 
and pain “cover up man to himself.” This seems to be a reasonable observation, since 
even our ordinary use of language confirms it. We do, after all, say we were “lost in 
pleasure,” or “I was beside myself with pain.”52 Pleasure and pain can overcome us, so 
that we only come back to ourselves afterwards. Heidegger, however, claims, 
“Circumspection regarding himself and insight into himself must again and again be 
wrested away by man in the face of the danger of διαφθείρειν and διαστρέφειν” (PS, 36). 
For Heidegger, phronêsis is an ever-renewed struggle. “Φρόνεσις, as soon as it is 
                                                
51 Martin Heidegger, Plato’s Sophist, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and Andre Schuwer (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1997), 16. German: Platon Sophistes in Gesamtausgabe, band 19 (Frankfurt Am Main: 
Vittorio Klostermann, 1992). 
52 On the other hand, it could be that bodily pleasures and pains are revealing and tell us a lot about 
ourselves. It seems they are capable of both covering us up to ourselves, and of being self-revealing. 
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achieved, is involved in a constant struggle against a tendency to cover over residing at 
the heart of Dasein” (PS, 36-37).  
 There is trouble in such an interpretation. Such a struggle as Heidegger names is 
not present in Aristotle’s concept of phronêsis. In fact, Heidegger’s interpretation sounds 
much more like Aristotle’s account of the continent person. Phronêsis, we recall, is an 
intellectual excellence possessed by the person with character excellence. But the 
temperate person is not like the continent person, “for a temperate man will have neither 
excessive nor bad appetites” (NE, 1146a10-12). The continent person is continent 
because he has bad appetites, but struggles against them and conquers them. The 
practically wise and temperate person will not even have such appetites, and so there is 
no struggle. This is what makes phronêsis an excellence, as opposed to a device used 
merely to struggle against bad appetites. Heidegger clearly has in mind the common 
person. Excellence is rare, so most people will indeed be involved in a struggle against 
pleasures and pains. However, this struggle, strictly speaking, cannot characterize 
Aristotle’s concept of phronêsis.  
 Heidegger’s ontological interpretation of phronêsis can, however, still offer 
insight. In differentiating the deliberation of technê and phronêsis, Heidegger tells us that 
the deliberation of the phronimos is directed toward himself, and his own life, as opposed 
to a work standing over against him. Heidegger goes on to clarify that the phronimos 
does not deliberate regarding particular advantages he can gain for himself, “e.g. health 
or bodily strength, which promote Dasein in a particular regard”. Rather, the phronimos 
deliberates well, “regarding ‘what is conducive to the right mode of Being of Dasein as 
such and as a whole’” (PS, 34). Heidegger specifies here that the phronimos is concerned 
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with the right (rechte) mode of being. While this, as has been shown, would not involve a 
struggle, Heidegger has indicated that the deliberation is concerned with good living.  
 Heidegger recognizes the importance of the ethicality of phronêsis. Technê can 
fail, and has the possibility of failure as part of what it is. In phronêsis, however, “every 
mistake is a personal shortcoming” (PS, 38). The mistakes made in technê are, thinks 
Heidegger, ultimately an advantage for the artist. This allows the artist to be more of an 
expert.53 But phronêsis “is not oriented toward trial and error; in moral action [sittlichen 
Handeln], I cannot experiment with myself.” Heidegger situates phronêsis more firmly in 
the ethical sphere, even in an ontological interpretation of it.  He also recognizes the aim 
of phronêsis, i.e. the mesotês. Heidegger calls this the “permanent orientation” of 
phronêsis.  
Φρόνησις is by its very sense στοχαστική; it has a permanent orientation, it 
pursues the goal, and specifically the µεσότης. With φρόνησις, unlike τέχνη, 
there is no more or less, no “this as well as that,” but only the seriousness of the 
definite decision, success or failure, either-or. (PS, 38) 
 
Again, we see Heidegger indicating that seriousness has to do specifically with an ethical 
decision. His interpretation is attempting to thrust us, reflectively, right into the difficulty 
of ethical decision making. Again, it is problematic to think of the phronimos as possibly 
failing, but Heidegger’s interpretation brings to light the seriousness and weight of 
ethicality. Even if the phronimos ultimately does not fail, he still must deliberate and 
deliberate well. Moreover, since phronêsis is permanently directed toward the mesotês, it 
cannot be any more complete than it is; it has no excellence.  
Heidegger continues with his interpretation of phronêsis, especially concerning 
the mysterious line that phronêsis cannot be forgotten.  
                                                
53 Thus the Platonic and Aristotelian notion that a good artist or craftsperson is the one who can best go 
wrong in his respective art or craft.  
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It is…clear from the context that we would not be going too far in our 
interpretation by saying that Aristotle has here come across the phenomenon of 
conscience [Gewissens]. Φρόνησις is nothing other than conscience set into 
motion, making an action transparent. Conscience cannot be forgotten. But it is 
quite possible that what is disclosed by conscience can be distorted and allowed to 
be ineffective through ἡδονή and λύπη, through the passions. Conscience always 
announces itself. (PS, 39) 
 
Interpreting phronêsis as conscience might explain how the prudent person can act well 
in a situation that has not allowed the proper time for deliberation. This interpretation 
also accounts for why phronêsis cannot be forgotten. It is key that Heidegger says 
phronêsis is conscience set into motion. Conscience is something we all have, but the 
phronimos sets it into motion in a particular way, such that the action is transparent. The 
phronimos simply sees the fact that a particular action is appropriate or inappropriate. 
Conscience announces itself and simply tells us whether or not to act in thus and such a 
way, without any process of reasoning. Conscience could also be seen as the guiding light 
for deliberation. Perhaps it illuminates the way for deliberation. Conscience calls us back 
to ourselves, and allows us to see what we can genuinely do in a given situation.  
On to Flourishing as Authenticity 
This analysis has paved the way for a discussion of Heidegger’s concept of authenticity, 
and how it may relate to Aristotle’s concept of the good life, or human flourishing. We 
have laid open the playing field with a discussion of Aristotle’s basic ethical concepts, 
and Heidegger’s interpretation of them. Again, the goal here is not to see how these 
interpretations might have inspired Heidegger’s Being and Time. Rather, we grant only 
that Heidegger used his own concepts in his interpretation of Aristotle’s ethics. Our 
interest is now to see in what ways the authentic and flourishing lives may relate to one 
another. We will, in the third chapter, reveal the ways in which a type of authenticity is 
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found in the life of character excellence. First, we must understand Heidegger’s 
authenticity on its own turf. 
 To this end, the next chapter will explore authenticity and its related concepts. 
Some of these concepts of have shown up in Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle. We 
have seen mention of being-in-the-world, being-with others, conscience, and authenticity. 
We have seen that phronêsis is a way of seeing what must be done. As logos provides for 
authentically human ways of being, we will see what the authentic life looks like in its 
own right. We will examine authenticity through the lens of the authentic self.  
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Chapter Two 
If Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics is primarily about human flourishing and the good life, 
then Heidegger’s Being and Time is primarily about an authentic way of human being. It 
is just as equally about that from which authenticity emerges—the everyday, inauthentic 
way of being. We will now explore the meaning of these ways of being. More precisely, 
we will make sure to differentiate these phenomena as they appear to the 
phenomenological observer from the way that they are lived. This important distinction 
will show that authenticity as a way of being—and it is an empty formality if it is not 
lived as a way of being—is not primarily an indivdualistic way of living. That is, the 
traditional “me versus them” conception of authenticity is rooted in the perspective of the 
phenomenologist, or the one doing the ontology, and not in the way that the authentic life 
is lived. In other words, authenticity is not primarily an individualist battle against a 
world of assimilation and conformity. 
 This warrants a note of caution. Until now, I have used the traditional 
“authenticity”, “inauthenticity,” and their cognates to render Heidegger’s terms 
Eigentlichkeit and Uneigenlichkeit. The traditional translation straightaway misleads the 
reader. We are led to believe that these terms designate the contrary of what I proposed 
above. That is, we think of the authentic life as a genuine one set over against a false or 
phony one. Heidegger, however, adhered to the etymological meaning of the German 
words. In Eigentlich (authentic), we have the root eigen. This means “own,” as in, “one’s 
own.” Thus, Eigentlichkeit is literally, “ownness” or “ownhood.” It is a way of being 
one’s own. More precisely, it is a self-appropriation. We may think this word in its 
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etymological sense as a “coming to ownness” (ad-proprius). Uneigentlichkeit, then, is the 
opposite; it is the mis-appropropriated, or disowned way of being. 
 It may be objected that “owned” and “disowned” have a similar problem to 
“authentic” and “inauthentic.” They seem also to connote one person owning up to 
himself in face of the crowd. That being the case, I will use versions of “self-
appropriation,” “owned,” “disowned,” “authentic,” “inauthentic” etc. as interchangeable 
translations for Eigentlichkeit and Uneigentlichkeit, respectively. Since we will be 
investigating these phenomena as ways of being, and thus through the lens of the self 
who lives them, I may often use “self-appropriation.”1 It is important however, that the 
reader keep in mind the meaning behind these words. We shall come to see that this 
meaning is peculiar. To come into one’s own is not to be one person against the crowd, 
but a way of being human that lives out who we simply are.  
In order to discover what authenticity is, we must look into inauthenticity. We 
will come to see that one is, according to Heidegger, either inauthentic or authentic. We 
will see who and how the inauthentic self is. This will allow us better insight into who 
and how the authentic self is.  
Inauthenticity 
The first chapter of Division I in Being and Time already provides shadings of meaning 
for authenticity and inauthenticity. Dasein—that being for whom being is an issue—has 
what Heidegger calls “mineness” (Jemeinigkeit). Thus, one must use personal pronouns 
                                                
1 Joan Stanbaugh, “An Inquiry in to Authenticity and Inauthenticity in Being and Time,” in Research in 
Phenomenology, 7 (1977): 153-161. Stanbaugh claims to look at authenticity and inauthenticity through the 
lens of the self (153), but never seems to address the problem in her paper. She does, however, give a 
helpful etymology of “authenticity.” It is, she says, rooted in the Greek autos, for “self.”  
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to designate oneself or someone else. Dasein makes decisions as to the way in which this 
mineness unfolds or plays out. Moreover, 
That entity which in its being has this very being as an issue, comports itself 
towards its being as its ownmost possibility. In each case Dasein is its possibility, 
and it ‘has’ this possibility, but not just as a property [eigenschaftlich], as 
something present-at-hand would. And because Dasein is in each case essentially 
its own possibility, it can, in its very being, ‘choose’ itself and win itself; it can 
also lose itself and never win itself; or only ‘seem’ to do so. But only in so far as 
it is essentially something which can be authentic [eigentliches]—that is, 
something of its own [zueigen]—can it have lost itself and not yet won itself. As 
modes of being, authenticity and inauthenticity (these expressions have been 
chosen terminologically in a strict sense) are both grounded in the fact that any 
Dasein whatsoever is characterized by mineness. (B&T, 68)2 
 
Here we see the introduction of authenticity and inauthenticity as ways of being for 
Dasein. We immediately see the importance of authenticity to Heidegger’s project and, as 
he claims, to human being. So far, it seems human beings can be either authentic or 
inauthentic. Either way, both modes of being are grounded in the ontological fact that 
Dasein is characterized by mineness. We shall explore further the implications of this 
mineness in both the inauthentic and authentic modes of being. 
Heidegger also identifies a third way of being outside authenticity or 
inauthenticity. This third way is the undifferentiated averageness (Durchschnittlichkeit) 
in which Dasein for the most part finds itself (B&T, 69). Heidegger says: 
At the outset of our analysis it is particularly important that Dasein should not be 
interpreted with the differentiated character of some definite way of existing, but 
that it should be uncovered in the undifferentiated character which it has 
proximally and for the most part. This undifferentiated character of Dasein’s 
everydayness is not nothing, but a positive phenomenal characteristic of this 
entity. Out of this kind of being—and back into it again—is all existing, such as it 
is. (B&T, 69) 
 
Here, Heidegger identifies the undifferentiated mode as a way for Dasein to be (Seinsart). 
Dasein is here shown to be neither authentic nor inauthentic, or differentiated. So far, it 
                                                
2 I have made slight typographical changes throughout to excerpts from Being and Time. 
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seems as though Dasein, in average everydayness, exists for the most part in an 
undifferentiated way. Otherwise, it would be difficult to see how this undifferentiated 
mode is that into and from which all existing passes.  
 Magda King immediately identifies Eigentlichkeit and Uneigentlichkeit as “the 
two most basic possibilities of existence.” Then, King claims,  
When Heidegger speaks of an ‘indifferent’ everydayness, he does not mean that 
this mode of existence ceases to be care, or that Dasein no longer exists for the 
sake of himself, let alone that he exists neither in one definite way nor in another, 
but means that the difference between an owned and disowned self does not come 
to light, it remains undifferentiated.3 
 
It is unclear here to or for whom the differentiation has not come to light. King must 
mean that a differentiated existence has not come to light for the existing Dasein. That is, 
Dasein, as it exists, can only be authentic or inauthentic, but the existing Dasein does not 
recognize this or make it a theme.4 Dasein’s daily life is for it undifferentiated and 
average. However interesting it may be, this “undifferentiated mode” quickly drops out of 
Heidegger’s treatise to leave us only with inauthenticity and authenticity. Let us now take 
a look at this everyday way of being-in-the-world. 
Being-in-the-world 
We must now indulge in a bit of textual explication. This will serve us in our analysis of 
inauthentic and authentic selfhood. Heidegger says that being-in-the-world “must be seen 
as a whole” (B&T, 78). Being-in-the-world cannot be broken up into components since 
we live it as a concrete whole. In other words, we are not at one time being and at another 
                                                
3 Magda King, A Guide to Heidegger’s Being and Time (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
2001), 40-42. 
4 This seems to accord with Robert J. Dostal’s conclusion in his article, “The Problem of ‘Indifferenz’ in 
Sein und Zeit,” International Phenomenological Society, Vol. 43, No.1 (1982), 57-58. Dostal’s article is 
somewhat tortuous and unclear, but he concludes that the “undifferentiated” is not a third way of being for 
existing Dasein, but is part of Heidegger’s “meta-existential” narrative. Therefore, “one can confidently 
assert that existence of Dasein has, on Heidegger’s account, two possible modes, not three.” 
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in the world. We can, however, theoretically explore these components to see what they 
mean, i.e., we can logically divide it up, but it is not existentially divided. These 
components are: 1. ‘in-the-world,’ 2. the ‘who’ which is-in-the-world, and 3. being-in, as 
such. The first of these deals with ‘worldhood’, and is found in chapter three of Division 
I. The second regards who Dasein is, and can be found in the fourth chapter. We shall 
primarily focus upon this second component. The third component is thoroughly 
discussed in chapter five, but we will here limit ourselves to Heidegger’s outline of it in 
chapter two.  
 Heidegger first tells us what being-in is not. Dasein is not in the world as water is 
in the glass. Nor is Dasein in the world as something merely present-at-hand, as, for 
example, a table, car or prairie. Rather, being-in is a “state of Dasein’s being” (B&T, 79). 
Heidegger then introduces a series of etymologies to suggest that being-in is a kind of 
residence or dwelling. Hubert Dreyfus says: 
What Heidegger is getting at is a mode of being-in we might call ‘inhabiting.’ 
When we inhabit something, it is no longer an object for us but becomes part of 
us and pervades our relation to other objects in the world.5 
 
Thus, we should so far understand being-in-the-world not to be something of which 
Dasein is immediately cognizant. For instance, when I am in my house, I am at home 
there. This means that I do not, for the most part, recognize the fact that I am at home. I 
am simply there, and I undertake my tasks there, relax there, think there, play there, eat 
there, etc. Being in my home is not a theme for me; it is simply a place to be. Although 
Heidegger’s being-in is quite similar to this, we must take this example carefully. Again, 
                                                
5 Hubert Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, Division I 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), 45. 
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Heidegger insists that being-in is not one entity within another (a person in a house), but 
a way or state of being, i.e., I am such that I am in a world. 
 Dasein is in its world through its involvement with it, or its concern (Besorgen). 
Dasein attends to its tasks and activities. Dasein has concern about such things. The 
concept of concern, says Heidegger, is introduced because we shall see Dasein’s being 
“made visible as care [Sorge]” (B&T, 84). Heidegger says, “being-in-the-world, as 
concern, is fascinated by [benommen] the world with which it is concerned” (B&T, 88). 
Dasein has been taken by or into the world. It seems Heidegger is playing on the 
relationship of benommen to the verb nehmen, “to take.” Dasein is “be-taken” by its 
world. This is similar to what we mean when we say we are “taken” with something or 
other. The world is that in which we thoroughly are. We are thoroughly wrapped up in 
our world through concern. Thus, being-in is akin to the spatial language we use when we 
say that we are “in love,” or “in a bind.” We are in some sense surrounded by love or 
difficulty, or we are taken in by it. Similarly, we are thoroughly in our world through our 
involvement with it. But what is the world?  
 When examining the worldhood of the world, we must examine our closeness 
with entities in our world. This closeness plays out in the general ways we go about our 
world, or our dealings or intercourse (Umgang) with it. To avoid what he sees as possible 
misunderstandings rooted in the Cartesian tradition, Heidegger avoids the word “things” 
when referring to those entities with which we deal, but instead opts for das Zeug. 
Macquarrie and Robinson translate this as “equipment,” but also note that it could be 
translated as “gear,” to show the collective meaning Heidegger attributes to it.6 Heidegger 
says, “there ‘is’ no such thing as an equipment” (B&T, 97). Those things we encounter in 
                                                
6 See footnote 1 on page 97. 
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our world do not sit solitarily without reference to anything else. “Equipment is 
essentially ‘something in-order-to’….” Equipment is always a totality of equipment, with 
each piece of equipment referring itself either to more equipment, or to its use or end.  
Equipment—in accordance with its equipmentality—always is in terms of its 
belonging to other equipment: ink-stand, pen, ink, paper, blotting pad, table, lamp, 
furniture, windows, doors, room. These ‘things’ never show themselves 
proximally as they are for themselves, so as to add up to a sum of realia and fill 
up a room. What we encounter as closest to us (though not as something taken as 
a theme) is the room; and we encounter it not as something ‘between four walls’ 
in a geometrical spatial sense, but as equipment for residing. (B&T, 97-98) 
 
When we seek the worldhood of the world, i.e., to know what the world is, we cannot 
treat the world as a sum of things. Nor can we define it in terms of theory, e.g. 
geometrically, or in terms of the natural sciences. This, according to Heidegger, is not 
how we primarily encounter or dwell in our world. If we decide to measure a room, or 
treat it as geometrical space, we do so only upon the background of and within the world 
in which we already dwell. Thus, the geometrical space of the room is what the room is 
for us geometrically, not primarily or ontologically. 
 We have already noted that equipment is characterized by its “in-order-to….” 
When, for instance, I grasp the hammer to work with it, I do not do so in a thematic way 
wherein I might robotically say, “I am now grasping the hammer, which serves the 
purpose of hammering nails.” Rather, says Heidegger, I grasp it pre-thematically in such 
a way that the hammer “could not possibly be more suitable” for the task (B&T, 98). The 
hammer is put to use, and I relate to it simply as the hammer I am using. In this way, the 
hammer, to speak as an Aristotelian, fulfills its function of hammering.7 This handiness 
(Handlichkeit) of equipment Heidegger calls the “ready-to-hand” (Zuhandenheit). 
Equipment is there ready for my handiness. When I move to the computer to type, I 
                                                
7 It could be that the “in-order-to” talk is a basic appropriation of Aristotle’s thought. 
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normally do not have this activity in mind as an explicit idea. Rather, I have my task on 
my mind, and the computer is the equipment through which I undertake my task. But the 
computer is not isolated; there is also the lamp, the books, the pens and paper that I might 
use for notes, etc. It is all there, ready for my use. Similar as ends, for Aristotle,8 are 
subordinated, so too do our “dealings with equipment subordinate themselves to the 
manifold assignments of the ‘in-order-to’” (B&T, 98).  
 How do we primarily come to recognize the worldly character (Weltmäßigkeit) of 
the world, since it is not immediately visible to us in our everyday intercourse with it? 
When equipment, which is for the most part ready-to-hand, breaks or goes missing, it 
becomes conspicuous or obtrusive. When the latter occurs, the equipment is no longer 
handy or at hand at all. In either of these cases, the equipment slips from its readiness-to-
hand, to mere presence-at-hand. It becomes the thing that is broken or missing. It now 
stands out no longer as a thing that I simply grab and use, but as something that I cannot 
presently put to its proper use. There are also times when something simply gets in the 
way of our tasks and concerns. These obstructions are those things for which we have no 
time. In any of these cases: 
The presence-at-hand which makes itself known is still bound up in the readiness-
to-hand of equipment. Such equipment does not veil itself in the guise of mere 
things. It becomes ‘equipment’ in the sense of something which one would like to 
shove out of the way. (B&T, 104) 
 
Even the presence-at-hand of equipment shows itself upon the background and within the 
context of the ready-to-hand. These two phenomena are interrelated, since presence-at-
hand cannot show itself without readiness-to-hand. The ready-to-hand, however, takes 
priority as the way we encounter equipment in the world. 
                                                
8 See the first chapter of the Nicomachean Ethics. 
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Dasein lets things be involved in its undertakings—Dasein makes way for 
equipment to do what it does, and this is always toward some end for which the 
equipment works. Dasein sets into relief the ready-to-hand by working with it.  
Dasein always assigns itself from a “for-the-sake-of-which” to the “with-which” 
of an involvement; that is to say, to the extent that it is, it always lets entities be 
encountered as ready-to-hand. (B&T, 119) 
 
The world is the setting or place in which the where-in, this assigning and for-the-sake-
of-which, plays out. “And the structure of that to which Dasein assigns itself is what 
makes up the worldhood of the world” (B&T, 119). Dasein in its concern ultimately 
makes up the worldhood of the world. In my daily undertakings and tasks, the worldhood 
of the world is set into motion, as it were. Thus, the structure of the world is one of 
meaning or significance (Bedeutung). Dasein is in the world in such a way that this world 
always has, in its structure, meaning or significance. 
Dasein, in its familiarity with significance, is the ontical condition for the 
possibility of discovering entities which are encountered in a world with 
involvement (readiness-to-hand) as their kind of being, and which can thus make 
themselves known as they are in themselves. Dasein as such is always something 
of this sort; along with its being, a context of the ready-to-hand is already 
essentially discovered: Dasein, in so far as it is, has always submitted 
[angewiesen] itself already to a ‘world’ which it encounters, and this submission 
[Angewiesenheit] belongs essentially to its being. (B&T, 121) 
 
Dasein is always situated. Or, we might say, human being is contextual. The significance 
or meaning is not something the world objectively has irrespective of my being, nor is it 
something I subjectively create. Rather, it is born of the way I constitutively am in the 
world.  
 Dasein is, further, directed towards the world and close with what is ready-to-
hand in its spatiality. The closeness of the ready-to-hand is determined primarily not by a 
measured closeness, but by my concern (B&T, 135). Something is brought close in 
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concern via my deseverence (Entfernung) and directionality (Ausrichtung). In 
deseverance, Dasein brings close that with which it deals in concern. Dasein is directed 
towards its tasks, and removes the distance between it and the task in order to undertake 
the task. Dasein is primarily in its there (Da), and understands itself here (Da) in terms of 
its there (B&T, 142). I am concerned with that, there. I bring it close so that it becomes 
this matter, here. Thus, Da-sein is literally “being-there,” and also “being-here.” I am in 
my world, and there with my concern, which is brought close to me here through my 
spatiality. In being-in-the-world, there is therefore significance. A thing matters to me, so 
I bring it close to deal properly with it. This closeness need not always be a physical 
closeness. I can think of a loved one who is miles away, and bring her close in concern, 
in thought. 
The Everyday Self 
We are thoroughly in the world, but who are we? In chapter four, Heidegger aims to 
identify who everyday Dasein is. Heidegger prepares us for this investigation with a 
discussion of the self.  
The assertion that it is I who in each case Dasein is, is ontically obvious; but this 
must not mislead us into supposing that the route for an ontological interpretation 
of what is ‘given’ in this way has thus been unmistakably prescribed. Indeed it 
remains questionable whether even the mere ontical content of the above assertion 
does proper justice to the stock of phenomena belonging to everyday Dasein. It 
could be that the “who” of everyday Dasein is just not the “I myself”. (B&T, 150) 
 
Heidegger is here warning us that the traditional concept of the self is misleading. The 
“I,” conceived as a subject remaining the same throughout its various experiences, is how 
we generally conceive ourselves. In other words, “Dasein is tacitly conceived in advance 
as something present-at-hand” (B&T, 150). We generally think it is obvious that the “I” is 
the proper “who” of who we are. This, however, is a misunderstanding. The self is 
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primarily a way of being (B&T, 153), whether this be authentic or inauthentic. If I 
understand myself as something present-at-hand, then this is already an inauthentic 
conception—or as Heidegger calls it, a “perversion” (verkehrten)—of myself (B&T, 
153). Heidegger goes on to suggest that Dasein is not what it thinks it is (“I myself”), 
even when Dasein says loudest, “I am myself” (B&T, 151). Dasein’s mineness is in part 
the very reason why Dasein is for the most part not itself. When I am not myself in this 
everyday manner, I am in such a way that I have lost myself (B&T, 152).  
 Dasein is constituted by being-in-the-world, but this being-in-the-world is always 
co-constitutive with being-with-others. Other Dasein are there with me, but not in such a 
way as to be present-at-hand or ready-to-hand. They are themselves Dasein, and are in 
the world with me (B&T, 154). When Heidegger talks about others, he does not intend, 
he says, to isolate one Dasein amongst many others. The others are those “from whom, 
for the most part, one does not distinguish oneself—those among whom one is too” 
(B&T, 154). I share the world with others, and am not isolated from them in what I do. 
Even if I choose to isolate myself by going off into the woods, I do so only upon the 
backdrop of being-with those from whom I remove myself. This removal is never a 
complete excision, but is always tethered to those with whom I primarily am. “The other 
can be missing only in and for a being-with” (B&T, 157). This being-with will become 
important in the characterization of authenticity.  
 Since being-with is not identical to being-in, but only co-constitutive with it, it 
does not operate within the realm of concern, but has its parallel in “solicitude” 
(Fürsorge). The ready-to-hand has its being through our concern with it. Being-with-
others has its being in caring for others, or solicitude. For example, providing food for my 
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family is made possible by this caring-for. However, Heidegger calls our attention to 
several deficient or “indifferent” modes of caring-for or solicitude. “Being…against, or 
without one another, passing one another by, not ‘mattering’ to one another—these are 
possible ways of solicitude” (B&T, 158). In fact, Dasein’s everyday way of being-with-
others is primarily inauthentic.9  
Dasein’s being has been “taken away by the others” (B&T, 164).10 Who, then, is 
Dasein? The who of everyday Dasein is neither this nor that particular person, nor the 
sum of all people; it is rather the inconspicuous “one” or the “they” (das Man). Heidegger 
notes the importance of using the neuter article, das, to express this (B&T, 164). As noted 
at the beginning of this section, everyday Dasein is not itself. That is, everyday Dasein is 
not its authentic self—Dasein has not yet appropriated itself from the they to come into 
its own (eigen). It is simply part of the crowd. Dasein is for the most part the anonymous 
one (Man). The being of the “I” is determined by the they, or the anonymous one. We 
might say that the they-self is not so much a who as a what.  
We must be careful to notice, however, that everyday Dasein does not recognize 
this lostness. To the everyday person, the “I” just is the self. I am myself. Yet, this “I” is 
only a designator for an anonymous “one”—everyone and no one in particular. Let us 
look at the beginning of the description of the they-self. 
We have shown earlier how in the environment which lies closest to us, the public 
‘environment’ already is ready-to-hand…In utilizing public means of transport 
and in making use of information services such as the newspaper, every other is 
like the next. This being-with-one-another dissolves [löst] one’s own [eigene] 
Dasein into the kind of Being of ‘the others’, in such a way, indeed, that the 
others, as distinguishable and explicit, vanish more and more. In this 
                                                
9 The possibility of  authentic being-with will be discussed in the fourth chapter, in conjunction with 
Aristotle’s concept of friendship. 
10 “Nicht es selbst ist, di Anderen haben ihm das Sein abgenommen” (Heidegger, 126). 
  51 
inconspiciousness and unascertainability, the real dictatorship of the “they” is 
unfolded [entfaltet das Man seine eigentliche Diktatur]. (B&T, 164)  
 
The everyday self is subsumed into its life with the others. Our being-with generally 
takes the shape of this public life. Insofar as it does, each one is just like any other. Both 
public and private realms are made possible by our basic constitution of being-with. We 
are with others in such a way so as often not even to notice it. We are released or 
dissolved into this otherness, so that the others are, in that respect, hardly other at all. The 
“I” clung to so tightly, is really no individual “I” at all. It is rather “the one,” or “the 
they.” Das Man disburdens Dasein of its being. The they “constantly accommodates the 
particular Dasein by disburdening it of its Being, [thus] the ‘they’ retains and enhances its 
stubborn dominion” (B&T, 165).  Being is made easy for us in public life. Decisions are 
made for us, and where they are not, decisions to be made are founded upon the options 
das Man provides.  
 Thus, “everyone is the other, and no one is himself” (B&T, 165). The self is not 
present-at-hand as das Man, nor is das Man itself present-at-hand. When the self 
conceives itself as present-at-hand, i.e. as a constant I-thing, it does so from out of das 
Man. “In terms of [das Man] and as [das Man], I am ‘given’ proximally to ‘myself’” 
(B&T, 167). Thus, the “I” is nothing more than a Man-selbst, a “they-self” or “one-self.” 
This self has been thoroughly dispersed (zerstreut) into das Man. This means that any 
attempt at individualism is illusory. The individual does not stand over against das Man. 
Rather the very possibility of this subject-object dichotomy is based in das Man, and its 
identity is dictated by das Man.  
 The general and everyday mode of understanding runs its course in idle talk 
(Gerede). As part of the public life of the they, idle talk understands what it talks about 
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only “approximately and superficially” (B&T, 212).11 In our common and everyday 
understanding, we all have the same thing in view.  
And because this discoursing has lost its primary relationship-of-being towards 
the entity talked about, or else has never achieved such a relationship, it does not 
communicate in such a way as to let this entity be appropriated in a primordial 
manner, but communicates rather by following the route of gossiping [Nachrede] 
and passing the word along. What is said-in-the-talk as such, spreads in wider 
circles and takes on an authoritative character. Things are so because one says so. 
Idle talk is constituted by just such gossiping and passing the word along—a 
process by which its initial lack of grounds to stand on becomes aggravated to 
complete groundlessness. (B&T, 212) 
 
In idle talk, we do not really know or understand what we are talking about, even if we 
think we do. We gossip and thoughtlessly pass the word along. Then, the shaky grounds 
upon which the talk began recede into utter groundlessness (Bodenlosigkeit). Even what 
has “been drawn from primordial sources with a struggle” is undetectable and never 
understood in everyday idle talk. Yet, idle talk creates the illusion that it understands 
everything. The more we find out or hear about something, the more we talk about it. All 
this talk leads us to think we understand and are privy to the facts. Ultimately, idle talk, 
encouraged by the public, “releases one from the task of genuinely understanding…[by] 
perverting [verkehrt] the act of disclosing into an act of closing off” (B&T, 213). Just as 
one is sure that “I am myself,” so too is one sure that one knows what one is talking 
about. In fact, one may talk a lot about oneself, without any understanding of what this 
means. 
 Das Man also gives birth to the ubiquitous desire to see what is new.12 This is 
Neugier, or what has been translated as “curiosity.” This traditional translation does not 
                                                
11 We here move past Heidegger’s treatment of understanding, interpretation, state of mind, and discourse, 
since these are not essential to the thrust of our argument. This works well since Heidegger himself 
recognizes the interlude: “In going back to the existential structures of the disclosedness of Being-in-the-
world, our Interpretation has, in a way, lost sight of Dasein’s everydayness” (B&T, 210). It is this 
‘everydayness’ upon which we must here focus. 
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get at the heart of the German word, which literally means “craving the new.” This 
craving does not wish to see in order to understand, but simply to jump from one novelty 
to the next. “In this kind of seeing, that which is an issue for care does not lie in grasping 
something and being knowingly in the truth; it lies rather in its possibilities of 
abandoning itself to the world” (B&T, 216). This craving for novelty is essentially a 
distraction, and is dictated by idle talk (B&T, 216-217). This leads into ambiguity, or 
Zweideutigkeit (literally, “double meaningness”). This is where “everything looks as if it 
were genuinely understood, genuinely taken hold of, genuinely spoken, though at bottom 
it is not” (B&T, 217). One thinks one knows exactly what is going on, but the matter has 
not been genuinely understood.  
 So it is that Dasein is fallen in its world. That is, one is absorbed in the world. 
Dasein has fallen away from itself, and is spread out into its world, and into das Man. 
Everyday existence is characterized by fallenness, and a tempting tranquillization. One 
becomes entangled (verfängt) in oneself, which is to say one is entangled in das Man. We 
see, then, just how murky inauthentic selfhood is. This is precisely where we think we 
have understood ourselves most. We think we know ourselves. Yet, we know ourselves 
only as objects. We do not understand that we never have been a thing present-at-hand, 
and never will be. We are either dispersed into das Man, or gathered into our proper 
(authentic) way of being. Let us now investigate this possibility of authenticity. 
Authenticity 
We have had to spend time upon inauthentic Dasein because, as Heidegger tells us, 
authentic Dasein is only “a modified way in which such everydayness is seized upon” 
                                                                                                                                            
12 The discussion of “seeing” will be important in the final chapter regarding contemplation. 
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(B&T, 224). He tells us that authentic Dasein does not transcend everyday fallenness. 
Heidegger is here attempting to avoid a picture of a super-Dasein who is able to escape 
fully the possibility of being a they-self. The authentic self does not entirely transcend the 
they, but modifies its own way of living.  
Being Towards Death 
Heidegger’s concept of authenticity relies upon his conception of death and its meaning 
for human being. Dasein, Heidegger tells us, has the character of the “not-yet.” We are in 
such a way that we are not-yet. 
Our problem does not pertain to getting into our grasp the “not-yet” which is of 
the character of Dasein; it pertains to the possible being or not-being of this “not-
yet.” Dasein must, as itself, become—that is to say, be—what it is not yet. (B&T, 
287) 
 
Dasein’s being is its becoming. Heidegger emphasizes here that we are not attempting 
simply to know about this not-yet, but to see it as a way of being. Dasein, as the not-yet, 
is not properly understood as a process toward completeness or fulfillment in death. 
Rather, Dasein “is its ‘not-yet’ constantly as long as it is, it is already its end too” (B&T, 
289). Dasein is its end by being-towards-the-end (Sein-zum-Ende). “Death is a way to be, 
which Dasein takes over as soon as it is” (B&T, 289). Thus, an ontological understanding 
of death is the foundation upon which any other questions concerning death can be 
properly founded, e.g., questions of “what may be after death” (B&T, 289). 
 Heidegger now takes us through a kind of dialectic—the authentic and inauthentic 
approaches to, and understanding of, death. First, we see an authentic characterization of 
death. 
Death is a possibility-of-being [Seinsmöglichkeit] which Dasein itself has to take 
over in every case. With death, Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost 
potentiality-for-being (eigensten Seinkönnen)…Its death is the possibility of no-
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longer being-able-to-be-there (Nicht-mehr-dasein-könnens). If Dasein stands 
before itself as this possibility, it has been fully assigned to its ownmost 
potentiality-for-being. (B&T, 294) 
 
We see again that death is a possibility of being. This possibility of death is something we 
can only experience in life. Heidegger’s ontology is one of human being, and it is 
precisely in our being where we must confront death, no matter how mysterious such a 
confrontation might be. Mortals are constantly faced with the possibility of no longer 
being. Being is the only grounds upon which we can have anything to say about death, 
i.e., by granting that we have the real possibility of no longer being. 
Paul Edwards has difficulty calling death a possibility in Heidegger’s sense of the 
word. Edwards thinks Heidegger is merely speaking incoherently, oddly, or ponderously 
when he uses “possibility” in the way that he does. Heidegger says the possibility of 
death can be genuinely understood as “the possibility of the impossibility of any existence 
at all” (B&T, 307). Curiously, death, understood as possibility, “gives Dasein nothing to 
be ‘actualized’, nothing which Dasein, as actual, could itself be” (B&T, 307). Edwards 
complains, “the total absence of experiences and behaviour is most emphatically not what 
we mean by ‘possibility’ in any of its ordinary senses.”13 Edwards claims Heidegger’s 
use of “possibility” is “altogether superfluous,” since “What makes death a ‘non-
actuality’ and thus a ‘possibility’ in [Heidegger’s] strange special sense is the 
impossibility of every way of existing.”14 Edwards continues: 
It is ‘possible’ but not certain that I will die five years from now. Heidegger is 
very definitely not using ‘possible’ in this sense when characterizing death as a 
possibility. For Heidegger repeatedly insists—quite rightly, though not very 
originally—that death is a certainty and not just a possibility in this sense.15 
 
                                                
13 Paul Edwards, “Heidegger and Death as ‘Possibility,’” Oxford Journals:Mind, vol. 84 (1975): 548-566. 
14 Edwards, Possibility, 558. 
15 Edwards, Possibility, 558. 
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While Edwards is, I believe, incorrect here, his remarks are telling. He recognizes that 
Heidegger would grant this use of “possibility,” although not as an authentic 
characterization of death. It is, in fact, the way “the one” normally thinks of death as 
certain. One thinks death is certain, and that it is inevitable that one will die one day.16 
This is usually coupled with the assumption that “one day” means, “but not now.” “The 
one” has forgotten or covered over the fact “that [death] is possible at any moment” 
(B&T, 302). In an authentic certainty of death, the indefiniteness of death’s “when” is 
recognized. Das Man, on the other hand, hides this indefiniteness by making death 
definite, as if death could be controlled. Really, however, the possibility of death is the 
possibility that at any moment I may no longer be. It is a possibility that strips one of all 
other possibilities, and once one “is” dead, there is nothing able to be actualized since 
actualization is a process of being.  
Edwards has missed the fact that death is certain, but when death will come is 
indefinite. Not only is it possible that “I will die five years from now,” but it is just as 
possible (even if it is unlikely) that I will die five minutes from now. Indeed, the nature of 
this sort of possibility is strange, and perhaps bewildering. But I argue that it is the 
possibility itself that is strange, and not Heidegger’s use of “possibility.” Ultimately, 
Edwards agrees with Heidegger’s characterization of death as nothingness, or the ceasing 
of any way of existing, but has qualms with Heidegger’s use of “possibility.” “Heidegger 
is not wrong, but perverse.” Let us see if we can come to a more sensible interpretation of 
“possibility.” 
The possibility of death is rooted in our very being. It is sensible to say, “I may 
die at any time.” Here is where the strangeness comes into play, and I do not think 
                                                
16 See section 52 in Being and Time. 
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Heidegger would deny it. It is possible that I may at any moment die, but when I am 
dead, there is nothing actual for me. I am not actualizing any possibility in death, since 
the very “I” is altogether removed in death. This “I,” whether authentic, inauthentic, or 
otherwise, gets its shape from being in the world. Death takes this being away, and so the 
“I” loses its very being, or its “I-ness,” so to speak. If the being of the “I” is removed, 
there is no actualization of anything since an actualization is a kind of being. If Edwards 
agrees that death is the cessation of any way of existing, then he must also agree that 
there is nothing to be actualized in death. Yet, it would be absurd not to admit—or to say 
that it is not possible—that one may die at any given moment. The “when” is indefinite, 
but that death will happen, is certain. So there is nothing wrong with Heidegger’s use of 
possibility. It seems Edwards qualm must be taken up with the possibility of death itself. 
In short, the possibility of the impossibility of being does not mean that I will be actually 
dead (perhaps only an outside, still-existing party can says so), but that my death is the 
possibility of no longer being. 
 Since death belongs to who we are, we can recognize it or, as Heidegger says, we 
can stand before it. In doing so, he says, we are assigned our ownmost potentiality-for-
being. But, as is apparent by what Heidegger says, we need not stand before our ownmost 
possibility; we can ignore it or shirk it. This is just what everyday Dasein does. Death is 
generally taken as simply an other event. “Dasein puts itself in the position of losing itself 
in the ‘they’ as regards a distinctive potentiality-for-being which belongs to Dasein’s 
ownmost Self. The ‘they’ gives its approval, and aggravates the temptation to cover up 
from oneself one’s ownmost being-towards-death…In this manner the ‘they’ provides a 
constant tranquillization about death” (B&T, 298). In the face of death, even if it is 
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someone else’s, we want to make the situation comfortable. Whether or not this is a fault 
is not the point. It does mean that we generally do not approach death with a genuine 
understanding of it. 
 In authentic (eigentlich) being-towards-death, which plays out in anticipation 
(Vorlaufen), Dasein confronts death as its ownmost (eigenste) possibility. In anticipation, 
“Dasein can have wrenched itself away from the ‘they’ and become its own” (B&T, 307). 
Authentic Dasein, which understands itself in its ownmost potentiality-for-being, is no 
longer caught in the throes of the they—it is itself. Death is what individuates each 
Dasein.  
The non-relational character of death…individualizes Dasein down to itself 
(vereinzelt das Dasein auf es selbst). This individualizing…makes manifest that 
all being-alongside the things with which we concern ourselves, and all being-
with others, will fail us when our ownmost potentiality-for-being is the issue. 
Dasein can be authentically itself only if it makes this possible for itself of its own 
accord. (B&T, 308) 
 
In anticipation of, or running towards, its ownmost possibility, Dasein becomes its own. 
Dasein must, of its own accord, take itself over from das Man by projecting its ownmost 
potentiality-for-Being, which is shown through anticipation. This is the criterion for 
authenticity.  
 We need not take Heidegger to be advocating or describing hermetic 
individualism.17 If we notice Heidegger’s qualification, “when our ownmost potentiality-
for-being is the issue,”18 we see that we need not take an individualist reading of 
“individualization.” When authentic Dasein takes over its potentiality for being, and 
chooses a certain path of action in accord with it, it is true that only the chooser can make 
                                                
17 See again Dostal’s “The Problem of Indifferenz,” 55-56. Dostal takes a different route to a similar 
conclusion in addressing this issue.  
18 wenn es um das eigenste Seinkönnen geht. 
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the choice. But the course of action that plays out accordingly may involve others, and 
will likely involve things with which we generally concern ourselves, even if these things 
are no longer of primary concern. Thus, Heidegger goes on to say:  
if concern and solicitude fail us, this does not signify at all that these ways of 
Dasein have been cut off from its authentically being-its-self. As structures 
essential to Dasein’s constitution, these have a share in conditioning the 
possibility of any existence whatsoever. Dasein is authentically itself only to the 
extent that, as concernful being-alongside and solicitous being-with, it projects 
itself upon its ownmost potentiality-for-being rather than upon the possibility of 
the they-self. (B&T, 308)   
 
Thus, Dasein is still constituted as a being who is alongside its world and solicitous, but 
when we are faced with our ownmost potentiality for being via a confrontation with 
death, concern and solicitude do not come to our aid in appropriating our mortality, and 
thus, in becoming authentic. 
 Since, as we have seen, death is certain, but the when is indefinite, Heidegger tells 
us that a threat is thus opened up to Dasein. 
Dasein opens itself to a constant threat arising out of its own ‘there’. In this very 
threat being-towards-the-end must maintain itself. So little can it tone this down 
that it must rather cultivate the indefiniteness of the certainty.  (B&T, 310)   
 
This threat is disclosed in the mood of anxiety (angst). Anxiety is the state-of-mind 
(Befindlichkeit), or the way one finds oneself, in which Dasein can cultivate (ausbilden) 
this indefiniteness of the certainty of death. In being-towards-death, we are anxious. But 
das Man “perverts anxiety into cowardly (feige) fear,” so Dasein must, ostensibly, hold 
itself authentically before death in anxiety (B&T, 311).  
 In Dasein’s individualized and anxious state, it is in an “impassioned freedom 
towards death” (B&T, 311). Dasein is here free because it has been “released from the 
illusions of the ‘they’.” Heidegger next searches for that which “gives testimony” 
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(Zeugnis gibt) to a possible authentic existence, “so that it not only makes known that in 
an existentiell manner such authenticity is possible, but demands [fordert] this of itself” 
(B&T, 311). Dasein’s possible authenticity still needs a phenomenal basis to which 
Dasein itself attests.  
Conscience, Guilt, and Resoluteness  
So far, authenticity has been seen only in its ontological possibility. Being-towards-death 
is the ontological condition for the possibility of being one’s own self. This plays out 
phenomenally in the call of conscience.19 Dasein is lost in das Man, and must be called 
back to itself so that it may choose (wählen) its authentic potentiality-for-being (B&T, 
313). Who calls and who is called? The answer in both cases is Dasein. Dasein, in the 
uncanniness (Unheimlichkeit) of anxiety, calls to the Dasein who is lost in das Man. The 
call summons Dasein to being guilty (schuldig). What is guilt? Heidegger defines guilt as 
being the basis for a “nullity” (Nichtigkeit). To be the basis for a nullity means “never to 
have power over one’s ownmost Being from the ground up” (B&T, 330). We are 
essentially a not. We are, according to Heidegger, constitutively possibility. “In having a 
potentiality-for-being, [Dasein] always stands in one possibility or another: it constantly 
is not other possibilities” (B&T, 331). Not only will we never have complete control over 
our being (we did not, after all, choose to be born), but we can only actualize one 
possibility at a time, while not actualizing others. 
Dasein is called back to the “stillness of itself,” away from the noise of idle talk, 
into its ownmost potentiality-for-being. Thus, Dasein wants to have a conscience, since it 
willingly takes over for itself its own guilt. The state of mind corresponding to this is 
                                                
19 See Stanbaugh, “Inquiry,” 156-159. Stanbaugh makes this helpful distinction: phenomenology is 
Heidegger’s method, but ontology allows us to see the fundamental structures of being, i.e., the conditions 
for the possibilities of ways of being. 
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anxiety. Thus, “this reticent self-projection upon one’s ownmost being-guilty, in which 
one is ready for anxiety—we call ‘resoluteness’” (B&T, 343). Resolute Dasein is resolved 
to being what it is—it is ready to hear the call of conscience and take upon itself its own 
guilt, its own not-ness.20 Resolute Dasein opens up for itself the “situation” (Situation). In 
the situation, Dasein can authentically see what it must be (B&T, 346). Thus, 
“resoluteness, as authentic being-one’s-self, does not detach Dasein from its world…[but] 
brings the self right into its current concernful Being-alongside what is ready-to-hand, 
and pushes it into solicitous being with others” (B&T, 344). The authentic self is 
thoroughly in the world, but with a new perspective. It sees the world anew, as it is. 
Heidegger emphasizes the worldliness, so to speak, of resoluteness. When 
resolute, or as authentically being oneself: 
the ‘world’ which is ready-to-hand does not become another one ‘in its content’, 
nor does the circle of others get exchanged for a new one; but both one’s being 
towards the ready-to-hand understandingly and concernfully, and one’s solicitous 
being with others, are now given a definite character in terms of their ownmost 
potentiality-for-being-their-selves. (B&T, 344) 
 
Resoluteness frees Dasein for its world (B&T, 344). We may here think of the etymology 
of “resolute.” The Latin verb solvo, from which we get “solve” and “solvent,” means to 
“free” or “loosen.” Thus, to resolve, or be resolute, means not to adhere stubbornly to an 
ideal. Rather, to be resolute means to be open and free.21 The world does not change in 
                                                
20 King, Guide, 196. King helpfully reminds us of the ambiguity of resoluteness, or Entschlossenheit. 
“Heidegger’s word means both resoluteness and utmost disclosedness. The ambivalence is essential, for it 
expresses that the authentic mode of care is the most original truth of existence, and that this can concretize 
itself only in the resolute choice on the part of a factically existing Dasein.” 
21 See Michael Inwood’s A Heidegger Dictionary (Malden, Oxford, and Carlton: Blackwell Publishing, 
1999), 186-187. “Schliessen means ‘to close, shut, fasten, etc.’ and also ‘to infer’ i.e. to join in thought to 
what precedes’. The prefix ent- indicates opposition or separation. Hence entschliessen originally meant ‘to 
open, unlock’. But by the sixteenth century the reflexive sich entschliessen meant ‘to decide, reach a 
decision’, ‘i.e. unlock one’s mind, clarify, make definite one’s thoughts’…The perfect participle 
entschlossen was used for ‘resolute’ and Entschluss for ‘decision, resolution’…erschliessen means ‘to 
disclose’…[Thus] ‘Resoluteness [Entschlossenheit] is a distinctive mode of Dasein’s disclosedness 
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authentic resolve, but the authentic person is changed in her being. The authentic person 
is self-appropriated and directed toward the world in such a way as to take hold of her 
course in it. Thus, “only by authentically being-their-selves in resoluteness can people 
authentically be with one another” (B&T, 344).  
The ordinary or Vulgär interpretation of conscience places conscience within the 
moral realm. It speaks of a good and bad conscience. In either case, says Heidegger, we 
have not reached the real, primordial phenomenon of conscience and being guilty. The 
common (mis)understanding of conscience also tries to thrust it into the practical realm. 
We miss a ‘positive’ content in that which is called, because we expect to be told 
something currently useful about assured possibilities of ‘taking action’ which are 
available and calculable. This expectation has its basis within the horizon of that 
way of interpreting which belongs to common-sense concern—a way of 
interpreting which forces Dasein’s existence to be subsumed under the idea of a 
business procedure that can be regulated. Such expectations (and in part these 
tacitly underlie even the demand for a material ethic of value as contrasted with 
one that is ‘merely’ formal) are of course disappointed by conscience. The call of 
conscience fails to give any ‘practical’ injunctions, solely because it summons 
Dasein to existence, to its ownmost potentiality-for-being-its-self. (B&T, 340) 
 
Common-sense is too common to see the real and exceptional phenomenon of 
conscience. In our commonness, we want hard results that we can see and feel. In fact, 
we may even wish for practical injunctions or prescriptions. Thus, we mistakenly 
interpret conscience as the voice that directs us toward concrete results. However, 
Heidegger tells us that the only function of conscience is to summon Dasein to its 
potentiality for being itself. But, Heidegger goes on to say, “to hear the call authentically, 
signifies bringing oneself into a factical taking-action” (B&T, 341).22 If the call only 
                                                                                                                                            
[Erschlossenheit].” We often tend to think of resolution as being a static, solid way of being. If I am 
resolved to do something, I may think of myself as immovable in that respect. However, we see that resolve 
is rather an openness to and for what is.  
22 Den Ruf eigentlich hören bedeutet, sich in das faktische Handeln bringen.  
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summons Dasein to its being, with no practical injunction, how can it at the same time 
bring Dasein to act?  
 Heidegger uses “act,” or Handeln, more than once. “The authentic understanding 
of the call has been characterized as ‘wanting to have a conscience’. This is a way of 
letting one’s ownmost self take action in itself of its own accord in its being-guilty…” 
(B&T, 342). To understand oneself in a potentiality-for-being, means that one must 
understand potential ways to be. This plays out authentically in the “situation.” To 
understand potential ways to be is to understand which course of action to take. But this 
does not mean that conscience is primarily that which gives practical injunctions. It may 
be that conscience only makes one ready to act in the practical, concrete world.23 
 Again, in reference to resoluteness, Heidegger speaks of taking action. But this 
time, he voices reservations about the term. 
…resoluteness can hardly be confused with an empty ‘habitus’ or an indefinite 
‘velleity’. Resoluteness does not first take cognizance of a situation and put that 
situation before itself; it has put itself into that situation already. As resolute, 
Dasein is already taking action. The term ‘take action’ is one which we are 
purposely avoiding…it suggests a misunderstanding in the ontology of Dasein, as 
if resoluteness were a special way of behaviour belonging to the practical faculty 
as contrasted with one that is theoretical. (B&T, 347) 
 
 Resoluteness appears here not to be an empty structure which allows for action; it is 
already firmly planted within the realm of action. Heidegger is trying here to avoid a 
divided Dasein, i.e., the division of praxis and theory. He is not altogether denying such a 
division, but rather denying it as fundamentally ontological. Thus, he goes on to say: 
Care…as concernful solicitude, so primordially and wholly envelops Dasein’s 
being that it must already be presupposed as a whole when we distinguish 
                                                
23 King, Guide, 194. King suggests that conscience (and Heidegger’s characterization of human being in 
general) is ethical, contrary to Heidegger’s insistence that it is not. “It would seem, then, that in summoning 
Da-sein to a decision about how he is to be, conscience itself gives him his first ‘ought’.” While it may lead 
to ethical situations, conscience in itself need not be ethical.  
  64 
between theoretical and practical behaviour…Resoluteness…is only that 
authenticity which, in care, is the object of care, and which is possible as care—
the authenticity of care itself. (B&T, 347-348) 
 
 Because Dasein is care, it is care that first gives rise to any theory-praxis distinction. 
Care runs its course in the world. Thus, authenticity or resoluteness does not remove 
Dasein from the world of action, even if conscience does not offer practical injunctions.  
When conscience calls us back to ourselves, it calls us back to the real fact that 
we are. We see ourselves as mortals. In this gathering of ourselves, we are able to act 
resolutely. By seeing that I am the sort of being who may cease to be at any moment, the 
moment or situation may be made clearer. I see that not only I, but also this context in 
which I currently am, is not everlasting, and I may then be able to choose reasonably—or 
simply to see—what it is I will do. So, conscience calls Dasein back to itself, and 
resoluteness allows Dasein to be and act authentically in its world. Although conscience 
gives no practical orders or injunctions, it still allows for Dasein to be ready to act. To be 
authentic, then, Dasein must listen to the call of conscience and resolutely respond to it. 
The response is action. Thus, authenticity is carried out in the practical world through a 
resolute response to the call of conscience. One now acts as oneself because one has 
taken over his own potentiality-for-being, and has resolutely actualized it.  
But what or who is this authentic self who acts? 
The Authentic Self 
We have seen that the Man-selbst is constituted by idle chatter, craving novelty, and 
ambiguity. This gives rise to the illusion that it is itself. It gives rise to the illusion that the 
self is a point called the “I” or “me.” But who is the authentic self? As suggested earlier, 
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the they-self is not so much the everyday who of Dasein as the what. In authenticity, 
Dasein becomes its own self, but who is the authentic self?  
When the they-self is appealed to, it gets called to the self. But it does not get 
called to that self which can become for itself an ‘object’ on which to pass 
judgment, nor to that self which inertly dissects its ‘inner life’ with fussy 
curiosity, nor to that self which one has in mind when one gazes ‘analytically’ at 
psychical conditions and what lies behind them. The appeal to the self in the they-
self does not force it inwards upon itself, so that it can close itself off from the 
‘external world’. The call passes over everything like this and disperses it, so as to 
appeal solely to that self which, notwithstanding, is in no other way than Being-
in-the-world. (B&T, 318) 
 
The authentic self, through resolution and being ready for her being, realizes (makes real 
for herself) her being through resolute action, but this is only after she has come face to 
face with the sheer fact that she is.24 What the authentic self first sees is that it is (B&T, 
321). When one comes back to oneself, the self is beyond all inauthentic conceptions of 
selfhood. It sees first that it is. As such, it is now authentically ready to be in the world by 
owning up to its being—a being that it can never fully own or control. 
 Authenticity brings one to oneself, but this self is not a thing, substance, or store 
of psychological content. We recall that when Dasein says “I” loudest, this is precisely 
when it is not itself at all (B&T, 151). So who is the authentic self? The authentic self is 
care. “The being of Dasein means ahead-of-itself-already-being-in-(the-world) as being-
alongside (entities-encountered-within-the-world)” (B&T, 237). The being of Dasein is 
care, and care plays out temporally. In authenticity, Dasein is ahead of itself (being-
towards-death), but already in a world, and being-alongside entities in that world, 
                                                
24 King, Guide, 197. “Now, what happens when the lost ‘oneself’ is summoned by conscience and the call 
is resolutely answered? Apparently, nothing happens; the factical world in which Da-sein lives is not 
changed, his daily occupations, his circle of friends and acquaintances are not exchanged for others, and yet 
his care-taking being-near-to things and his caring-for being-with others are now primarily determined not 
by the possibilities prescribed by ‘them,’ but from the resolutely grasped possibilities of his own self.” We 
shall see that this “own self” is not what we might immediately think. 
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whether in concern or solicitude. When one hears and properly responds to the call of 
conscience, one is then ready to be in the world. Rather than shirking one’s being, the 
authentic self now takes up who it already is by looking ahead to its ownmost potentiality 
for being.  
 In the first instance, authentic Dasein is itself. The self has been, under 
Heidegger’s determination, removed from the dictatorship of the they, and is now 
individuated before its own death. The self has been recalled to itself by the calling of 
conscience. We already saw that inauthentic Dasein thinks it knows itself. Inauthentic 
Dasein can easily point out numerous things that it is, and just as many things it desires or 
things by which it is pleased. Dasein thinks it knows itself, and is most sure of this when 
it says, “I.” It is this “I” that Dasein claims to know. For Heidegger, this “I” is dictated by 
das Man, i.e., the content of the “I” is all of the involvements of the Man-selbst. This 
amounts to an objectification of the self as a thing present-at-hand in the world. 
 The authentic self, according to Heidegger, is the self who no longer says “I” 
loudly. The self-knowledge available in authenticity is not the knowing of a self as a 
thing. 
We choose this term [i.e. transparency] to designate “knowledge of the self” in a 
sense which is well understood, so as to indicate that here it is not a matter of 
perceptually tracking down and inspecting a point called the “self,” but rather one 
of seizing upon the full disclosedness of being-in-the-world throughout all the 
constitutive items which are essential to it…In existing, entities [see] ‘themselves’ 
only in so far as they have become transparent to themselves in equal 
primordiality in those items which are constitutive for their existence: their being-
alongside the world and their being-with Others. (B&T, 186-187) 
 
Seizing upon oneself means seizing upon care. Calling the self “care” is not an 
objectification. It rather signifies a way of being. Just as the Man-selbst is dispersed into 
das Man, the authentic self is a distention of temporal being in the world. The authentic 
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self just is care, and this means that it is ahead of itself, already in the world, and with 
others in that world. Authentic Dasein is not divorced from the world, but thoroughly in 
it. Self-appropriation is becoming who one most basically is. It is a readiness to be, and 
this being plays out temporally. “As something that keeps silent, authentic being-one’s-
self is just the sort of thing that does not keep on saying ‘I’; but in its reticence it ‘is’ that 
thrown entity as which it can authentically be” (B&T, 369-370). The self is literally no-
thing, but rather a way of being. Heidegger emphasizes “being” here to show that the self 
is not making authenticity a cognizant theme, but is rather being authentic as care.  
Resoluteness operates in silence. This return to the self in silence is characterized 
by “stillness” (Stille). While keeping silent does dispel idle talk, it is not the same thing as 
being dumb. “Keeping silent authentically is possible only in genuine discoursing” (B&T, 
208). Authentic Dasein has something to say. Perhaps we might say that authentic Dasein 
has something worth saying, i.e., it has “an authentic and rich disclosedness of itself” 
(B&T, 208). In authenticity, we no longer identify ourselves as what we do, desire, like, 
dislike, etc. We are simply beings already thrown into a world, alongside entities therein 
(via concern and solicitude), in anticipation of our death. We are a temporal, dynamic 
movement. When this is understood, Dasein does not have much to say about itself, 
because the self is no longer identified by the “me” or “I.” The “I” is not a thing, as das 
Man would have us believe. The silence of resoluteness derives from the fact that, as 
care, Dasein does not see itself as a particularized “me,” identified by typical, everyday 
modes of understanding. The self that is known is not an object, but being-towards death, 
already being-in-the-world, and being-with others. 
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Let us recall that, as resolute, Dasein is already acting. As resolute, we are open 
and free, and can see what is to happen in the situation. We are thoroughly in the 
situation, just as we are in the world. The resolute and authentic self is absorbed into the 
situation, as everyday Dasein is absorbed and taken in by its world. The difference is this: 
everyday, inauthentic Dasein is taken in by its world in such a way so as not to see it for 
what it is. Everyday Dasein operates in such a way that its being as care is covered over. 
Authentic, resolute Dasein, on the other hand, is absorbed knowingly into the situation. 
This knowing is not a thematic knowing. That is, Dasein does not step back, as if looking 
at itself in the situation from a distance. Rather, it sees from within the situation what is 
to be done. Through care, resolute Dasein is open and directed toward the world. Dasein 
becomes free for the world so as thoroughly to be in it, without being swept off its feet by 
it. 
What Authenticity Is and Is Not 
Theodor Adorno saw Heidegger’s formulation of authenticity, and its insistence on 
mineness, or a reclamation of the self from the they, as empty and formal. Authenticity 
“takes its directive, beyond real states of affairs, from the highly formal sense of 
belonging to oneself.”25 Thus: 
The societal relation, which seals itself off in the identity of the subject, is de-
societalized into an in-itself. The individual, who himself can no longer rely on 
any firm possession, holds on to himself in his extreme abstractness as the last, 
the supposedly unlosable possession.26  
 
In the movement of authenticity, i.e., the movement away from the they-self or public 
life, the self becomes sealed in by its own mineness—a mineness that belongs to any 
                                                
25 Adorno, Jargon, 115. 
26 Adorno, Jargon, 115. 
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Dasein and just is the character of any Dasein. This universality empties Dasein of its 
content. Therefore, Adorno goes on to say, “By it [authenticity] the living subject is 
robbed of all definition, in the same way as it loses its attributes in reality.”27  
The individualization in the face of death is only this: one comes face to face with 
one’s being as care. This means that the self is no longer conceived as a thing, or as das-
Man conceives it. The individualization is not a process of returning “into oneself.” There 
is no self to hold onto as a “firm possession.” In fact, authentic selfhood is a letting go of 
the self—the self as it is normally conceived. Authentic selfhood lets go of ways of 
conceiving itself. The self is not a concept. To get beyond the Man-selbst is to get beyond 
the concern with oneself as a thing. Authentic selfhood is spread out into dynamic, 
temporal being, rather than selfhood dispersed into misunderstanding, confusion, and 
entanglements. That is, authentic selfhood is the thrownness of its past and the not-yet of 
its future, all of which makes up the present moment.To call the self “care” is not an 
empty abstraction, if we understand how care temporally unfolds, i.e. how care is. 
Understanding the self as care does not “rob the living subject of definition,” because the 
self is no longer conceived as subject. There is no subject to be defined. Rather, there is a 
life to be lived, and this happens concretely in the world with others. 
Again, in authenticity, self-conception drops out of the picture. What is left is 
being there in the situation. Oddly, the self-appropriation of authenticity is a letting go of 
all self-conception. The authentic self, in other words, no longer conceives of itself. 
Being released from self-conception is being released from the ways in which one 
typically identifies oneself. That is, one typically conceives of oneself on the basis of 
being a they-self. Heidegger pushes past all self-conception in his formulation of 
                                                
27 Adorno, Jargon, 122. 
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authenticity. It may seem paradoxical that the authentic self, one’s own self, is beyond 
conceptions of particularity and individuality. This need not mean that “the individual” 
(whatever this may mean) is lost. Rather, it is that the authentic self’s concern is directed 
elsewhere. 
Another possible problem has been raised by Hermen Philipse. We opened this 
section on authenticity by saying that authentic Dasein does not escape from das Man, 
since the authentic self is only a modification of the Man-selbst. Yet, does not 
authenticity move past das Man? Philipse thinks there lurks a “persistent contradiction or 
tension” here.28 “Heidegger on the one hand stresses that we cannot free ourselves from 
the One or Everyman, and on the other hand claims that we have to liberate ourselves 
from it in order to become authentic.”29 There is tension, thinks Philipse, with the idea 
that the Man-selbst is the self thoroughly involved in its cultural setting, and it is only in 
and from this setting that one could be responsible for oneself.30 But, Philipse thinks, 
authenticity is defined as the opposite of das Man.31  
We recall Dasein becomes itself, which is not its they-self, while still being-in-
the-world. In fact, authentic Dasein is in-the-world, but in an authentic way. Authentic 
Dasein is not separate from das Man so as to have severed all ties with it. Rather, Dasein 
is only separate insofar as its self is no longer a Man-selbst. Das man is passed over in 
becoming one’s own, but this “does not by any means signify that the ‘they’ is not 
reached too. Precisely in passing over the ‘they’…the call pushes it into insignificance” 
(B&T, 317). Thus, authentic Dasein is not liberated from das Man in such a way as to be 
                                                
28 Herman Philipse, Heidegger’s Philosophy of Being: A Critical Interpretation (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1998), 27. 
29 Philipse, Philosophy, 27. 
30 Philipse, Philosophy, 27. 
31 Philipse, Philosophy, 27. 
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entirely unrelated to it. Rather, it is related insofar as it is sees the they and its they-self—
which still lurks as a possibility of being even for authentic Dasein, via the temptation of 
the they—as insignificant.  
 For us, the ones doing phenomenology, we see that the authentic self is not a 
Man-selbst. Phrased in this way, it seems authenticity entails a “me versus them” battle. 
It seems the authentic self is a self against the world. However, this is how it appears to 
us, the ones describing the phenomena. For the authentic person, however, who lives 
concretely in the world, and who is care, he is not a Man-selbst. The emphasis on the “is” 
here means that, as care, the authentic person is unconcerned with das Man. Das Man, as 
Heidegger says, has become meaningless or insignificant [Bedeutungslosigkeit]. The 
authentic person is simply unconcerned with das Man. Das Man is not something to be 
overcome for the authentic person. For the authentic person, as authentic, das Man is not 
a theme or a point of consideration at all.  
 We see now that the mineness of authenticity cannot entail a “me versus them” 
mentality. If it were to do so, then the self would be conceived all over again as a thing. It 
would be conceived as a subject set over against an object. Or, we may even say that the 
self as subject is objectified. This, however, is a disowned or inauthentic understanding of 
selfhood. The self as care has gotten beyond individualism. We say that this is beyond 
individualism since care is what human being most fundamentally is, and since it is 
unconcerned with being an individual. This, however, does not preclude individuation. 
From the phenomenological perspective, it is this whole, embodied being who takes over 
his own being as care, but he does not make individuation a theme. His projects and 
relationships will naturally take on their own particular flavors, but they will be based in 
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that which is common to all—care.32 The owned self is owning up to being—the fact that 
he is, that he is mortal, and in a world with others. The ownership here is not one of 
owning a thing called the self. There is no self-possession in that sense. Rather one owns 
up to being as care, and this entails the understanding that one is never fully in control of 
one’s being.  
As care, Dasein is absorbed into the world, and is directed toward what must be 
done, and also directed toward others. As care, Dasein gets beyond the particularized, 
objectified self. We must remember that this plays out temporally. “In resoluteness, the 
present is not only brought back from distraction with the objects of one’s closest 
concern, but it gets held in the future and in having been” (B&T, 387). This way of being 
in the present—a present released by the future and having been—is the Augenblick, or a 
way of truly seeing what is at hand. It is understood “in an active sense as ecstasis [im 
aktiven Sinne als Ekstase]” (B&T, 387). This is why resolute Dasein is “carried away” in 
the situation. The authentic self is ek-static, i.e., it stands out into the world. “Temporality 
is the primordial ‘outside-of-itself’ in and for itself” (B&T, 377). The authentic self is as 
having been, and is as being-toward-death—this is the temporal distension of authentic 
selfhood. Therefore, there is a manifold meaning to care. Care is the temporal movement 
of being-towards-death, being already in a world, and alongside beings in that world. 
Care is also the direction we have toward our world. It is what allows for our projection 
onto the world. It allows for our concern with our tasks in the world, and allows for our 
caring-for others.  
As resolute, we are ready to heed the call of conscience, and are “ready for 
anxiety.” We can even cultivate (ausbilden) our sense of uncertainty in the face of death. 
                                                
32 We will take this as our starting point in chapter four with the discussion of authentic being-with. 
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This need not mean that we are constantly wringing our hands, and worried over death.33 
Rather, we are simply ready for what is, in our acceptance of what will be and has been. 
This means, however, that being one’s own is in some sense not constant. One is not 
constantly seeing what must be done in the situation, since the situation does not always 
present itself. Resoluteness and its disclosure of Dasein and the world depends upon 
“what is factically possible at the time” that one is resolved (B&T, 345).  
Dasein is already in irresoluteness, and soon, perhaps, will be in it again [Das 
Dasein ist je schon und demnächst vielleicht wieder in der Unentschlossenheit]. 
The term “irresoluteness” merely expresses that phenomenon which we have 
interpreted as a being-surrendered to the way in which things have been 
prevalently interpreted by the “they”...“Resoluteness” signifies letting oneself be 
summoned out of one’s lostness in the “they”. (B&T, 345)    
 
For Heidegger, authenticity seems only to happen here and there. We perhaps cannot 
avoid slipping back into the everyday ways of being, understanding and interpretation. At 
most, we can only be ready to be appealed to in the call of conscience. “Wanting to have 
a conscience” does not mean that “one cultivates the call voluntarily” (B&T, 334). So 
what we have here is not a moral injunction. The most we can do is be ready for the call 
of conscience. We can only keep ourselves open (resolute) for it.  
 To be clear, there are two reasons why we cannot always be authentic. First, we 
must remember that authenticity, as with all human being, plays out temporally. 
Authentic human being must be situated. Heidegger evidently thinks that the “situation” 
is something that happens only now and again. When a situation does present itself, it is 
not everlasting. We act, or live through it, and then it is over. Next, we can only wait for 
the call of conscience. We cannot force the call. Instead, we must simply wait for it, and 
                                                
33 In his “What is Metaphysics?” essay, Heidegger says that angst brings with it a “peculiar calm.” This 
essay can be found in Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper Collins Publisher, 1993), 
100. 
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when we are called, we can answer to the call or not. Thus, authenticity is not a goal that 
we strive to achieve. It is rather based upon a call that brings us back to our being. Just as 
we do not have control over our being from the ground up, we do not have control over 
the call which calls us to our being. 
Let us now see a different type of authenticity in Aristotle. We will turn to the life 
of character excellence to see what sort of self-appropriation we might find there. Perhaps 
we will come to a steadier type of authenticity not so dependent upon mood or an 
uncontrollable call of conscience. We will see if Aristotle offers a way to think of 
authenticity as something more firm and lasting.
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Chapter Three 
We have seen that in authenticity, the everyday they-self is modified into a self who 
confronts its own being—that it is—by facing its own death. The persistence of the “I” 
recedes in favor of a reticent resoluteness to be. We have also seen that authenticity 
seems to be momentary—part of the movement of our temporal being. Is there a way to 
think a more steady kind of self-appropriation in Aristotle? We shall see, through an 
overview of the character excellences, that the typical importance of the “I” recedes in 
favor of a more beautiful or noble way of being. We shall see here the differences and 
similarities to Heidegger’s version of authenticity. 
 In his discussion of liberality, about which we shall have more to say later, 
Aristotle says, “it is more characteristic of excellence to do good than to have good done 
to one, and more characteristic to do what is noble than not to do what is base” (1120a12-
13). We notice, on the one hand, that excellence for Aristotle is in one respect directed 
away from oneself. One does excellent things for the sake of the noble. On the other 
hand, we recall that excellence runs its course in activity, and activity is acted out by 
someone, or some self. One acts excellently, and in doing so, pulls the focus away from 
the particularized self and its interests, and directs it towards what is noble or best. In 
doing so, however, there is also a way in which the excellent self is addressed. In acting 
for the sake of the noble or beautiful (and ultimately the good), we shall see that the 
excellent person in Aristotle necessarily, but accidentally, also appropriates or owns up to 
the self. That is, we shall see a new kind of authenticity at play.  
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Thus, in this chapter we shall explore some of the similarities and disparities 
between the authentic self and the excellent self.1 For the sake of continuity, we shall 
follow the order of character virtues as Aristotle laid them out. We will confine ourselves 
to the character excellences in Books III and IV of the Nicomachean Ethics. This will 
place us immediately on some common ground between Aristotle and Heidegger, since 
the discussion begins with courage, and that with which courage has to deal—death. 
Character Excellences and The Self 
Before discussing the particular character excellences, let us remind ourselves of the 
context and aim of the Nicomachean Ethics. We recall that Aristotle does not intend his 
ethics to be a mental excursion on which we might gain knowledge; the goal is not 
knowledge but action. The serious student of Aristotle’s ethics seeks insight into 
becoming good, not simply to know what the good is. This is the context in which 
Aristotle’s discussion of the particular character excellences must be situated. Thus, he 
deals with each excellence appropriately, with his audience in mind. Keeping this context 
in mind will allow us to see the flexibility of Aristotle’s ethical theory, since it is 
ultimately to be applied to sundry concrete settings and lives. 
 We shall see that Aristotle often discusses each particular excellence by assigning 
it a special theater in which it most readily shows itself. For example, courage most 
readily shows itself in battle, and temperance in situations pertaining to the sense of 
touch. We need not think these are the only places in which these virtues may play out, 
but that they can be seen most readily there.  
                                                
1 An extensive treatment of what the self is for Aristotle will come in the fourth chapter. For now, let the 
reader think of “the self” as a practical designation. For example, one acts out excellence in some concrete 
setting, and it is the excellent person himself, or the one becoming excellent that acts.  
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Having prime or special theaters in which virtues can most readily play out allows 
us to see several important aspects of the good life. First, the student sees that excellence 
is difficult, since it is seen most readily in difficult situations. Next, we may see that, even 
though there may be prime theaters, many of us do well enough by approximating to the 
excellences. For example, we show something very much like courage in nobly facing a 
disease (i.e., in a situation other than battle). Thus, one need not begin to habituate 
oneself to an excellence by jumping right into the prime theater. Related to this, if we do 
well in situations demanding something close to temperance, then this increases the 
likelihood of being temperate in all situations. Conversely, the truly temperate person will 
do well in all situations dealing with bodily pleasures. Having a prime or special theater 
of virtue gives the student of practical science a picture, or vision, of excellence on which 
to model herself. Let us now turn to Aristotle’s picture of courage. We shall spend the 
most time on courage since an important link will be made from it to Heidegger’s 
conception of authenticity in the face of death. We shall see how courage includes 
something like Heidegger’s concept of authenticity, but only as incidental to its 
enterprise. 
Courage and Death 
We have seen that virtue is a habitually developed disposition. More specifically, it is a 
mean which aims at an intermediate action. Courage is a mean with respect to fear and 
confidence (θάρρη), but deals primarily with fearsome things (1117a30). The courageous 
person aims for the courageous act when appropriate, rather than being rash or cowardly. 
This breakdown is not as obvious, nor as rigid, as it may seem. Those who are rash seem 
to rush headlong into anything, fearing nothing. Aristotle calls such people “madmen” 
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(µαινόµενος) rather than courageous (1115b25). But do we not normally think of the 
courageous as being fearless? For Aristotle, “to fear some things is even right and noble” 
(1115a11-12). For example, one may rightly fear disgrace. Fear may motivate us to be 
better. Poverty and disease we should not fear, since they are not vicious, i.e., they do not 
proceed from anyone. However, fearlessness in the face of these does not constitute the 
truly courageous person. 
To understand Aristotle’s conception of courage we must understand that with 
which courage most properly deals. This is where Aristotle draws a narrow conception of 
courage, and places it in its prime theater. This will allow us, the students, to see properly 
the difficulty of true excellence. Many instances that would appear to show true courage, 
such as fearlessness before being flogged, Aristotle briefly dismisses. True courage must 
be concerned with the most terrible or dreadful (δεινῶν) of things. 
Now death is the most terrible of all things; for it is the end, and nothing is 
thought to be any longer either good or bad for the dead. But the brave man would 
not seem to be concerned with death in all circumstances, e.g., at sea or in 
disease. In what circumstances, then? Surely the noblest. Now such deaths are in 
battle; for these take place in the greatest and noblest danger. (1115a26-30) 
 
A reader or student of Aristotle’s practical science may at this point be put off by this 
restriction of courage. Surely there are other ways to be brave than only in battle. 
Aristotle does not consider even a death at sea to be the perfect venue in which courage is 
displayed. As we shall see, however, Aristotle allows more room for courage than it 
seems at first glance. 
First, we should notice the centrality of death to Aristotle’s conception of courage. 
Aristotle calls death deinon, i.e., dreadful or terrible. We should take this word in its 
broad significance. Death is terrible, dreadful, powerful, or even awful, i.e., something 
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leaving us full of awe. Death is terrible in a similar way as a powerful storm, or as ocean 
waves during a hurricane might be terrible. It is something that is “beyond human 
strength” (1115b7-8). We have no control or power over death, but death has power over 
our lives. Death, claims Aristotle, is the most terrible of all, and is that with which the 
courageous person is most properly concerned. It is most terrible because it is the end or 
limit (πέρας) of human life. Also, and just as importantly, nothing is thought to be good 
or bad for the dead. 
It is important that Aristotle tell us in a practical science that nothing is either 
good or bad for the dead, since the good is what we seek. Death seems to strip human 
being of anything that makes human being worthwhile. When nothing is any longer good 
or bad, human being is no longer. We recall that human being is directed toward the 
good, which is happiness. All that we do is, or seems to be, directed toward producing or 
maintaining this end. When this end and all other goods are removed, human being seems 
no longer to be human. Even when the bad parts of human being—poverty, disgrace, 
disease, and friendlessness—are removed, there too seems a life that is no longer human. 
In short, death seems to remove all that makes human being what it is; it removes the 
being from the human who dies, such that a corpse is not fully human any longer, but a 
human in name only. But death also removes the human from being human by stripping 
human life of all that made it a human life.2  
Death is the limit of human being. It is the end of human being by removing the 
being of the human. Death removes not only the being of the particular human, but also 
his humanity. This recalls the human function argument. The dead can no longer fulfill 
                                                
2 We seen, then, for Aristotle, good and bad seem to be bound up in who we are. We can separate our 
ethicality logically, but perhaps not in being. 
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their function, or their being. They cannot be, and they cannot be human. The courageous 
one takes heart in face of this ultimate limit. Rather than submitting to nihilism in the 
face death, the courageous one says that life—and this already means the life of virtue—
is worth living in the face of death. To retreat into nihilism—the idea that life is absurd 
because it only leads to death—is cowardice. In this way, the life of courage preserves 
the good life. Courage is situated at the extreme of life, and is thus the excellence that 
protects all the other excellences by affirming their worth. 
 The courageous person will thus have a lot to lose in death. “And the more he is 
possessed of excellence in its entirety and the happier he is, the more he will be pained at 
the thought of death; for life is best worth living for such a man, and he is knowingly 
losing the greatest goods, and this is painful” (1117b10-12).3 The better the life, the more 
painful is it that it will be lost. Losing a good life, or even the thought of losing it, is more 
painful the better the life is. Thus, courage must shoulder a great weight—that of death. 
Despite this death, the courageous ones act nobly in the face of it. Yet, it appears to be 
not just any death that one must face to show true courage. Why does Aristotle restrict 
courage to the theatre of battle? The answer is in the context of his practical science. 
 This science is practical, and this means that with which it deals will play out in 
concrete action within the polis. Thus, it is political in the broad, Greek sense of the 
word. For Aristotle, and especially for his pupils, courage is most readily noticed in 
battle. This is even confirmed by the ways in which honor is bestowed in the polis 
(1115a30-32). We recall that Aristotle does not want to stray too far from what is 
ordinarily accepted to be the case. Soldiers are honored for their courage in battle, 
                                                
3 Καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν µᾶλλοω τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχῃ πᾶσαν καὶ εὐδαιµονέστεροσ ᾗ, µᾶλλον ἐπὶ τῷ θανάτῳ 
λυπήσεται. 
  81 
perhaps more than any other instance of what appears to be courageous action. Aristotle 
needs to find an example of courage his students can live up to. The example he uses 
shows the student of practical science that excellence is difficult and rare. But there is a 
further reason why Aristotle chose battle as the prime theatre for courage. 
 In battle, one can toe the line and not retreat. One can courageously face an 
imminent threat to one’s safety or life. On the other hand, one can retreat. The fear of 
death can overtake the soldier, and he can flee it. Beyond this, the rash soldier can rush 
headlong into life-threatening situations, with no concern for whether or not he survives. 
The courageous soldier will not choose to face death in any situation in battle, but only 
when it is noble, or beautiful, to do so. The courageous soldier does not heedlessly or 
thoughtlessly fly into danger, but does so only when it is appropriate. He is not as 
expendable as the rash soldier. “Rash men are precipitate, and wish for dangers 
beforehand but draw back when they are in them, while brave men are keen in the 
moment of action, but quiet beforehand” (1116a7-9). The rash thus turn out to be 
sometimes willing to follow through with their reckless ways, but sometimes they are no 
better than the coward, and hardly distinguishable from him (1115b32). By blurring the 
lines between these vices, Aristotle implicitly shows us how distinguished the excellent 
person really is. The path of vice seems pell-mell and blurry, while that of excellence is 
difficult and rare, but clearly seen (see 1106b29-35). 
 The greatest difference between the rash and the courageous person is that the 
rash “do not hold their ground against what is really terrible” (1115b33-34).4  The rash 
may rush headlong into deadly situations, but they likely do not see that the situations are 
deadly. The rash soldier merely goes for the glory of the situation, and perhaps, upon 
                                                
4 ἐν τούτοισ γὰρ θρασθνόµενοι τὰ φοβερὰ οὐχ ὑποµένοθσιν. 
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seeing the deadliness of it, will retreat. The courageous person does not rush into any 
deadly situation, nor does he talk much about it beforehand (1116a9). This is significant. 
Aristotle has not only given his students a picture of courage to follow, but has offered a 
picture that stays true to human experience. A true recognition of our mortality has a way 
of making us quiet.5 Yet, when the courageous person does act, he is keen and steadfast. 
In battle, as we said, one can flee the imminent threats against one’s safety or life, or one 
may remain steadfast. Where it is appropriate, the courageous soldier remains steadfast. 
He confronts death, even if it is painful to do so. In fact, this is just what constitutes his 
courage—he faces death despite the fact that this means the possibility of losing his life 
(1117b13-15). 
 Thus, we see the nearly paradoxical nature of courage: it is fulfilled when it is 
faced with the possibility of its own doom. We must keep in mind, however, that the 
courageous soldier does not practice courage in order to die, but irrespective of whether 
or not he dies. The practice of courage, then, is most fully a life practice. It runs its course 
in life and living, even and especially where life is in danger of being lost. It is the 
trademark of courage that the courageous person own up to his life by owning up to the 
possibility of losing it. While this may play out especially well in the battlefield, we see 
that Aristotle allows room for other ways of being that are much like courage; we even 
call them by the same name.6 
 Directly after Aristotle tells us that it is death in battle where courage is most 
readily seen, he says: 
                                                
5 We may recall here Heidegger’s characterization of the reticent resolute person. 
6 See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Books II-1V, translation and commentary by C.C.W. Taylor (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), 175-176. Perhaps my “prime-theater” interpretation will offer a broader 
view on Aristotle’s meanings, and we should see, contra Taylor, that courage is not limited merely to battle. 
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Properly, then, he will be called brave who is fearless in face of a noble death, and 
of all emergencies that involve death; and the emergencies of war are in the 
highest degree of this kind.7 (1115a33-35) 
 
First, we notice that the courageous are brave in all emergencies directly involving death. 
Next, we see that the circumstances of war most produce such circumstances.8 So, there 
is no reason to think that someone facing a terminal illness could not be facing it bravely; 
for the key to courage is steadfastly facing one’s death, and accepting its threat despite 
the pain it causes, and all this for the sake of what is fine, beautiful, or noble to do. The 
theater of war produces situations in which courage can be, and usually is, most readily 
seen. This is, again, because one can here flee from the constant dangers of battle. One 
cannot flee the terminality of a terminal illness. While this does not preclude courage in 
the face of the illness, it opens the possibility of a hopeless abandonment to death (which, 
presumably, would be neither excellent nor vicious), rather than a brave steadfastness in 
the face of it. Although there may be a proper or most fitting situation for courage to be 
readily seen, this does not mean we cannot use the word in approximate ways, or 
accurately in different situations. Thus, we need not be suspicious of any absolute 
restriction of courage to battle.9 
                                                
7 Κυρἰως δὴ λέγοιτ᾽ἂν ἀνδρεῖος ὁ περί τὸν καλὸν θάνατον ἀδεής, καὶ ὅσα θάνατον ἐπιφέρει ὐπόγυια 
ὄντα. Τοιαῦτα δὲ µάλιστα τὰ κατὰ πόλεµον. 
8 See St. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, trans. C.I. Litzinger, O.P. 
(Notre Dame: Dumb Ox Books, 1993), 177. Aquinas claims that enduring death for the sake of virtue is 
courageous, “But [Aristotle] makes a special mention of death in battle because in that undertaking men 
more frequently suffer death for the sake of the good.” So, death in battle here is taken as a prime theater 
for courage, rather than the exclusive field in which it must be exhibited. Aquinas continues, “death in 
battle happens in the greatest danger since a man easily loses his life there. It happens also in the most 
noble of danger since a man undergoes the danger in that case on account of the common good that is the 
greatest good…But virtue deals with what is greatest and best. Therefore, the virtue of fortitude especially 
deals with death that takes place in battle.” 
9 See Amelie Rorty, “The Two Faces of Courage,” in Philosophy, vol. 61, no. 236 (April, 1986): 151-171. 
“If we retain the traditional conception of courage and its military connotations—overcoming and 
combat—we should be suspicious of it” (151). Rorty seems not to hold Aristotle suspicious, but to leave 
room for a broader construal of Aristotelian courage. “Although he retains physical courage as the primary 
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 That Aristotle is not ultimately concerned with restricting courage only to battle is 
evidenced by what he offers us in the eighth chapter. First, he wraps up his previous 
discussion of courage by saying, “Courage, then, is something of this sort [τοιοῦτον τι], 
but the name is also applied to five other kinds” (1116a16). On the one hand, courage 
seems restricted to its display in battle only, but then we are told that courage is only 
“something of this sort.” Courage may be most properly seen in battle, and is most 
properly a phenomenon concerning death, but it may be seen in other similar ways as 
well.  
The five similar conditions to courage are named in order, where the first is 
closest to courage, and the last is furthest from courage. The five conditions are these: 
political courage, experience with regard to particular facts, passion, sanguinity, and 
ignorance. While I will not discuss these in depth, it is noteworthy that even the last two 
of these, Aristotle says, are like courage, but are not courage. Even if the sanguine 
“closely resemble brave men,” or the ignorant are thought to be brave because they 
sometimes temporarily hold their ground, neither of them are actually brave (1117a10-
27). However, this does not mean they are somehow wicked or corrupt. It is simply that 
their actions do not proceed from a courageous character. Later, when discussing the 
virtue of liberality, Aristotle says that the prodigal are not wicked, but foolish (1121a16-
30). Similarly, the sanguine or ignorant may be blamed from the perspective of 
excellence, but they are not corrupt. Thus, we see the flexibility in Aristotle’s conception 
of excellence. Some people come very close to courage, and some stray a little further 
away from it, while others go to the opposite extreme of cowardice. We may thus 
                                                                                                                                            
case, Aristotle extends its exercise to political and moral contexts, as well as to those that, like the traits 
involved in facing disease and loss, require endurance and fortitude” (164).  
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approximate to courage, and the theater of war is only the prime theater in which courage 
may most readily be seen. 
We may also recall here the quoted passage presented above. The more excellent 
and happy one is, the more he will be pained at the thought of death. Not everyone will 
be excellent in the same way, or to the same degree. Just as courage need not be reserved 
for the battlefield only, goodness of character can move in degrees and be seen in various 
ways. 
The Courageous Self 
Courage, as we have shown, is fulfilled through a confrontation with death. The 
courageous soldier is most himself precisely when he looks away from himself towards 
the courageous action. Let us recall that courage, as any other character virtue, is 
maintained through habituation. When one has habituated oneself to a courageous 
disposition, one is ready to act courageously. Even on the spur of the moment, one acts 
courageously because sudden actions are done “in accordance with one’s state of 
character” (1117a20-21). Thus, when circumstances call for courage, the courageous 
person is ready to be courageous. The courageous person is not looking for honors, 
rewards, or anything else that is selfishly motivated. Rather, it is by answering to the 
demands of the current situation (and doing so habitually), that the courageous person is 
constituted. Since courage may be approximated, this habituation need not take place on 
the battlefield—a place where few would have the chance at courage. Rather, we could 
habituate ourselves to something very much like courage in other areas of life. 
 That the courageous person is not, qua courageous, selfish (in our colloquial 
sense) can be seen when we recall his being pained by the thought of death (1117b10-11). 
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The more one is possessed of excellence, and in this case courage, the more one is pained 
by the thought or imminence of death. Life for an excellent person is good, and it is 
difficult to give up good things.10 Yet, despite this pain—which is indeed a personal 
one—courage calls us to act. If I were to lead an excellent life, and were particularly 
courageous, the thought of dying would pain me. Despite these considerations of myself, I 
decide to answer courageously as the situation demands, knowing well that it could mean 
the loss of my life. Thus, courage allows for a movement away from the everyday self 
and its demands and desires, toward nobility. The courageous soldier, for example, does 
not risk death in battle for his own sake (what reward would there be for him were he to 
die?), but for the sake of what is best. 
Temperance 
Courage allows the life of virtue to be lived, since it confronts death. Once the challenge 
of death is faced in courage, temperance allows for the discipline to live excellently. 
Temperance deals not with pleasures of the soul (love of learning, honor, etc.), but with 
bodily pleasures (1117b28-32). It is not even with all bodily pleasures that temperance is 
concerned. We do not blame, after all, the person who takes great delight in looking at 
paintings or listening to music, although either of these could be done to excess (1118a3-
8). Here we notice that it is possible to go to excess with some bodily pleasures without 
being “bad,” or at least not being overly blamed, especially since these examples exhibit 
particularly human things to do. Aristotle is narrowing temperance down to its proper 
                                                
10 Aquinas, Commentary, 193-194. Aquinas contrasts this view with the typically Stoic view that not even 
death is painful. It seems natural that the good soul would find dying difficult and sad. Aquinas might say 
that this natural reaction is good, since it indicates good things, i.e., the sadness is felt over the loss of what 
is truly good in life—excellence. 
  87 
theater by overlooking actions that are neither temperate nor intemperate, even though 
they may be somewhat excessive. 
 People who delight in odors are not necessarily intemperate, but only those who 
delight excessively in odors which incite their appetites (1118a9-16). For instance, the 
glutton is intemperate when he delights too much in the smell of food only because it 
entices him to eat it. Yet, Aristotle does not say much here about intemperance or self-
indulgence. He is interested in narrowing the theater even further. Thus, he tells us that 
animals do not seem to delight much in the scent of what they will eat, but rather the act 
of eating their food (1118a17). In other words, intemperance seems to carry a beastly 
quality of consumption, while overindulgence in scents still seems a human affair, since 
there seems to be some cognitive aspect here. We are now on the track of the bodily 
pleasures with which temperance shall deal.  
The pleasures that temperance keeps under control must be ones shared by other 
animals, so that the self-indulgent person looks somewhat inhuman or brutish. Thus, 
temperance deals primarily with the pleasure of touch. Taste, in human beings, is 
discriminatory, and thus operates differently than taste in other animals. It would be 
indeed strange to call someone intemperate for loving the flavor of this or that food or 
drink.11 Thus, it is the sense of touch (and therefore texture), with which temperance 
deals, e.g., the drinking of the drink, the eating of the food, and the feeling of sexual 
intercourse (1118a17-32). 
                                                
11 See again C.C.W. Taylor’s commentary, 196. Taylor complains, “while it may be useful to define taste 
as the sense by which we discriminate flavours…that by no means supports the identification of the 
enjoyment of taste with the enjoyment of the process of making refined discriminations of taste, or of the 
discriminations thus produced.” Aristotle’s point is not to equate enjoyment of taste with refined 
discriminations, but rather to show that there is still the use of logos in human taste, even if only to the 
degree that one recognizes one likes the flavor of this or that drink or food, i.e., it is reflective. But the mere 
gobbling of food or sloshing of drink has to do only with touch. Even the results of overeating and drinking 
seem texture related.  
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 Temperance (σωφροσύνη) is a soundness of mind. Literally, it suggests a saving 
of intelligence. Temperance saves the intelligence so that it can act properly. More 
precisely, temperance saves the intelligence from a lack of discipline, or self-indulgence 
(ἀκολασία).  
By not having appetites leading to self-indulgence, the temperate person avoids 
the scattered, particularized life of the “I” or “me.” For Aristotle, the undisciplined life of 
self-indulgence or intemperance is not a fully human life. If we think of the extreme of 
self-indulgence, e.g., one who goes to excess in every bodily appetite, we easily imagine 
a chaotic, slavish, and brutish existence. We say he is a “slave to his passions.” The 
temperate person, on the other hand, leads a disciplined life of self-control, and this 
moves beyond the helter-skelter life of the pleasure-seeker. 
 The temperate person, qua temperate, is beyond particularized appetites by being 
in control of them. He is not pulled in the direction of multiple desires—“I want this and 
that”—but has expanded himself into a disciplined, controlled, and centered way of 
being. The temperate self, however, is not defined by the negativity of its not being 
controlled by pleasures; this would be more like continence. Let us recall that the 
temperate person does not have bad desires at all. There is no struggle here, but simply 
well-being. The temperate person is one who is in control of himself, especially when it 
concerns bodily appetites. Once habituated to temperance, the temperate person will not 
avoid his appetites, but will put them in their proper place. That is, he knows when, 
where, and how to indulge in them. 
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Liberality and Magnificence 
With courage in the face of death, and self-control in temperance, we can now move on 
to the virtues dealing with money. Liberality is a mean with regard to both the giving and 
taking of wealth, but primarily with regard to giving (1119b22-25). Liberality, in Greek 
(ἐλευθεριότης), is related to the word for “freedom,” just as the English word “liberal” 
can mean both “generous” and “free.” Thus, the liberal person freely gives wealth, as 
reason directs. The prodigal (ἀσωτία) person is wasteful with money; he literally is not a 
preserver (σωτήρ) or saver of money. The deficient disposition with regard to liberality 
is illiberality (ἀνελευθερία), or “meanness.” The illiberal person is the one who is not 
free with his money, but is rather miserly. Thus, the freedom of liberality is not an all or 
nothing affair warranting wild spending sprees. Nor does the liberal person care to keep 
too much wealth for himself. Rather, “he will give to the right people, the right amounts, 
and at the right time,” and he will do so with pleasure (1120a24-25).  
 But does not the liberal person give in order to be honored? If this were the case, 
liberality would not be motivated by a desire to give in the right ways, but by a concern 
with how one will be regarded by others. However, it is more characteristic of the liberal 
person to give than to receive. Thus, giving is the foundational activity of liberality. 
Moreover: 
It is highly characteristic of a liberal man also to go to excess in giving, so that he 
leaves too little for himself; for it is the nature of a liberal man not to look to 
himself [τὸ γὰρ µὴ βλέπειν ἐφ᾽ἑαυτὸν ἐλευθερίου]. The term ‘liberality’ is used 
relatively to a man’s substance [κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν]; liberality resides not in the 
multitude of gifts but in the state of the giver, and this is relative to the giver’s 
substance. There is therefore nothing to prevent the man who gives less from 
being the more liberal man, if he has less to give. (1120b5-10) 
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First, we notice that liberality seems something like courage, since that which drives it 
(giving), also has the potential to undermine it. However, just as death does not 
undermine the courage of the courageous person, but merely prevents him from showing 
any further courage, excessive giving will not entirely undermine the liberality of the 
liberal person.12 The liberal person will give at the right time, and to the right people, and 
in the right amounts. Even if this leaves him with little for himself, we need not take this 
to mean that he has given wrongly, or wastefully. The giving cannot be wasteful since it 
is appropriate. Moreover, it does not matter how much the liberal person has (or has left), 
since the mark of his liberality is not how much he gives, or has to give, but its 
appropriateness, i.e., how it accords with his substance and with the situation. 
 Liberality comes from one’s substance, but we can also translate ousia here as 
“one’s own,” or even loosely as “being.” Liberality is situated in how one has habitually 
established oneself to be. It is interesting that Aristotle tells us that we use liberality 
according to the liberal person’s ousia, since ousia also relates to property. There may be 
an intentional ambiguity here. Liberality shows itself according to both what one has, and 
how one is. Liberality has to do with how one is, and what the liberal person has at his 
disposal. 
 Since giving, then, is the activity in which liberality is readily seen, the act of 
liberality is directed away from itself toward the recipient. The wasteful person—the one 
who does not rightly preserve and spend his wealth—gives excessively, but in a way that 
seems aimed at self-indulgence (1119b31). As can be noticed with the vices relative to 
                                                
12 In his commentary, Taylor offers a good interpretation of excessive giving (τὸ ὑπερβάλλειν ἐν τῇ 
δόσει). Taylor says, “‘Excessive’ cannot imply improper excess, which is the vice of extravagance; it must 
mean ‘more than normal’ or ‘more than expected’” (207).  
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the other virtues, prodigality even seems to mix somehow with illiberality.13 The prodigal 
begin to take money excessively, since “they wish to spend and cannot do this easily” 
(1121a30-b1). Moreover, the prodigal give “much to flatterers, or those who provide 
them with some other pleasure” (1121b6-7). They thus are self-indulgent and “incline 
towards pleasures because they do not live with a view to what is noble” (1121b8-10).14 
The liberal person moves beyond personal interests and pleasures. One is liberal not for 
the sake of oneself, but for the sake of the noble or beautiful. Again, we see the expansion 
of a traditional concept of self, toward a concept of self that is beyond particularized and 
self-directed desires, pleasures, etc. Here, the self is directed away from itself.  
The magnificent person, who gives and spends larger sums of money than the 
liberal person, will also provide an expansion beyond selfish interest, toward beauty and 
nobility. He is, in fact, “like an artist; for he can see what is fitting and spend large sums 
tastefully” (1122a34-b1). The magnificent soul directs his energy away from himself, 
toward the project that will be beautiful or noble, such as votive offerings to the gods, 
public buildings and spaces, and sacrifices (1122b19-21). While magnificence indicates 
greater sums of money spent than liberality, the magnificent person will not go to the 
excess of vulgarity. The vulgar person spends not “for the sake of the noble but to show 
off his wealth, and because he thinks he is admired for these things” (1123a25-26). Thus, 
the mean of magnificence is not self-oriented, but beauty-oriented.  
 
 
                                                
13 Again, Aristotle implies here how rare, difficult, and distinct excellence is, while a vicious life is easy 
and muddled. 
14 Interestingly, Aristotle notes that prodigality in some sense ruins the self (1120a3), about which we shall 
say more later in the chapter.  
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Magnanimity and Honor 
While magnanimity (µεγαλοψυχία) is perhaps self-directed, i.e., making the self its 
object, we see that ultimately the magnanimous self goes beyond the particularized, 
pleasure-seeking self to the excellent self. The magnanimous person is one who reckons 
himself worthy of great things, and really is worthy of them, as opposed to the vain 
person who thinks himself worthy of great things but is not (1123b1-9).15 We must 
understand that if the magnanimous person is excellent, and thinks himself worthy of 
great things, then he must be truly good (1123b30). This is what separates magnanimity 
from vanity; the former is born of a life of all around excellence and proper self-
estimation, and the latter is born of something less than excellence, and improper self-
estimation. 
 We need not think that Aristotle’s description of magnanimity exhibits, as Sir 
David Ross has suggested, “the self-absorption which is the bad side of Aristotle’s 
ethics.”16 Magnanimity is most properly concerned with honor and dishonor. Yet, even 
when great men bestow honors upon the magnanimous person, “he will be moderately 
pleased, thinking that he is coming by his own or even less than his own; for there can be 
no honor that is worthy of perfect excellence” (1124a5-8).17 He cares little for honors not 
because they are unworthy of him as a particularized self, but because they are not 
worthy of his excellence, since it is excellence that makes him good, and it is this 
goodness of which he has proper estimation. In other words, he does not view himself as 
                                                
15 Thus, we may see here the difficulty of proper self-estimation in Aristotle’s thought. 
16 Sir David Ross, Aristotle (London: Methuen & Co, 1977), 208. 
17 This quote should be enough to dismiss the misinformed claim that Aristotle’s magnanimous person 
uncritically accepts the community’s evaluation of him. See Jacob Howler, “Aristotle’s Great-Souled 
Man”, in The Review of Politics, vol. 64, no. 1 (Winter, 2002): 32. Nor is the magnanimous person, as we 
shall see, “a slave to honor.”  
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an object of which the honors are unworthy. Rather, he sees himself as an active being 
practicing excellence. It is therefore excellence, which the magnanimous person 
habitually practices, of which the honors are unworthy. 
 That the magnanimous person does not make much of honors bestowed upon him 
shows he is neither “self-absorbed,” nor even the opposite of what we call “humble.”18 In 
fact, Aristotle says that the magnanimous person will not be a gossip, since he “will 
speak neither about himself nor about another, since he cares not to be praised nor for 
others to be blamed” (1125a5-7). His focus is himself insofar as he is the embodiment of 
the excellence he diligently practices. Moreover, “he must be unable to make his life 
revolve round another, unless it be a friend; for this is slavish, and for this reason all 
flatterers are servile and people lacking in self-respect are flatterers” (1124b31-1125a3). 
If he were self-absorbed, it seems the magnanimous person would relish the opportunity 
to talk about himself, and would also gladly receive flattery. That the magnanimous 
person estimates himself highly need not entail vanity or self-absorption. In fact, in the 
picture Aristotle sketches, there seems no preclusion of humility before gods, since he is 
not a boaster, but simply someone who knows himself (i.e., the excellence he practices or 
embodies) well enough to form a proper self-estimation.  
 It is this self-knowledge that is important for our investigation. The magnanimous 
person’s self-estimation is proper and correct.19 Thus, he must first know himself in order 
                                                
18 James Stover and Ronald Polansky make this suggestion. See their article, “Moral Virtue and 
Megalopsychia,” in Ancient Philosophy, Vol. 23, no. 2 (2003): 354-355. I would add that what we typically 
consider humility or being humble is often an excessive or perverted humility. One need not think oneself 
as depraved, a failure, or worthless in order to be humble. Perhaps true humility is something more akin to 
Heidegger’s “being-guilty”—we can never have full power over our being from the ground up.  
19 Howler, “Aristotle’s Great-Souled Man,” 32. Howler sets up an opposition between a “Socratic 
megalopsuchos” and Aristotle’s magnanimous person. Howler says Aristotle’s magnanimous person 
“suffers from a potentially tragic lack of self-knowledge. The Socratic megalopsuchos, in contrast, 
recognizes that not even practical wisdom can rightly claim to be an ordered whole (kosmos) of the virtues, 
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to make the proper self-estimation.20 This is not an easy task, since what he knows is that 
he is excellent, and excellence is difficult. One must first be truly excellent to be 
magnanimous. 
Pride [µεγαλοψυχία], then, seems to be a sort of crown of the excellences; for it 
makes them greater, and it is not found without them. Therefore it is hard to be 
truly proud [µεγαλόψυχον]; for it is impossible without nobility and goodness of 
character. (1124a1-5) 
 
If magnanimity is difficult, then the self-knowledge required for it comes with that 
difficulty. It would be very easy for us to think we have properly estimated ourselves as 
“good” or “great,” when in fact this is only vanity. The self the magnanimous person 
knows is the excellent self. The excellent self is far from the particularized self, which is 
often defined by its passions or appetites. Both the vain and unduly humble, by contrast, 
do not know themselves, and thus improperly estimate themselves (1125a17-28). They 
do not know themselves because they are shaped by their desires and ignobility.  
 Aristotle next mentions an unnamed excellence also having to do with honor, but 
on a smaller scale. We recall the magnanimous person does not seek honor, but accepts it 
when bestowed by a good person. But it is difficult to be magnanimous since one must 
first be truly excellent. While the magnanimous person does few deeds which will result 
in great honor (1124b25), he will not do them for honor, but because they are noble and 
good. However, we cannot conclude from this that some degree of honor seeking, on a 
smaller scale, may not be appropriate and even good. This honor-seeking in smaller 
                                                                                                                                            
which is to say that he recognizes our inevitable imperfection and lack of self-sufficiency.” First, Howler’s 
translation of kosmos as “ordered whole” is here an inappropriate interpretation. That Aristotle calls 
magnanimity “the crown of the virtues” need not entail that it somehow orders all the others. Moreover, 
Aristotle’s magnanimity does not preclude a self-knowledge that knows the limits of human being, i.e., the 
fragility of our mortal lives. 
20 Stover and Polansky, “Moral Virtue,” 356. Stover and Polansky have noticed a possible connection 
between the self-estimation of the magnanimous, and self-love. This connection will be addressed in our 
discussion of friendship and self-love in chapter four. 
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affairs is not ambitiousness. In fact, relative to ambitiousness, it would seem unambitious, 
and relative to unambitiousness, it would seem ambitious (1125b1-25). This means that 
some degree of honor loving may be appropriate in a situation that might call for it. It is 
made appropriate by that action that makes the actor honorable, viz., good action. Honor 
reflects the goodness of the action done, and thus, it is not improper to desire honor to 
some degree. 
Good Temper, Truthfulness, and Ready-Wit 
 The nameless virtues are no less important for not having typical names.21 Again, as with 
the virtues explicitly named, we see an expansion of our general concept of self. Good 
temper (πραότης), for example, is a mean with respect to anger. However, this 
gentleness does not preclude anger. The gentle or good tempered person will indeed get 
angry, but only “at the right things and with the right people, and further, as he ought, 
when he ought, and as long as he ought.”22 All this, moreover, he does “as reason 
dictates” (1125b32-36). Yet, reason does not always predetermine when, where, with 
whom, or how long one should be angry, because it is ultimately the particular facts and 
perception which will demand the appropriate reaction (1126b2-5). Thus, the person of 
good temper acts based upon what the situation demands, rather than out of personal 
motivations. Even if he acts based upon what he thinks might be ultimately beneficial for 
himself, he must do this here in consideration of what it demands, for the sake of nobility 
or beauty. 
                                                
21 See Paula Gottlieb’s article, “Aristotle’s ‘Nameless’ Virtues,” in Apeiron: A Journal for Ancient 
Philosophy and Science, vol. 27, no. 1 (1994): 1-15. Gottlieb shows that the nameless virtues are just as 
important for Aristotle as those explicitly named. 
22 ὁ µἐν οὗν ἐφ᾽οἷς δεῖ καὶ οἷς δεῖ ὀργιζόµενος, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὃτε καὶ ὃσον χρόνον.  
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 The excellent person is, in addition to being good tempered, neither obsequious 
(ἄρεσκος) nor contentious (δυσέριδες). Although the mean is here unnamed, those 
practicing this unnamed virtue are neither too quick to please nor too quick to pain others 
in social interactions, but neither are they opposed to pleasing or causing pain to others. 
They do either of these only with reference to what is noble or expedient (1126b29). 
Thus, the primary concern is not how others perceive them, or receiving a personal gain 
from social interaction, but what is best and noble in a given situation. 
 This leads well into what Aristotle calls “truthfulness,” since it lacks any real 
name as a virtue. The truthful person (ἀληθευτικός) is neither boastful (ἀλαζών)23 nor 
mock-modest (εἴρων). The sort of truthful person Aristotle intends here does not merely 
keep faith in agreements,  
but the man who in the matters in which nothing of this sort is at stake is true both 
in word and in life because his character is such. But such a man would seem to 
be as a matter of fact equitable. For the man who loves truth, and is truthful where 
nothing is at stake, will still more be truthful where something is at stake; he will 
avoid falsehood as something base, seeing that he avoided it even for its own 
sake…He inclines rather to understate the truth; for this seems in better taste 
because exaggerations are wearisome. (1127a33-b9).  
 
We are talking here about one who is unassumingly truthful. This is someone who, even 
in word and life (ἐν λόγῳ καὶ ἐν βίῳ), is truthful. What does it mean to be truthful in 
word and in life? It means, in this instance, that both one’s words and the activity of 
one’s life stay true to excellence and what any given situation demands. It means, more 
basically, one’s words and life show themselves without pretense as a testament to a 
fulfilled way of being. This, perhaps, need not entail that the truthful person clings 
absolutely to fact and factual statements, as perhaps a moralist would have us do. In other 
words, there is no need always to speak the truth, even if one is not lying. It may be that 
                                                
23 As a noun, this Greek word means “a false pretender” or an “imposter.” 
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even lying is not entirely prohibited here if we maintain a distinction between fact and 
truth. For example, the truthful statesman may lie to protect his people from some greater 
danger, thus preserving the truth of his position, i.e., one who serves and protects his 
people. We notice, in the least, that the truth-speaker is perhaps not always inclined to say 
much (like the magnanimous person), and even “understates the truth.”24 He sees no need 
to be overbearing to be truthful, since simplicity is often enough.25  
 Indeed, in general social intercourse, the excellent person is tactful, ready-witted, 
knows when to listen and when to speak, when to joke and when to refrain from joking, 
and also knows “the kind of people one is speaking or listening to will also make a 
difference” (1127b33-1128a18). Again, the mark of the ready-witted (εὐτράπελοι) is, as 
the word suggests, versatility, and a keen perception of what is appropriate in a given 
context. As Gottlieb says, this versatility will “enable its possessor to be sensitive to his 
audience and to know when a particular joke would be appropriate to make (and also to 
appreciate) and when not.”26 Even in jest the versatile soul is flexible, and ready to act 
appropriately.  
Authenticity and Excellence 
Heidegger’s concept of authenticity shows that the authentic self has come into its own in 
the face of death. Aristotle’s courageous soldier turns his focus away from himself and 
aims towards the noble. Is there already something like authenticity in courage?  
                                                
24 See Gottlieb’s “Aristotle’s ‘Nameless Virtues’,” 5. My interpretation may or may not be tantamount to 
Gottlieb’s interpretation: “The term ‘truthfulness’ as a translation for ἀλήθεια is…misleading. It is apt to 
imply that the truthful person will simply tell the truth on all occasions. [Aristotle’s] truthful person is one 
who is truthful about his own possessions, beliefs and abilities and who gives out the right amount of 
information on the right occasions.”  
25 We often have a tendency to overstate or to be overly emphatic to get across a point. A “word” or “life” 
is no more or less true with more or less emphasis. It is what it is.  
26 Gottlieb, “Nameless Virtues,” 5. 
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Formulaically, of course, we do not see in Aristotle’s discussion of courage what we see 
in Heidegger’s discussion of being-toward-death. We might notice, however, that 
Aristotle’s conception of courage in the face of death does not preclude a Heideggerian 
reading, and may in fact engender one. If courage allows one to face death despite the 
pain that confrontation may cause, then is the courageous soldier or person already 
“authentic”? If so, we see that the life of excellence would already include authenticity, 
not as its goal, but incidentally. 
Authenticity in Courage? 
We may first take stock of Heidegger’s formulation of authenticity to see its primary 
elements. In an anxious being-towards-death, the inauthentic they-self can either flee its 
own mortality, or resolutely accept it. This is attested phenomenologically by the call of 
conscience, which calls Dasein back to itself. Conscience calls Dasein to its potentiality 
for being itself, i.e., conscience shows Dasein the possibility of being authentic. It does 
this by summoning Dasein to its own “being-guilty.” That is, conscience reveals to us 
that we can never have complete power over our being. Our being is not entirely up to us, 
since we never chose to be born (throwness), and since we will die. Dasein can either 
take hold of the potentiality for being itself and actualize it, or Dasein can shirk it. Do we 
see in Aristotle’s conception of courage anything of this sort already taking place? 
 As we suggested above, the key to Aristotelian courage is a confrontation with 
death. The courageous person is one who comes face to face with death and what that 
means for his life, i.e., the courageous person faces the possibility of losing his life. We 
recall that battle is Aristotle’s prime theater for courage. The soldier can run away from a 
dangerous or deadly situation, but this would not be noble where courageous action is 
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demanded. He could flee danger, and own up neither to his responsibility as a soldier, nor 
to the demands of excellence. But what happens when courage is actualized? 
 In courage, one is faced with one’s own mortality. But the courageous person 
faces this mortality, and accepts it as his lot. Because of this confrontation, he is able to 
shoulder the responsibility of the courageous action, despite the possibility of losing his 
life. While we do not and could not find Heideggerian language in Aristotle’s description 
of courage, we see that it is not precluded. The courageous person, in actualizing courage, 
is as being-towards-death and owning up to his mortality. Since he realizes death’s is 
close at hand, he realizes the nullity of his being, i.e., he faces the fact that he does not 
have power over his being. In facing one’s mortality, we see the ultimate limit of human 
being. Thus, by actualizing courage, the courageous person affirms human being in the 
highest degree. The courageous person is resolute, and firmly faces the real threat of 
death despite any pain this causes.27 His courageous action is a realization of his 
mortality, no matter the consequence. 
 The courageous person acts, however, not for the sake of affirming his being—
which means affirming his mortality—but for the sake of the noble, beautiful, or fine. In 
other words, his goal or end is not affirming his own being (although this happens 
through his courage), but to act for the sake of what he thinks is best, i.e., to act for the 
sake of the noble. The self-appropriation in courage is not the goal or end of the action, 
but is incidental to it. The courageous soldier would have no need merely to affirm his 
being—it is already affirmed through his excellence. Courageous activity enacts a kind of 
authenticity without authenticity being the goal. 
                                                
27 Walter Brogan, Aristotle and Heidegger, (Albany: SUNY Press, 2005). “To be courageous is to stand 
resolutely in the face of the possibility of no longer being” (143). 
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 The courageous self is appropriated not because he explicitly desires and chooses 
authenticity, but because he habitually establishes himself as courageous. To choose 
authenticity as a primary end of one’s being, in this instance, would not be acting 
courageously. This is not to say that the courageous person could not also enjoy the fruits 
of his affirmation of being, but this again would be incidental to his courageous practice.  
 In an effort to synthesize Aristotle’s and Heidegger’s thought, Walter Brogan 
views Heidegger’s discussion of authenticity, or Dasein’s being-a-whole, as “remarkably 
parallel to Aristotle’s own understanding of the life that is characteristic of the happy 
person.”28 Brogan claims that the Aristotelian concept of dunamis, or potentiality, 
signifies being “gathered into oneself,” or a motion back into oneself, away from one’s 
involvements, so as to be ready for those involvements.29 He then relates this to virtue. 
Virtues open up a relationship to oneself, to one’s capacities as a source for 
directing one’s emotions and actions…the movement is from an actual 
entanglement with one’s surroundings to a return to oneself, and that this 
distancing of oneself from the immediacy of one’s involvement opens up the 
horizon of possibilities for being oneself in that situation.30 
 
It is not clear how the idea of drawing into oneself in potentiality relates to Aristotle’s 
idea of excellence. It may be that excellence allows for a “return to oneself,” but this 
return cannot be seen, from the Aristotelian standpoint, as a withdrawal into oneself. 
Even the practically wise person, when he deliberates, is deliberating for the purpose of 
action, and with regard to a particular situation. The concern here is that Brogan’s 
language makes Aristotle’s excellent person one who withdraws into an “inner citadel” 
and holds council with himself there, with little relation to the world in which he dwells. 
But one is excellent through the actualization of excellence. The actualization of 
                                                
28 Brogan, Aristotle and Heidegger, 140. 
29 Brogan, Aristotle and Heidegger, 141. 
30 Brogan, Aristotle and Heidegger, 142. 
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excellence happens in habitual practice. Thus, the excellent person will often act out of 
habit, since he is thoroughly enmeshed in the moment, and has no time for recourse to 
private thought. It is difficult to see, then, how he “opens up a certain distance from the 
moment” and withdraws into himself.31 
 Again, Brogan claims that courage is “first of all a disposition toward one’s own 
being and concomitantly a way of relating to others.”32 A distinction must here be made. 
Courage, as a confrontation with death, does involve a “disposition toward one’s being.” 
But courage is directed toward acting nobly in the face of what is most fearsome and 
most unsettling. To be clear, one is not courageous simply in order to be, and feel oneself 
in the fullness of being, but to act for the sake of what is fine, noble, or beautiful. Or, we 
may say that one is courageous to be noble. So it is not pure being toward which courage 
is directed, but being noble or good. 
 While comparisons between Heidegger’s authenticity and Aristotle’s virtue are 
indeed warranted, we must take care not to turn Aristotle’s thought into Heidegger’s. We 
cannot rightly claim that, in the Nicomachean Ethics, “Aristotle continues to concern 
himself primarily with the ontology of human being and continues to draw the discussion 
away from the specificity of practical life.”33 While there may be intriguing ontological 
aspects to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, even ones that invite a Heideggerian 
interpretation of them (as we saw in chapter one), we cannot claim that Aristotle’s 
practical science is primarily ontological. In the discussion of virtue, whether character or 
intellectual virtue, the end is not a return to one’s being, or a distance from the moment, 
but rather a full involvement in the moment for the sake of what is noble. Even if we say 
                                                
31 Brogan, Aristotle and Heidegger, 143. 
32 Brogan, Aristotle and Heidegger, 143. 
33 Brogan, Aristotle and Heidegger, 143. 
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that authenticity is the being of the noble, we must see that this authenticity is not merely 
being, but being good. For example, if I act courageously, I allow the noble to come to 
fruition. I become noble, which is to say that I become authentic. This, however, is not 
the same as Heidegger’s authenticity. I have not merely come into being, but into being 
good. We can restate this by saying that I have come into my being, and this being is 
good. This is why the goal for the student of the Ethics is not knowledge, and certainly 
not simply being or letting be, but becoming good.  
If Aristotle draws his discussion away from the “specificity of practical life,” he 
does so not in order to do ontology, but because he is careful not to pretend to excessive 
prescription for particular actions. A Heideggerian interpretation of Aristotle does not 
force the conclusion that Aristotle was doing what Heidegger did, but rather allows us to 
see different shadings of Aristotle. We must take care that this interpretation does not 
confuse us into thinking that the two thinkers were undertaking the same project. 
Beyond Heidegger’s Authenticity 
In what other ways might the life of excellence open up a new way of living and self-
fulfilment? We saw that courage already takes up Heideggerian authenticity, but not as its 
goal. Is there a way in which the other virtues may also be seen to open up a kind of 
authenticity, even if it does not fall under a Heideggerian formulation? Is there in 
Aristotle’s thought a way to think of something like self-fulfillment and cultivation, 
rather than authenticity? In Heidegger’s case, there is a modification of the everyday 
they-self, into an authentic self. That is, the authentic self has taken over its being from 
the they, and found some breathing room in the freedom of being toward death. This 
allows the self to be who it is as care. The self is temporally expanded in care, and stands 
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out into its world in care. For Aristotle, we see an already expanded conception of self—a 
self that is excellent, which is beyond the self that is caught up in its own particularities, 
i.e., desires, pleasures, pains, etc. There is no struggle for the excellent person to find or 
be himself; he already is thoroughly himself through his excellence. 
 In our analysis of temperance, we saw an expanded concept of self. We saw a self 
that is saved from a dispersal into appetites and bodily pleasures. The temperate person is 
thoroughly in the world, in the concrete setting of praxis, but is not controlled by the 
contexts in which she lives. She rather responds appropriately to situations having to do 
with bodily pleasures, i.e., she neither spurns nor plunges into bodily pleasure.  We can 
also say that the temperate person saves her humanity by not giving way to brutish 
desires and pleasures, i.e., excessive pleasures of touch. Since the temperate person is not 
scattered in pleasure and desire, we can say that she is disciplined and collected.  
  The temperate person is excellent, and does not struggle to be so, and any self-
appropriation or coming into one’s own is incidental to the practice. The temperate 
person has perhaps appropriated herself, or is her own self, but not because she has won 
over her being from those in which she has been lost. Rather, she has been sublimated 
into the life of excellence—an excellence she embodies, but which remains universal and 
ultimately beyond her particularity. Thus, in a strange sense, her “ownness” is far from 
what we might consider it to be, if we think in these terms at all. She has become 
excellent, and this is now who she is, and this is in some respect universal. In this respect, 
the life of virtue is akin to Heidegger’s authenticity. The ownness of the self is beyond a 
particularized self-possession. The ownness is rather a proper way of being human.  
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  With respect to liberality, the prodigal person in some sense ruins himself. 
Aristotle says, “the wasting of substance is thought to be a sort of ruining of oneself, life 
being held to depend on possession of substance” (1120a2-3).34 Again, Aristotle may be 
playing on the ambiguity of ousia, or substance. As the wasteful person recklessly spends 
money, and spends in the wrong places, or at the wrong times, or with respect to the 
wrong people, he brings ruin not only to his possessions, but also to himself. We are in 
some degree preserved by what we have. By looking towards his own pleasures and 
urges, he ruins himself. On the other hand, the liberal person “does not look to himself” 
(1120b5).35  Again, the liberal person does not focus primarily upon himself as a 
particularized being, but upon giving appropriately. There can be here, then, no primary 
concern of trying to appropriate oneself, even if being liberal allows for a sense of 
fulfillment and self-cultivation. The primary concern is giving, even if one recognizes 
that giving will help cultivate the self. Again, the self that is here cultivated would not be 
so much the particularized being, but the self insofar as it is excellent. 
 In magnanimity, there is true self-knowledge. The magnanimous person is fully at 
home with himself because he is excellent, and has properly estimated himself to be so. 
We recall that he is not given to gossip, and also does not talk about himself. 
Corresponding to this description of the magnanimous person, we recall that, for 
Heidegger, reticence (Verschwiegenheit), or keeping silence, is a possibility of genuine 
discourse for human beings. “To be able to keep silent, Dasein must have something to 
say—that is, it must have at its disposal an authentic and rich disclosedness of itself” 
(B&T, 208). Like the magnanimous person, the authentic person will not say much, and 
                                                
34 δοκεῖ δ᾽ἀπολειά τις αὑτοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἠ τῆς οὐσίας φθορά, ὡς τοῦ ζῆν διὰ τούτων ὄντος. 
35 ὥστε καταλείπειν ἑαυτῷ ἐλαττω. This could also be rendered: “he leaves less for himself.” 
  105 
will presumably speak the truth from a genuine “disclosedness” of himself. This genuine 
self-disclosure seems akin to the self-knowledge of the magnanimous person. The great 
difference, however, is what is known in the self-knowledge. The magnanimous person 
knows his excellence in the way he enacts it and is disposed to it. The self-disclosure of 
the authentic person is a disclosure of oneself as a temporal way of being—as care. 
Aristotle’s unnamed, social virtues show us a person concretely in a social world. 
The excellent person is well integrated into the world. He exhibits truth in life and word, 
is gentle without being obsequious, and is ready for jesting when appropriate. As 
suggested, all of these virtues take their cue from what the situation demands, e.g., what 
is appropriate to say or feel here, with respect to these people, and at this time. But this 
raises an important point in our comparison. 
We saw that Heidegger’s authenticity ultimately depends upon resolutely 
answering the call of conscience. One cannot force the call to happen, but one can only 
wait for it. In resolutely answering it, one sees clearly the situation in which one is. One 
is then ready to act. Authenticity, then, depends upon something ultimately out of our 
control. The character excellences also depend upon something beyond our control, i.e. 
the situations or contexts in which they play out. 
The liberal man will need money for the doing of his liberal deeds, and the just 
man too will need it for the returning of services…and the brave man will need 
power if he is to accomplish any of the acts that correspond to his excellence, and 
the temperate man will need opportunity… (1178a28-33)36  
 
The life of character excellence significantly depends upon external goods, and one may 
not always have these at one’s disposal. Let us recall, however, that one develops 
character excellence through habituation. One need not be doing an excellent deed to be 
                                                
36 This passage will be addressed in again in the fifth chapter, in reference to the life of contemplation. 
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considered excellent, but one must live a life in which excellent deeds are and have been 
done to be considered excellent. What does this mean for self-appropriation in virtue? 
 Excellence is dispositional. In habitually developing excellence, one develops a 
disposition toward excellence. This is why we can say, “she is courageous” even while 
she is not doing anything particularly courageous (e.g. while she sleeps). She is the sort 
of person to do courageous things when appropriate. She is disposed to doing courageous 
things. If, however, the self-appropriation comes to life in courageous action, this must 
also mean that she is disposed to self-appropriation, but not always practicing it. Self-
appropriation follows along with excellence to the degree that one is excellent, and in the 
way that one is excellent. This means that it must follow excellence as a developed 
potentiality (or “first actuality”), or as excellence is actualized.  
 There is a difference, then, between this “dispositional” self-appropriation, and 
Heidegger’s “wanting to have a conscience,” or waiting to hear the call. If one is 
excellent even when not performing excellent actions, then one is self-appropriated or 
collected even when this is not made evident through excellent action. For example, the 
temperate person was said to be self-controlled. This self-control or collectedness is 
incidentally enacted in temperate actions. It would be absurd to say that one is no longer 
collected or self-controlled just because one is not performing a particularly temperate 
action. The temperate action simply allows the self-control to be activated—the action 
sets the self-appropriation into relief. 
 Since Heidegger’s authenticity-inauthenticity binary has to do only with ways of 
being, and authentic being depends upon the call of conscience, one cannot always be 
authentic. One can, at most, be ready to be authentic. This is not to suggest that 
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Heidegger’s version of authenticity is somehow inadequate; we are merely exposing its 
limitations. One can work to habituate oneself to excellence. One can work to get beyond 
the particularized self that seeks only bodily pleasure. In Heidegger’s version of self-
appropriation, one can only wait for it. These two types of self-appropriation are not 
mutually exclusive. We do now see a way, however, that self-appropriation or 
authenticity can run its course outside the Heideggerian framework. We will see in the 
final chapter a more pronounced way in which the life of excellence is a life of self-
appropriation and self-cultivation. But first, let us explore the connections between being-
with and friendship, and role of the self in these phenomena. 
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Chapter Four 
We have seen the points of intersection and divergence between Aristotle’s concept of 
character excellence, and Heidegger’s concept of authenticity. There is a kind of 
authenticity in courage, yet only incidentally. We then saw new ways of being oneself 
through the other character virtues. In this chapter, we shall explore new connections and 
divergences between Heidegger and Aristotle by focusing upon Aristotle’s concept of 
friendship, and Heidegger’s concept of being-with. Both thinkers think human being is 
naturally, or ontologically, constituted by life with others. For Aristotle, a naturally 
political life leads to several different types of friendship. While Heidegger, on the other 
hand, thinks that being-with others is for the most part inauthentic, he does grant the 
possibility of authentic being-with, although he says little about it. 
 We have made mention of Heidegger’s concept of being-with, but in the service 
of our investigation of being-in-the-world. We shall in this chapter explore the 
implications of being-with in order to see the intersecting and divergent paths between it 
and Aristotle’s concept of friendship. We will draw from Heidegger’s discussion of 
being-with in Division I of Being and Time. As with our preceding chapters, we will 
move beyond what is given in the text to its implications for the self who lives out these 
basic relationships. This shall then be compared to Aristotle’s concept of friendship, as 
found in Books VIII and IX of the Nicomachean Ethics. We shall see that, for Heidegger, 
authentic being-with is based upon an authentic self-disclosure—knowing oneself. For 
Aristotle, the highest form of friendship cannot be without self-love, which must be, as I 
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shall show, based upon self-knowledge.1 We will therefore see again different ways of 
being oneself, but this time based upon our relationships with others. 
 To do this, we need to discover exactly what the self is for Aristotle. In the last 
chapter, I suggested ways of self-appropriation through character excellence, but we did 
not see what the self is for Aristotle. In his discussion of friendship, Aristotle tells us 
explicitly that the self is mind. In this chapter, then, I will clarify what “self as mind” 
must mean. This will allow us to see several things more clearly. First, we will be able to 
understand Aristotle’s claim that the friend is “another self.” The friend as another self 
will turn out to be not at all what it appears at first sight. Likewise, “self-love” will be 
understood as an unusual phenomena, quite different from what we might generally 
consider self-love to be. Next, understanding the self as mind will be indispensable for 
the discussion of contemplation in the final chapter. There, we will also be able 
retrospectively to see more clearly what sort of self-appropriation occurs in the character 
excellences. Let us now turn to Heidegger’s discussion of being-with. 
Being-with and the Self 
We dwell in a world of equipment that sits ready-to-hand, and we understand that the 
equipment is not only for oneself, but for others as well. These others, however, are 
revealed to us as quite distinct from the equipment we use. “These entities are neither 
present-at-hand nor ready-to-hand; on the contrary, they are like the very Dasein which 
frees them, in that they are there too, and there with it” (B&T, 154). Let us repeat what 
we saw in the second chapter. 
By ‘others’ we do not mean everyone else but me—those over against whom the 
“I” stands out. They are rather those from whom, for the most part, one does not 
                                                
1 We recall here the discussion of magnanimity in the previous chapter. 
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distinguish oneself—those among whom one is too…This ‘with’ is something of 
the character of Dasein; the ‘too’ means a sameness of being as circumspectively 
concernful being-in-the-world. (B&T, 154) 
 
We do not first take up being-with as a theme. We do not need to re-cognize that there 
are others there. Rather, we are with one another, and this is part of who we are. The 
newborn child, for instance, need not take a moment to survey the new world to 
recognize other beings there with her; she simply is there with others (mother, father, 
etc.). We are with each other in such a way so as, for the most part, not to distinguish 
ourselves from the others. Even when one makes attempts at individualization, this is 
done only upon the backdrop of already being-with-others.2 
 We have here a picture of human being as thoroughly and constitutively with 
others. We are involved in and concerned with our various projects, and others “show 
themselves in their special environmental being, and do so in terms of what is ready-to-
hand in that world” (B&T, 160). As we have seen, we do not comport ourselves toward 
others with concern (Besorgen), but by caring-for, or “solicitude” (Fürsorge). This is the 
realm in which we are. Thus, since the self is not isolated, but constituted by being-with-
others, self-knowledge is “grounded in being-with” (B&T, 161). Being-with is the basis 
of both self-knowledge and knowing others, whether this is inauthentic or authentic 
knowledge. Caring for others provides the basis even for inauthentic ways of caring for 
others, e.g., indifference, overlooking, treating the other as merely the sales clerk, etc. 
But it also provides the basis for authentically caring for and knowing the other by letting 
him be. 
 
                                                
2 See B&T, 156. Heidegger discusses the possibility of being alone as necessarily upon the backdrop of 
being-with-others.  
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Authentic Being-with 
At least one way of authentically being-with others is through what Heidegger calls 
“leaping ahead” (vorausspringen). This allows the one who springs ahead authentically to 
give the other his care. “This kind of solicitude pertains essentially to authentic care—
that is, to the existence of the other, not to a ‘what’ with which he is concerned; it helps 
the other to become transparent to himself in his care and to become free for it” (B&T, 
159). It is unclear what Heidegger could mean by “giving care back” to the other. How is 
it that one could give care to another, especially considering that the other already is 
constituted by care?  
 Magda King suggests that, unlike “leaping-in” (einspringen), which takes care 
over for the other, and “concerns primarily the handy things that have to be taken care 
of,” leaping-ahead “is not primarily concerned with what the other does but with his 
existence as a self.”3 King suggests further that leaping-ahead may help the other “to 
make him transparent to himself in his own being as care.”4 Perhaps it is not so much 
what the authentic self explicitly does for the other, but what he simply allows the other 
to do. Perhaps it is in letting the other be that the authentic person gives back care to the 
other. But, of course, the other still needs to take over his being for himself, and this is 
something only he can do. 
Although Heidegger says little about it, it is possible to be authentically with 
others. Using a rare example, he describes the possibility of people working together 
authentically. 
                                                
3 King, Guide, 77. 
4 King, Guide, 77. 
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…when they devote themselves to the same affair in common, their doing so is 
determined by the manner in which their Dasein, each in its own way, has been 
taken hold of. They thus become authentically bound together, and this makes 
possible the right kind of objectivity [die rechte Sachlichkeit], which frees the 
other in his freedom for himself. (B&T, 159) 
 
In order for people to be together in an authentic way, each person must have “taken 
hold” of herself individually. This means that each person must have authentically 
grasped who she is, and we have already seen the formula for how this happens. This 
allows us then to become truly open for the other, and to allow the other to be herself. 
When human beings are authentically together, they see one another in their being, and 
allow each other to be who they are, i.e., to take over and actualize their respective 
potentialities for being.  
 Let us recall Heidegger’s idea of self-knowledge as it relates to being-with others. 
Heidegger mentions a kind of self-knowledge or seeing of the self in “transparency” 
(Durchsichtigkeit). This seeing is a seeing-through.5 When Dasein really knows itself, 
i.e., knows itself authentically, it does so as seeing itself as a dynamic being in the world, 
who is as being alongside its world in concern, and being-with others in caring-for, or 
solicitude. Thus, as we saw in the second chapter, one’s being is authentically revealed as 
care, and as such, as being already in a world and with others. Dasein is not isolated in 
authenticity, but is with others in such a way as now to “have some understanding of the 
potentiality-for-being of others” (B&T, 309). That is, in authenticity, Dasein can 
understand others as the sort of being that they are. This could only be understood to the 
degree to which the authentic person sees the similarity of his own being to that of others, 
even though their being will play out in particularized ways that may differ from his own. 
                                                
5 Macquarrie and Robinson note that this self knowledge (Selbsterkenntnis) is distinguished from that 
quoted earlier (Sichkennen) by the former “being concerned with a full and sophisticated knowledge of the 
self in all its implications” (186). 
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 We recall that authentic resoluteness “pushes [the self] into solicitous being with 
others” (B&T, 344). Through authenticity, we are able to be with others in a way that 
allows for true disclosure of the other, and letting the other be who he or she is. This 
means that we will not make another person into a mere object of our pleasure or use, 
even if we find him pleasant or useful. We understand that we cannot make the other 
person into more, or less, than he is. This observation will be significant in our 
comparison of Heidegger’s concept of being-with to Aristotle’s concept of friendship. 
 So, one can authentically be with others only insofar he has understood himself as 
the sort of being he is, viz. care. This is also the case for the others as well. For there to be 
a genuine relationship, each member must have cleared the way for his or her own 
dynamic being. If this is the case, then insofar as each person is most truly care, they 
share in their being with one another. Insofar as those in question are most constitutively 
care, they are no different from one another. When they take over their being as care, 
they are able to become one. Authentically revealed as care, human beings can genuinely 
communicate. Their being is shared with one another as care. This sort of communication 
need not entail speech, although discourse is not excluded.  
Genuine Communication 
In his section on discourse or talk (Rede), Heidegger tells us that communication, or 
Mitteilung, is a way in which a “co-state-of-mind [Mitbefindlichkeit] gets ‘shared’ 
[Teilung], and so does the understanding of being-with [Mitsein]” (B&T, 205). Mitteilung 
is literally “with-part.” Those who communicate are with one another.  
Communication is never anything like a conveying of experiences, such as 
opinions or wishes, from the interior of one subject into the interior of another. 
Dasein-with is already essentially manifest in a co-state-of-mind and a co-
understanding. In discourse being-with becomes ‘explicitly’ shared [geteilt]; that 
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is to say, it is already, but it is unshared as something that has not been taken hold 
of and appropriated [ergriffenes und zugeignetes]. (B&T, 205) 
 
As beings who are constitutively with one another, we are able to communicate. 
Mitteilung shows that we are beings who are already sharing (geteilen) with one another. 
However, genuine sharing, taking part, or communicating with another happens only 
insofar as each person communicating has grasped and appropriated his or her own being.  
Heidegger designates hearing (hören) as an essential mode of discourse.  
Listening to (Das Hören auf)…is Dasein’s existential way of being-open 
[Offensein] as being-with for others. Indeed, hearing constitutes the primary and 
authentic way in which Dasein is open for its ownmost potentiality-for-being—as 
in hearing the voice of the friend whom every Dasein carries with it. (B&T, 206) 
 
The last, and rather strangely phrased, part of the quote is foreshadowing the discussion 
of conscience. It is on the basis of hearing that we are able to open ourselves to the call of 
conscience. We hear meanings, not mere tone-data or sheer sound. “If we say we have 
not heard aright, it is not by accident that we say we have not understood” (B&T, 206). 
Hearing and understanding go hand-in-hand. Hearing also allows us to listen to one 
another. If our own (eigen) being has been appropriated (zugeignetes), then we are able 
genuinely to communicate with others.  
Again, genuine communication need not run its course in speech. Another 
essential mode of discourse is being silent (Schweigen). Silence (Verschiegenheit) 
“articulates the intelligibility of Dasein in so primordial a manner that it gives rise to a 
potentiality-for-hearing which is genuine, and to a being-with-one-another which is 
transparent [durchsichtige]” (B&T, 208). Let us recall that transparency, or seeing 
through, is the phenomenon of genuine self-knowledge. In genuine communication, 
whether in speech or silence, our being with one another is shared. As such, the other 
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becomes transparent. We can truly know the other. In what way do we know the other? 
We know the other as care. Our being is shared insofar as we are both care. We are still 
particular beings since we are embodied creatures, but our being, as care, is ultimately the 
same. Whether or not a word is spoken or thought, we both understand each other in our 
very being. We have communicated.6 
Friendship 
Aristotle begins his discussion of friendship by immediately establishing why we need 
friends. Friendship is most necessary for life, and no one, he says, would choose to live 
without friends (NE, 1155a4-5). Aristotle will argue for these claims, but we should first 
notice the weight he gives to friendship. First, friendship is most necessary for living 
(ἀναγκαιότατον εἰς τὸν βίον). Not only is friendship in some way necessary for life, 
but additionally, no one would choose to live without friends (ἄνευ γὰρ φίλων οὐδεὶς 
ἕλοιτ᾽ἂν ζῆν). We should notice here that Aristotle has moved from what is necessary 
for life to how we would reasonably choose to live. Let us investigate Aristotle’s reasons 
behind these claims.  
 Even if one has all other goods, he would still choose friends. According to 
Aristotle, a prosperous life needs beneficence, or else it is useless.7 If one is rich and 
powerful, it seems he would want someone with whom to share the wealth. Moreover, 
there is great risk in having wealth, so one might need friends to preserve the riches. We 
think we need friends even more in poverty and hard times; friends may here be our only 
                                                
6 This section should suffice to undo Martin Buber’s objection that  “Heidegger’s self is a closed system” 
and that the authentic self, though acting in the world, “does not include the belief that in this life with the 
world the barriers of the self can be breached, nor even the desire that it should happen.” See Buber’s 
Between Man and Man, trans. Ronald Gregor-Smith (London and New York: Routledge Classics, 2002), 
199-203. If the self is care, we become one another as care. There is no closed system here. 
7 He will argue similarly in IX.9 for why happy people need friends. 
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comfort. Beyond this, both young and old need friends, since the former need good 
influence, and the latter need help as their bodies decline. Between these extremes, those 
in the “prime of life” need friends to stimulate noble activity (1155a6-16). So far, 
Aristotle seems to have touched on the great extremes of life. When rich or poor, in good 
times and bad, it seems we need friends.  When young or old, and even when one is in the 
prime of life, friends are needed. If we need friends at these extremes, then we will likely 
need them for life in general.  
 Now Aristotle moves on to show that friendship is even natural. It is not only 
needed in the general circumstances of life, but also for life itself. “Again, parent seems 
by nature to feel it for offspring and offspring for parent, not only among men but among 
birds and among most animals” (1155a16-19). Friendship is here claimed to be so basic 
to life that even parents among other species of animals feel it for their offspring. This is 
where we need to understand how broadly Aristotle uses “friendship,” or philia. 
Friendship, for Aristotle, extends to the most basic bonds between sentient beings. It is, 
as Martha Nussbaum notes, somewhat akin to our broad concept of love.8 Aristotle’s 
concept of friendship is broad enough to cover both the basic natural bonds that hold 
parent and child, as well as what we commonly mean today by “friendship.”9 
 From the most basic, natural unit of the family, Aristotle says friendship will even 
extend to the polis. 
We may even see in our travels how near and dear every man is to every other. 
Friendship seems too to hold states together, and lawgivers to care more for it 
than for justice; for unanimity seems to be something like friendship, and this they 
aim at most of all, and expel faction as their worst enemy; and when men are 
                                                
8 Martha Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 354. 
9 Nussbaum, Fragility, 328. Nussbaum chooses to leave philia untranslated, or to translate it as “love.” She 
says, “philia is extensionally wider than friendship—it takes in family relations, the relation between 
husband and wife, and erotic relationships, as well as what we would call ‘friendship’.” 
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friends, they have no need of justice, while when they are just they need 
friendship as well, and the truest form of justice is thought to be a friendly quality. 
(1155a20-28). 
 
As we saw above, Aristotle again directs us toward extremes. We move from the unit of 
the family, to that in which families are encompassed—the polis. Where there is 
friendship, there is no need for the imposition of justice through law. Where friendship is 
present, there is no need for that which artificially brings people together, since people 
are already together of their own accord. The just, however, will need friendship, since 
they themselves are fair, and will presumably need friends by which to be fair.10 
 Aristotle has shown us not only why we would choose to have friends—or more 
extremely, why we would not choose to live without them—but also why friendship is 
most necessary for life. Without the friendship or love of parents, life would literally not 
go on.11 Offspring need the care and love of parents in order to survive. Beyond survival, 
we wish to live good lives, and part of this goodness includes friends with whom to share 
in the goodness. Also in bad times, friends could be considered perhaps our only and 
greatest good. In the formation of cities and states, i.e., when human beings come 
together for civilization, we need the bond of friendship in order to work together. Thus, 
we see friendship is necessary for life, and worthy of choice for the good life. 
                                                
10 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Books VIII and IX, trans. with commentary by Michael Pakaluk (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1998). It is not likely, then, as Pakaluk suggests in his commentary, that the just 
might need friendship because they would otherwise quarrel, or because without friendship the just are not 
ready to participate well in civic life (49). 
11 In his commentary, Pakaluk says “necessary,” for Aristotle, “can mean ‘worth choosing for on account of 
something else’…and that seems to be its meaning here. The superlative would be appropriate because 
friendship is necessary in all three states of life (youth, prime of life, old age) and in various conditions of 
prosperity and misfortune” (46). While Pakaluk may be correct that “necessary” for Aristotle can 
sometimes mean “worth choosing on account of something else” (as when it is necessary to choose warm 
winter clothes to wear if one does not want to freeze), I do not think that is how it is used in this instance. 
The use of the superlative actually seems to suggest that without friendship, we literally could not live; thus 
the passage about parents and offspring. Moreover, Aristotle then mentions that friendship is worthy of 
choice; thus the passages about wealthy people wanting friends for beneficence.  
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Definition and Types of Friendship 
Friendship is being well-minded (εὐνοεῖν)12 and desiring or wishing good things 
(βούλεσθαι τἀγαθὰ) for the other’s own sake, when this is mutually recognized, or not 
overlooked (µὴ λανθάνοντας), between the friends (1156a4-5). The friends must both 
understand that they want good things for one another, and are well-minded toward one 
another. Otherwise, there may be no difference between friends and those who are simply 
well-minded or well-disposed toward one another, while having none of the other 
characteristics of friendship. In friendship, there is a “mutual and recognized love 
[ἀντιφίλησις οὐ λανθάνουσα], and those who love each other wish well to each other in 
that respect in which they love one another” (1156a9-10).13 But in what ways may friends 
love one another? 
 The three types of friendship are those of use, pleasure, and good character. 
Characteristic of the first two types is that the friends do not love one another based on 
good character, but only to the degree that the friend is pleasant or useful. Right away, 
Aristotle tells us: 
Now those who love each other for their utility do not love each other for 
themselves but in virtue of some good which they get from each other. So too 
with those who love for the sake of pleasure; it is not for their character that men 
love ready-witted people, but because they find them pleasant. Therefore those 
who love for the sake of utility love for the sake of what is good for themselves, 
and those who love for the sake of pleasure do so for the sake of what is pleasant 
to themselves, and not insofar as the other person is loved but insofar as he is 
useful or pleasant. (1156a10-17) 
 
                                                
12 It will become clearer why I have chosen to translate eunoein more literally as “well-minded” rather than 
the typical “goodwill.” I do not think the latter translation is bad (even if ‘will’ is slightly misleading or 
perhaps anachronistic for Aristotle), but as we shall see, I think Aristotle intends for his audience at least to 
be peripherally aware of the etymological meaning.  
13 All words translated here as “love” and its cognates are from some form of the Greek verb phileo. 
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Friendships of use and pleasure are based out of a love that conceives of the other person 
as useful or pleasant. First, let us note that Aristotle does not at all consider these kinds of 
friendships to be depraved in any way. It is typical and ordinary for us to love others for 
their usefulness, or for whatever pleasure they bring us. We naturally want good things 
for ourselves, and when we judge someone to be useful (e.g., a ride to work) or pleasant 
(e.g., ready-witted) to us in some way, then this is generally good for us. Let us notice 
that these friendships are largely self-directed. I love a pleasant friend because he pleases 
me in some way. 
 While these types of friendship are not bad, Aristotle does consider them 
incidental (κατὰ συµβεβηκός), “for it is not for being the man he is that the loved person 
is loved, but as providing some good or pleasure” (1156a17-19). In friendships of use and 
pleasure, the friend is loved as pleasurable or useful.14 Thus, since there is no firm ground 
to stand on, i.e., character, these friendships may be easily dissolved, “if the parties do 
not remain like themselves; for if one party is no longer pleasant or useful the other 
ceases to love him” (1156a19-21). If a pleasurable friend changes, and is no longer 
pleasant in the way I found him to be, then we will likely no longer be friends. Likewise, 
if I change in what I find pleasant, then the friends I once thought pleasant are no longer. 
These friendships are often ephemeral since they deal with fluctuating things. 
                                                
14 This need not entail that pleasure-friendships and use-friendships do not include friends loving one 
another for their own sake, as John Cooper has shown. See Cooper’s article, “Aristotle on Friendship,” in 
Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, ed. Amelie Rorty (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 
1980), 311. Cooper says, “A character friend wishes his friend to prosper because he recognizes his good 
character and thinks that it is fitting for those who are morally good to prosper.” Likewise, “the pleasure-
friend will now be said to wish well to his friend for his friend’s own sake, in consequence of recognizing 
him as someone who is and has been an enjoyable companion, and the advantage-friend wishes his friend 
well for his friend’s own sake, in consequence of recognizing him as someone who regularly benefits him 
and has done so in the past.” All this is in contrast to the idea that a pleasure- or use-friend could only wish 
his friend well to gain some personal benefit in the future. Perhaps my further interpretation of the self 
below will shed light on this topic—the pleasure and use friendships do not include a love of their friends 
as what they most are, i.e., mind. 
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 The friendship of goodness, on the other hand, is enduring because the excellence 
upon which it is founded is enduring. Let us recall that the life of excellence is habitually 
practiced. It would take great and perhaps perpetual misfortune to make a good life bad. 
Aristotle calls this a perfect or complete (τελεία) friendship. In a friendship of character, 
and especially of good character,15 the end or telos of friendship is fulfilled. Good friends 
are “alike in excellence; for these wish well alike to each other qua good, and they are 
good in themselves” (1156b8-10). Good friends, alike in excellence, love each other for 
the other’s own sake, and thus are most considered friends. They are friends without 
qualification, or simply (ἁπλῶς) friends. Their friendship stands on no pretense. There is 
nothing else required than that each be the one he or she already is. In addition, they are 
both pleasant and useful to one another. So, this is a complete friendship, since it also 
includes the other incidental types of friendship. It is also complete to the degree that 
each friend is a fulfilled or complete person through virtue. 
 Let us note also that strong friendships take time to develop, and demand the 
intimacy of “living together,” by which Aristotle means that the friends will devote much 
time to one another, enjoying the same things as one another (1157b5-24). Good 
friendships need time, and cannot develop overnight. The friends will also love each 
other. 
Now it looks as if love were a passion, friendship a state; for love may be felt just 
as much towards lifeless things, but mutual love involves choice and choice 
springs from a state; and men wish well to those whom they love, for their sake, 
not as a result of passion but as a result of a state. (1157b28-32) 
 
                                                
15 See again Cooper’s “Aristotle on Friendship,” where he insists that it is better to refer to this type of 
friendship as a “character friendship,” since this expression “brings out accurately the basis for the 
relationship is the recognition of good qualities of character, without in any way implying that the parties 
are moral heroes” (308). This seems to agree with my view that there are degrees of goodness 
(approximation to excellence), and that this is how must of us will live. 
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Whereas love (φίλησις) is normally considered a passion or something undergone 
(πάθει), in a friendship based upon good character, there is a degree to which the friends 
choose to love one another, as this choice comes from their disposition or state (ἕξει) of 
being good. From being good, one wishes good things for his friend for his own sake, and 
thus loves him, or has a friendly feeling toward him. Thus, the love here is not something 
merely and uncontrollably felt, but comes from a steady way of being (good).  
The Self and Friendship 
Aristotle goes on, in IX.4 to tell us that friendships proceed from the relation one has to 
oneself, or the way one is toward oneself (ἒοικεν ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐληλυθέναι). We 
consider friends those who wish good things to one another for their own sake, and also 
those who wish their friends to be and live for their own sake (βουλόµενον εἶναι καὶ 
ζῆν). These good things, says Aristotle, are also what each good person wishes for 
himself, and this is also true for everyone else, “insofar as they think themselves good” 
(1166a10-11). Notice that Aristotle begins by saying the good person wants good things 
(virtue) for himself, but he extends this to anyone who takes himself to be good. While 
the good man is the “measure of every class of things,” i.e., that by which we judge 
things to be good, one need not be excellent to have some degree of goodness. Thus, 
wishing good things for oneself is not here restricted only to excellent people, who are 
very rare, but extends to anyone to the degree that he is good.16 
 In the last chapter, I argued for different ways of self-appropriation through 
character excellence. However, we did not see what the self most properly is for 
                                                
16 This corresponds to John Cooper’s argument represented above. 
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Aristotle. If the good person wishes good things for himself, and is in good relation to 
himself, what is the self? 
[The good person’s] opinions are harmonious, and he desires the same things with 
all his soul; and therefore he wishes for himself what is good and what seems so, 
and does it (for it is characteristic of the good man to exert himself for the good), 
and does so for his own sake (for he does it for the sake of the intellectual element 
in him, which is thought to be the man himself); and he wishes himself to live and 
be preserved, and especially the element by virtue of which he thinks. (1166a12-
19) 
 
What is this self? The self is mind, or the thinking element (διανοητικὀς). The good 
person is of one mind with himself (ὁµογνωµονεῖ), and whatever he desires (the desired 
things being good), he desires wholly, and not only desires them, but does them. There is 
no tension between what reason says and what is desired. He is collected and together, 
and does not desire haphazardly, and is not unclear about what he desires (virtue). All of 
this is done for the sake of himself (ἑαυτοῦ ἕνεκα), and we see that this “self” is the 
thinking element or mind. 
 Since being is good for those who are good, they will wish to continue living, and 
enjoying the good life. However, they will do this only on the condition that they 
themselves can enjoy it: 
while no one chooses to possess the whole world if he has first to become 
someone else…he wishes for this only on condition of being whatever he is; and 
the element that thinks would seem to be the individual man, or to be so more 
than any other element in him. (1166a20-24) 
 
We wish good things for ourselves, as we are here—i.e. our human, mortal selves. If we 
were to wish for the greatest things, e.g., becoming gods, we would no longer enjoy this 
goodness. If, for example, I wish good things for myself, I do so only on the condition 
that I can enjoy them. If I have to become other than I am—if I have to lose myself to 
become other than myself—to enjoy good things, then I cannot reasonably wish these 
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good things for myself. It would not be me who enjoys them, but whoever it is I become. 
Aristotle reiterates who the self is, but this time by saying that mind is to be considered 
self more than anything else (δόξειε δ᾽ἂν τὸ νοοῦν ἕκαστος εἶναι ἢ µάλιστα). Why 
introduce the qualification, “more than anything else”? Let us take a look at the subtleties 
of Aristotle’s definition of self.17 
Identifying the Self as Mind 
As Suzanne Stern-Gillet has rightly suggested, Aristotle’s concept of self is very different 
from any modern conception of self. 
As for a theory of the self, Aristotle had none that could even remotely be 
compared with modern ones. Nowhere does he systematically set out to address 
explicitly formulated and related questions on the issues of self-identity, 
personhood, and individuality. Nowhere does he attempt to uncover, formulate, 
and critically examine the structure of his predecessor’s or his contemporaries’ 
concepts of selfhood.18  
 
While Aristotle spoke plenty about soul, his conception of selfhood is not given a full 
account. Thus, we shall attempt here to unpack what Aristotle’s concept of self is, in its 
relation to the happy life, and particularly the life of friendship. It is, however, important 
to note that “Aristotle’s notion of the self differs significantly from later, more purely 
cognitive and descriptive, concepts of selfhood.”19 Beyond this, we shall see that the self 
is not for Aristotle a private “inner” world into which the subject delves for self-
                                                
17 My interpretation of Aristotle’s conception the self agrees with Charles Kahn’s interpretation. His 
interpretation may be found in his article, “Aristotle and Altruism,” in Mind, Vol. 90, no. 357 (January, 
1981), 20-40.  
18 Suzanne Stern-Gillet, Aristotle’s Philosophy of Friendship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1995), 18. 
19 Stern-Gillet, Friendship, 19. 
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discovery. Rather, it is a self firmly planted within the world, and one who is absorbed, as 
it were, in that world.20 
The self is said to be nous, or mind. Mind is the faculty for thought, whether 
theoretical or practical.21 As suggested in De Anima, mind is made manifest in thinking, 
reasoning, or logos. Mind thinks universals, and has knowledge by means of them.22 We 
need not reference De Anima in order to understand that self is mind in Nicomachean 
Ethics, or even to have some understanding of what this could mean in an ethical context. 
We only need recall that the human ergon must involve logos, and from there, it is only a 
few steps toward establishing the role of mind in a practical science (mind allows for 
logos). However, if we are to unpack thoroughly what self as mind could mean, then we 
must think beyond what is explicitly given in the Ethics. Aristotle could not have told us, 
in the context of a practical science, what it means for the self to be mind.  
Since mind thinks by means of universals, and since all human beings have mind, 
each human being has a share in universality.23 However, we are embodied creatures, not 
                                                
20 Stern-Gillet, Friendship, 16. Stern-Gillet here translates J.P. Vernant in this way: “The subject does not 
constitute a closed internal world, which he must enter in order to find or, rather, to discover himself. The 
subject is turned to the outside. In the same way as the eye does not see itself, the individual looks 
elsewhere, outwards, before apprehending himself. His consciousness of self is not a reflexive process, a 
retreat into himself, an internal enclosing, face to face with his own person: it is existential.” This may be 
found in the original French: L’Individu, la Mort, l’Amour: Soi-meme et Autre en Grece Ancienne, (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1989), 214. 
21 Stern-Gillet, Friendship, 26. Stern-Gillet claims, “Practical reason…constitutes the hub around which the 
self is formed, since it alone can effect the integration of the various psychic elements into a whole.” I do 
not know if I can go all the way with Stern-Gillet here. Claiming practical reason as “the hub” of the self is 
in some way sensible, since it appears prior to the discussion of theôria as the apex of happiness. On the 
other hand, it seems that Aristotle would not want to restrict the self primarily to practical or theoretical 
reason, but would rather see mind as the capacity for either of these. 
22 This comes from De Anima, 417b21-23. Kahn also employs De Anima in his article (35).  
23 Kahn offers a “strong” interpretation of friendship as other self, saying that Aristotle has three distinct 
claims: “A. The true or deepest self of a human being is his or her nous. B. The nous of all human beings is 
fundamentally one and the same. C. Perfect friendship between persons of outstanding excellence is a 
relationship in which each partner becomes (at least obscurely) aware of the identity asserted in B, and 
hence recognizes (at least implicitly) the true self of the other as identical with his or her own true self.” We 
will say more about C later. For now, let us modify B by saying that the nous, qua nous, of all human 
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just minds. A human being is a “this here,” an embodied being. We sense particulars 
(with our bodies), but know them by means of universals (with our minds). Moreover, as 
embodied creatures we also have desires. For the good person, desire obeys the reasoning 
or thinking part of the soul. Each person has mind, which thinks by means of universals, 
but each person also desires and has particular appetites. In addition, as Charles Kahn has 
noticed, it is not only the body that individuates us, but also the way in which we use our 
minds. “Such an intellect will be individualized by its particular stock of phantasms, the 
range of concepts it has assimilated, and the degree of scientific training it has achieved 
(as well as by its broader connections with the emotional and sensory faculties in action 
and perception).”24 The way I take things up into my imagination may be peculiar to me. 
Also, the way I relate (with mind) to my emotions may be more or less peculiar to me. As 
Stern-Gillet suggests, “Rather than, in the strict sense of the term, identifying human 
beings with their nous at the exclusion of anything else in the Soul…Aristotle assigns to 
nous the exercise of a regulating and predominating influence over the other elements in 
the human soul.”25  
By saying that the self is more mind than anything else, Aristotle is taking into 
account the fact that we are primarily mind—that is, mind primarily defines us as 
humans—but we are also body. This fits well with our analysis of Book I.7 concerning 
the human function. We also have bodily desires, but these are meaningless for us 
without mind. That is, they cannot be pursued, controlled, enjoyed, or shirked without our 
understanding—an understanding mind makes possible—that they are worth pursuing, 
                                                                                                                                            
beings is fundamentally one and the same. The reason for this modification shall become clear as the 
chapter proceeds. 
24 Kahn, “Altruism,” 36. 
25 Stern-Gillet, Friendship, 27.  
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controlling, etc. Yet, this is not to discount the fact that we are also our bodies, and this is 
what is most particular about us.  
If we were merely minds, no one would presumably be distinguished from anyone 
else. All minds would think universals, and so be universally disposed; there would be 
nothing here to individuate this person from that one. There would, in short, be no 
persons at all.26 If we were only mind, even the thoughts that we think would not be 
individuated, because there would be no phantasms, or images, by which to think them. 
Phantasms ultimately come to us through the senses, or aesthesis. We then use these 
images for thought. As said above, these images used by my mind are mine and not yours 
ultimately because they find their source in my body. So, even if you and I, for example, 
both understand the make-up of an atom, but you describe it with different imagery than I 
do, it is not because our minds are inherently different. Rather, it is because our “stock of 
phantasms” are different, and this differentiation is ultimately sourced in our bodily 
individuation. Our minds, qua minds, are not different.27  
 Let us recall that the soul, for Aristotle, is not literally divided, nor is it separate 
from body.28 We can logically, or in thought, divide the soul into its constituent parts, one 
of which is mind (assuming mind is part of the soul) and another the appetitive part. We 
must remember, however, that these are all parts of a unitary, composite being—the 
human being. So, we can call the whole human being “self” but strictly speaking, and 
especially in the context of wishing well to ourselves, or loving ourselves and excellence, 
                                                
26 Kahn refers to a “impersonal” or “superpersonal principle of reason” (38).  
27 This distinction will become important in our discussion of self-love, and in the discussion of 
contemplation in the final chapter. 
28 See De Anima II.2., trans. J.A. Smith, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). “Hence, the rightness of the view that the soul cannot be 
without a body” (414a19-20). 
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we consider the self mostly to be mind. As Stern-Gillet suggests, mind is the “sine qua 
non of an integrated personality. But it is also a sine qua non in so far as it constitutes the 
one specifically human element in the soul, upon whose recognition as such moral virtue 
depends.” Stern-Gillet rightly treats mind in this context as the “steward” of our a-
rational drives.29 
 The self is most mind, thus identified with universality, but there is also bodily 
desire and appetite. The latter are particularities, and play out more or less particularly for 
different types of people. For instance, the excellent person sides more with mind, and 
using his mind controls well his bodily appetites. Thus, he knows himself best (recall our 
discussion of magnanimity), since his mind directs the bodily appetites. As Kahn says, “it 
is only by the action of this intelligent principle in us that we are able to live the rational 
life of moral and intellectual excellence.”30 Character is often determined by the way in 
which we deal with our lives as human beings, i.e., as embodied and thoughtful beings. 
Even the most excellent person will have bodily appetites, “for all men [πάντες] enjoy in 
some way or other both dainty foods and wines and sexual intercourse, but not all men do 
so as they ought” (1154a18-19). These appetites are a real part of everyone. Yet, in the 
case of good people, these appetites are least what identify them as selves. Nevertheless, 
even the good person is going to be one who enjoys this or that type of food, but in the 
right way.31 It is mind that allows for this “right way” to take its course. 
                                                
29 Stern-Gillet, Friendship, 27.  
30 Kahn, “Altruism,” 37. 
31 Moreover, the good person, being of one mind with her herself, controls these appetites so that, as we 
recall, there is no struggle between desires. This is contrary to Lorraine Smith Pangle’s argument in 
Aristotle and the Philosophy of Friendship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 145-146. “To 
be wholly and continually ‘of one mind with oneself,’ desiring the same thing ‘with one’s whole soul’ 
(1166a13-14), would seem to be completely attainable only in the case of a simple being who had only one 
interest and one activity, such as the Aristotelian divinity that has no body and that finds its happiness in 
contemplation (1154b20-31). For, composite beings such as we are, with an inability always to take 
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The bad person, however, is at variance with himself, and does not know how 
properly to direct his bodily appetites or desires (1166b6-7). 
This is true, for instance, of incontinent people; for they choose, instead of the 
things they themselves think good, things that are pleasant but hurtful; while 
others again, through cowardice or laziness, shrink from doing what they think 
best for themselves. And those who have done many terrible deeds and are hated 
for their wickedness even shrink from life and destroy themselves. (1166b7-13) 
 
Incontinent people may see what is best, but they do not do it. They give into what is 
immediately pleasant, rather than what is ultimately best. Beyond the incontinent are the 
wicked who flee (φεύγουσι) life and destroy (ἀναιροῦσιν) themselves by their habitually 
bad deeds. The bad identify themselves with their appetites, and thus, their real self is 
slowly destroyed through bad living.32 The bad, in other words, do not know themselves. 
They are the utter opposite of the good person, who is of one mind with himself, and 
collected. Those who identify themselves with appetites are pulled in the direction of 
those various appetites, and are therefore scattered among these appetites. They cannot 
preserve themselves. Thus, the good self is most himself, and knows it, while those 
identifying themselves by their appetites, likes, dislikes, etc., are least themselves.33 
                                                                                                                                            
pleasure in the same thing and with a variety of serious concerns, it is impossible to avoid moments of 
feeling torn.” Pangle has misquoted Aristotle. At 1166a13-14, Aristotle does not say that the harmonious 
person desires the same thing with all his soul, but the same things (τῶν αὐτῶν). Thus, even his various 
bodily desires are not in conflict with his overall well-being. His desire for a moderate amount of fine food 
or drink, for instance, is never in conflict with what his reason tells him to do. While this may be an ideal, 
there is no need to equate Aristotle’s excellent person with the unmoved mover.   
32 This is perhaps why Aristotle insists that becoming better after being bad is so very difficult. If the self, 
or mind, is destroyed (or even nearly so), then it is unlikely that the bad person will listen to reason, and 
thus, needs punishment before argument. 
33 Stern-Gillet, Friendship, 29. Stern-Gillet here treats the self as “an achievement word,” ostensibly 
meaning that one must work toward excellence, and thereby gradually achieve real selfhood. Since, 
however, we have determined that Aristotle permits degrees of goodness and approximations to excellence, 
it is possible for someone to be more or less “himself,” to the degree that he is good. Thus, there is no need 
to follow Stern-Gillet in suggesting, “akratic and vicious people are not ‘selves’.” Her own reason for this 
conclusion should be contrary to the conclusion: “not only do their passions and appetites pull in different 
directions, but they rebel against and weaken the part that ought to direct them.” If the vicious do rebel or 
weaken mind, this suggests that mind is still there, but is not dominant in the vicious person’s life. This 
means that the self is still present, but is not collected and dominant in the way that the excellent self is. In 
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 This is not to conclude that Aristotle encourages us to shed our likes and dislikes, 
or be unconcerned with the pleasures others take in things, if these pleasures are other 
than theoretical enterprises. For instance, our general way of getting to know people—
being first interested in what music, books, or foods they enjoy—is productive and 
helpful for us. It allows us a view into that person’s world, and then perhaps later, with 
time, we begin to know the person more and more, beyond those likes and dislikes. Even 
then, we do not disregard the other interests he or she might take, but we see they find 
their proper place as regards who he or she is. So, the particulars are still present, e.g., my 
friend’s favorite foods or songs, but as we grow together, I do not identify her (her self) 
by those things only.  
Let us say more about the universality of self. Insofar as we identify the self as 
mind, we are left with something of a paradox. The self as mind is the least self-ish sort 
of self that we could conceive. We normally tend to conceive of the self much in the 
same way as Heidegger claimed das Man conceives the self. We tend to think of the self 
as a static “me” or “I”—a truly individuated substance or subject. Granted, as said above, 
even mind could be individuated, in respect of that which it thinks—it thinks using these 
particular phantasms gathered from this particular aesthetic experience, or set of 
experiences. However, when one is self-controlled or of one mind with oneself, the 
individuating characteristics of the thought are least self-defining, while the universal 
disposition of thought is more characteristic of that self. In intellectual or character 
excellence, the good person strives for excellence, and this is in one respect beyond 
individuation (insofar as it is excellence, it is beyond individuation, but insofar as this 
                                                                                                                                            
other words, while mind is most the self, the vicious identify themselves least as mind, but most as their 
appetites.  
  130 
person is habitually excellent, the excellence is individuated). The self, then, insofar as it 
is mind, is by our standards quite unlike any other concept of self as individual. 
Moreover, it is the universality of self that allows for the sharing of oneself with another. 
The Friend is Another Self 
For this reason, then, the good person is also “related to his friend as to himself (for his 
friend is another self)” (NE, 1166a31-32). The friend is another self not because he is 
another “me” as compound of matter and form, but because, in the highest type of 
friendship, the friends are like each other via the universality of mind and the virtue in 
which they share.34 The most universal element in them is most who they are, and thus, 
they are in a sense the same as one another. Kahn says, “The true self, then, which I and 
my friend have in common, is our relationship to this impersonal or superpersonal 
principle of reason; that is to say, our true self is its activity in us, which makes our own 
thoughts and actions rational, to the extent that they are shaped by it.”35 When a 
friendship is based upon good character—or character to the degree that it is good—then 
we can see ourselves in our friends, because we both share in the same things, i.e., we 
                                                
34 See Dean Cocking and Jeanette Kennett’s “Friendship and the Self,” in Ethics, Vol. 108, No. 3 (April 
1998), 502-527. It is not the case, as Cocking and Kennett suggest, that the likeness of the friends is the 
basis upon which their friendship stands (506-507). Indeed, in friendships of character the friends are like 
each other insofar as they are good, but it is the character and goodness that is the basis of the friendship, 
not primarily the likeness between the friends. In other words, that the friends are like each other is 
incidental to their goodness. Again, in a footnote, Cocking and Kennett falsely give the “likeness” position 
to Aristotle. “It follows then that I cannot love you for any characteristics which I am unable to love in 
myself…Perhaps I am not inclined toward friendship with you because I do not like what I see of me when 
I look at you. I see my mean streak reflected in you or my tendency to brood over imagined slights. I am 
surely more likely to be inclined toward friendship with someone in whom I see reflected my particular 
sense of humor or my burning concern with social issues” (508, fn. 11). This arises from a 
misunderstanding of what the self is for Aristotle. As I shall show, the good sort of self-love is not loving 
individual characteristics (sense of humor, for example), but mind, which is in some sense beyond the 
individual, though in the individual. The friend, then, is not another self because he or she shares in my 
particular characteristics, but insofar as he or she shares in mind. 
35 Kahn, “Altruism,” 38. 
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both share in goodness, and we are both mind. It is the universal disposition of mind that 
allows us to say that the friend, and especially the good friend, is another self.  
 This is not to say that there is no individuation between friends. Again, we are 
talking about embodied human beings who have appetites of a certain sort. However, 
insofar as the friends are themselves good, they both embody excellence. They are at one 
mind with themselves, since their desires are under the control of who they most are. 
Good people do good things, and to that extent—i.e., to the extent that one is courageous, 
temperate, etc.—their selves are universal. Yet, they do these things here, now, and with 
respect to these people, etc. Thus, the virtue, insofar as it is enacted by this person, 
becomes to some degree particularized.36 “Thus, for instance, if Callias is joined with 
Coriscus in primary friendship, it is Coriscus’ particular courage that Callias apprehends 
and likes rather than courage simpliciter.”37 As mentioned above, good friends will know 
and appreciate even the most particular things about each other. “Not only do primary 
friends know of each other’s current views, interests, goals, sorrows, and successes, but 
they are also in a position empathetically to understand how these arise from earlier 
influences, achievements, traumas, difficulties, ambitions, etc. Each knows how the other 
became the virtuous individual he now is.”38 
 In friendships of pleasure or use, we love the friend for his sake, but we are here 
identifying him (his self) as pleasurable or useful. We also recall that these friendships are 
                                                
36 Kahn, “Altruism,” 38-39. True friends are “identical with one another only in that our ‘true selves’ are 
identified with the very same principle of intelligence active in us both; but the mode and circumstances of 
its activity are inevitably different for each of us. Not only is our empirical awareness (aesthesis) body-
dependent and hence individualized, but the concrete problems on which, and the conditions in which, 
reason is exercised will differ from person to person. Even the best of friends are not identical with one 
another. Hence the repeated qualification: the being of one’s friend is just as precious as one’s own ‘or 
nearly so’. For the self which loves (and acts and dies) is a person, the individual human being.” 
37 Stern-Gillet, Friendship, 47.  
38 Stern-Gillet, Friendship, 47. 
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most easily dissolved, as we may no longer find pleasure or use in our former friend. 
When friendships are based upon pleasure and use, they are based upon particulars that 
the friends happen to have in common. These particulars are often shifting, since they 
deal with changeable, bodily things, or things that are only temporarily useful. 
Friendships based upon character, and especially good character, are not based upon 
transitory things. Good people are, we recall, at one with themselves, “being, so to say, of 
one mind (for the wishes of such men are constant and not at the mercy of opposing 
currents like a strait of the sea)” (1167b6-8). Thus, these friendships tend to last, since we 
love the other as who she most properly is. 
 Since it is because of mind that we claim the friend to be another self, we can also 
see new meaning in Aristotle’s definition of friendship, which says that friends are well-
minded toward one another. This is especially significant in friendships of good 
character. We wish our friends good things and are well-minded or well-disposed 
towards them, and this is mutually recognized. The mutual recognition of well-
mindedness allows for the union of friendship. In mutual recognition, friendship is made; 
for well-mindedness alone does not make a friendship, since we can be well-minded even 
towards competitors or people we know very little (1166b301167a3). Being well-minded 
is a beginning or principle (ἀρχή) of friendship, and after intimacy and time, there 
develops a mutual recognition and real friendship (1167a11-12). It is through the 
universality of mind that the friend is another self, and the other self is a friend because 
we are well-minded toward one another. 
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Self-Love 
Not only is a friend another self and loved, but good people should also love themselves. 
Before saying how or why good people love themselves, Aristotle reveals the ways in 
which we normally think self-love to be bad. 
Those who use the term as one of reproach ascribe self-love to people who assign 
to themselves the greater share of wealth, honors, and bodily pleasures; for these 
are what most people desire, and busy themselves about as though they were the 
best of all things, which is reason, too, why they become objects of competition. 
So those who are grasping with regard to these things gratify their appetites and in 
general their feelings and the irrational element of the soul…it is just, therefore, 
that men who are lovers of self in this way are reproached for being so. (1168b14-
23) 
 
The term “self-love” (φίλαυτον) is often used reproachfully. We think of “self-
absorbed” people as, in the least, unpleasant company. The grasping, or those who claim 
more than their due (πλεονέκται), especially of bodily pleasures, money, etc., are justly 
reproached. They gratify only their desires (ἐπιθυµίαις) and passions (πάθεσι), or 
generally the part of the soul without logos (τῶ ἀλόγῳ τῆς ψυχῆς). Interestingly, 
Aristotle notes that it is these sorts of people busying themselves about such things that 
gives rise to competition. The Greek here actually reads: διὸ καὶ περιµάχητά ἐστιν. 
When people treat wealth, honors, and bodily pleasures as though they were the best of 
things (ὡς ἄριστα), then they fight. When the self is treated as nothing more than a ball 
of appetites and passions, then this can cause tension between all those simultaneously 
desiring the same things.  
 Is it possible, then, to love oneself in a good way, or a way that should not be 
reproached? Whoever desires to act justly, temperately, and in accordance with the 
excellences in general, seems “more than the other a lover of self” (1168b29). That is, 
those who assign themselves the greatest goods (i.e., activities in accordance with 
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excellence) are most properly called lovers of self, and more so than the reproachable 
self-lovers. Aristotle seems to be telling us here that the reproachable self-lovers are not, 
strictly speaking, lovers of self, but lovers of what they mistakenly consider themselves 
to be. “Self-love” is so often a disgraceful epithet because people often mistake their 
desires, appetites, etc., for who they “really” or most are. As we have seen, this sort of 
mistake can lead to, in the extreme, the dissolution of self, or at least a scattered version 
of the self wherein the part of the soul without logos seems to rule more than mind. 
 The good person is self-controlled and of one mind with himself. He is most 
properly a lover of self. Again, the self he loves is the mind. 
A man is said to have or not to have self-control according as his intellect has or 
has not the control, on the assumption that this is the man himself; and the things 
men have done from reason are thought most properly their own acts and 
voluntary acts. That this is the man himself, then, or is so more than anything else, 
is plain, and also that the good man loves most this part of him. Whence it follows 
that he is most truly a lover of self, of another type than that which is a matter of 
reproach, and as different from that as living according to reason is from living as 
passion dictates, and desiring what is noble from desiring what seems 
advantageous. (1168b34-a6) 
 
When one has chosen to do something, i.e. deliberated about this or that course of action, 
then we consider that chosen act to be most properly his own action, rather than 
involuntary actions, or even actions from appetite. It is the mind that ultimately gives rise 
to the choice, and so mind must be most the self. We should also see now that the most 
proper self love is not particularly “egoist.” As Kahn observes, when we consider nous 
the true self, the “issue of egoism versus altruism collapses, because of the collapse of the 
distinction in principle between the self and the other.”39 Again, the self that is here loved 
is not the particularized “me” identified by “my” bodily pleasures, pains, etc., but rather a 
universally disposed self. The analogies Aristotle draws at the end of the quote are 
                                                
39 Kahn, “Altruism,” 39. 
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significant. The good self-lover is as different  from the bad self-lover as a reasonable life 
is from a passionate one, and as desiring nobility is from desiring advantage. Those who 
live according to passion and desire advantage identify themselves with and by these 
things. They mistake themselves for what they desire. Those who live according to mind 
desire what is noble, and are taken up into that nobility. 
  This brings us back to the point discussed above. Even though the self that is 
loved is properly mind, mind could not be loved without body. Aristotle treats love as an 
undergoing, or “passion” (1105b21-23). We saw earlier how mutual love between good 
friends involves choice. This sort of love seems a little more firm and lasting than a mere 
undergoing. However, this does not occlude the fact that they are still feeling. Good 
people allow mind to be in control. This means that their passions are under control of 
reason. This means that the love they feel is more or less stable as their lives take on 
more or less the stability of excellence. Yet, they still feel. This cannot happen without 
body. That is to say, there must be body for there to be love, even where this love is held 
under mind’s sway. 
 The mind cannot love itself, since mind is impassive, or apathê. So, when the 
good self-lover loves herself, her self-love requires embodiment. Notice the contrast 
Aristotle draws. The good sort of self-love is as different from the bad sort as desiring 
what is noble is different from desiring what seems merely advantageous. It is telling that 
Aristotle’s analogy involves desire. He sets up a contrast of desire where one desire is 
good, and the other is only seemingly good, but is in fact bad. The desire for nobility is 
good, and results ultimately from the desirer being of one mind with herself. The desire 
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for what seems advantageous is bad, and results ultimately from the desirer not being of 
one mind with himself.  
   Self-love is analogous in that it too involves something bodily—love. Self-love 
is under the direction of mind, and strangely, directed back toward the self as mind. But 
this, as Kahn has noticed, must involve the whole, composite being. “But the self-love of 
the good man is simply the loving commitment of the whole person, or the whole psyche, 
to the welfare or predominance of this principle [nous] in us. And the welfare of this 
principle in us is our own life of virtuous activity.”40 To say that it is the loving 
commitment of the “whole psyche” means that the whole, embodied human being is 
involved in self-love. Moreover, as Kahn tells us, the self-love runs its course and is 
fulfilled in excellent activity. The self-lover need not make a mental theme of this self-
love. Rather, she loves herself through her own good living. Her good activity is a 
testament to her respect and love for herself.  
Needing Friends and Loving Life 
Aristotle now returns to the question of whether or not we need friends. More precisely, 
he asks whether or not the happy person will need friends, since the happy person is 
thought to be most self-sufficient, and already to have the greatest good(s). It is 
characteristic of the good person to live an active life, and this will include doing good 
things for others. Thus, the good person needs friends by which to do well (1169b13). 
Surely it is strange, too, to make the blessed man a solitary; for no one would 
choose to possess all good things on condition of being alone, since man is a 
political creature and one whose nature is to live with others. Therefore, even the 
happy man lives with others; for he has the things that are by nature good. 
(1169b17-19) 
 
                                                
40 Kahn, “Altruism,” 38. 
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The better we are, the more we fulfill the human function. To put it differently, the better 
we are, the more human we are, since the primary work of human being is fulfilled 
through our activity. If we are, then, political by nature, and naturally are with others, 
then the good person will fulfill that part of his nature, which is being with others. He 
therefore needs friends insofar as this fulfills his nature. Qua good, he will be with others 
he loves, with whom he wants to spend his time, upon whom he will confer goods, and 
with whom he will share goods. Along with this, it is easier to be continuously active 
with and toward others than by oneself (1170a4-7). We are able to discuss with others, 
and arguably thinking is often most productive with others, since we are able to hear new 
ideas and criticize our own more easily with others.  
 Those who might think the happy person needs no friends likely think so because 
they consider friends to be useful or pleasurable only. If these were the only types of 
friendships, then the happy person might have little use for them. Aristotle offers a 
further argument why the happy person will need friends. 
We have said at the outset that happiness is an activity; and activity plainly comes 
into being and is not present at the start like a piece of property. If happiness lies 
in living and being active, and the good man’s activity is virtuous and pleasant in 
itself…and if a thing’s being one’s own is one of the attributes that make it 
pleasant, and if we can contemplate our neighbors better than ourselves and their 
actions better than our own, and if the actions of virtuous men who are their 
friends are pleasant to good men…the blessed man will need friends of this sort, 
since he chooses to contemplate worthy actions and actions that are his own, and 
the actions of a good man who is his friend have both these qualities. (1169b29-
1170a4) 
 
Happiness is found in living and activity—specifically, activity of the soul in accordance 
with excellence. Since this is the case, and this activity is pleasant to the one doing the 
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acting, it is difficult for the one doing the acting to contemplate41 the actions he does, 
except in hindsight. Moreover, we are often too close to ourselves to contemplate well 
our own actions. We thus need distance—a better perspective—from which to 
contemplate good action. We take pleasure in our own good action at least partially 
because it is our own and proper to us, but anyone living and doing well will share in the 
same goodness. Since it is easier to contemplate the actions of others, and another’s good 
action is very much like my good action insofar as it is good, then the good person will 
enjoy contemplating the good lives of his friends. The friend’s actions, too, are also in 
some sense one’s own; for, both parties are most themselves, and this is mind, which 
tends towards the universals of excellence and goodness. Moreover, the friend is another 
self, so his actions will be in some sense my own, but easier to contemplate because 
carried out in his particular way. Also, the friendship belongs to the friends, and so the 
actions may proceed in some sense from that friendship. 
 Aristotle told us in Book I that self-sufficiency (αὔταρκες) extends beyond just 
one person by himself, and will involve family, friends, and even fellow citizens, “since 
man is sociable by nature [ἐπειδὴ φύσει πολιτικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος]” (1097b7-10). Again, 
human being is by nature political and lives with others. The happy life is self-sufficient 
not in the sense that the happy person lives alone and needs no one else. Self-sufficiency 
is rather defined as, “that which when isolated makes life desirable and lacking in 
nothing” (1097b15-16). The happy life, then, is self-sufficient in this way, but as we have 
seen, this self-sufficiency will include others. Again, we notice here the broadness of 
Aristotle’s concept of self, since it stretches out to include not just the happy self, but also 
                                                
41 We should notice here that Aristotle is not using θεωρεῖν in such a strict sense as he does in Book X. 
This will be discussed in the next chapter.  
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her friends, family, and fellow citizens to the extent that she plays an active role in the 
city. 
 Aristotle’s final argument for why the happy person will need friends is important 
for our investigation. Life for human beings is defined essentially by perception and 
thought (νοήσις). Life, too, is by nature good, “since it is determinate [ὡρισµένον]” 
(1170a21). Life as perception and thinking is determinate because, when fulfilled, it is a 
life lived according to excellence.42 This is made clear when he says, “and that which is 
good by nature is also good for the virtuous man (which is the reason why life seems 
pleasant to all men)” (1170a22-23). Let us recall that the excellent person is the measure 
for what we consider good, since he will reasonably choose and live the best life. 
Excellence is the standard, and excellence plays out in the lives of excellent people. The 
excellent life is determinate, whereas the wicked life (the opposite extreme) is 
indeterminate (1170a24).43 This is corroborated by Aristotle’s comment in Book I: 
It is possible to fail in many ways (for evil belongs to the class of the unlimited, as 
the Pythagoreans conjectured, and good to that of the limited), while to succeed is 
possible only in one way (for which reason one is easy and the other difficult—to 
miss the mark easy, to hit it difficult); for these reasons also, then, excess and 
defect are characteristic of vice, and the mean of excellence. For men are good in 
but one way, but bad in many. (1106b29-35) 
 
Excellence is rare and difficult. To do well, one must live in accordance with reason and 
excellence. There are, however, many ways to go wrong. So, extremes cause a bad life to 
be indeterminate. Let us recall that Aristotle often says the extremes, i.e., the vices, blend 
                                                
42 Outside the context of a practical science, perception is limited by what it perceives. In De Anima II.6, 
Aristotle outlines proper, common, and incidental sensibles. Beyond this, excesses can to some degree 
destroy sense (De Anima, 424a29-32). Thought is limited by what it thinks, viz., universals. Also, as we 
shall see in Book X of the Nicomachean Ethics, we cannot think all the time, since we are embodied 
beings. 
43 Pakaluk, Commentary, 210. Pakaluk refers to this passage of the determinacy of life as “obscure,” and 
turns to other non-ethical texts of Aristotle to explain what Aristotle might have in mind. We need not, 
however, move past what is given to us here in the Ethics, since Aristotle’s meaning is made clear by the 
context. 
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with one another, so that the rash, for example, sometimes seem cowardly, because they 
seem keen to fight beforehand, but in the moment, may turn cold and flee. Thus, the life 
of viciousness is a confused, indeterminate life. The excellent life, however, is an active 
life of the mean, and thus is difficult to achieve, but no doubt determined and definite. 
Indeed, after he has told us that life is pleasant and good for all men, since it is good for 
the excellent person, Aristotle goes on to say that this excludes lives of wickedness and 
pain, since these are indeterminate lives.44  
 Not only will we need friends, but we desire them to be there for and with us. Life 
is good in itself, and thus desirable. The good life, then, will be made up of pleasant 
activities. While the one who acts cannot contemplate well his own activity—since this 
could obstruct the activity to the degree that he is no longer doing it, but contemplating 
it—he will presumably be aware to some degree of what he is doing. If not, then he could 
not have even the slightest understanding that he is now doing something worthwhile. So, 
there is a basic self-awareness involved in action. 
If he who perceives that he sees, he who hears, that he hears, and he who walks, 
that he walks and in the case of all other activities similarly there is something 
which perceives that we are active, so that if we perceive, we perceive that we 
perceive, and if we think, that we think; and if to perceive that we perceive or 
think is to perceive that we exist (for existence was defined as perceiving or 
thinking); and if perceiving that one lives is one of the things that are pleasant in 
themselves (for life is by nature good, and to perceive what is good present in 
oneself is pleasant); and life is desirable, and particularly so for good men, 
because to them existence is good and pleasant…and if as the virtuous man is to 
himself, he is to his friend also (for his friend is another self): then as his own 
existence is desirable for each man, so, or almost so, is that of his friend. 
(1170a29-1170b8) 
                                                
44 Pakaluk, Commentary, 211. Referring to this passage, Pakaluk says, “this is a digression, intended to 
forestall the obvious objection that not all the activity of all living things is good and pleasant. Exactly how 
the passage works is unclear, but its important point is the reminder that, as elsewhere in the ethics, we 
need to generalize on the basis of typical and central cases.” This last assertion is correct—we are reminded 
of the standard of goodness. However, the passage is not meant simply to forestall obvious objections, but 
primarily it reminds us of the indefinite, clouded, and confused nature of a bad life. Aristotle’s comment on 
pain probably means simply that a life overcome with pain cannot be considered flourishing. 
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Being self-aware for the good person means being aware of his good activity. This 
perception or awareness will then be itself pleasant. Ultimately one is pleased at simply 
being (εἶναι), because one is aware of perceiving and thinking, and this is how life was 
defined. Not only will he be pleased at the fact that he is, but will also desire life. This 
means that he will desire to continue living in a good way. However, it is not only his 
own being that he desires, but also his friend’s being (well-being), since the friend is 
another self. Thus, one is pleased not only by his own life, but by his friend’s life as well. 
He will be pleased simply that his friend is, and will want him to continue to be. Life, for 
the good, is wonderful, and they will need friends with whom to share in that wonder.45  
Being-with and Friendship 
Human being, as we have seen for both Aristotle and Heidegger, is naturally political, or 
constitutively being-with. For both thinkers, the human being is turned out towards its 
world. For Aristotle, there is no great need for an independent conception of self since, 
for him, the self is not a static thing situated in an inner world, as opposed to the outer 
world. Rather, one (-self) is concretely in the world or the polis, and one most naturally 
finds his station there. For Heidegger, also, the self is not a point or a heap of 
psychological states and passions, but rather a way of being concretely in the world, 
concerned with projects and solicitous for others.  
 Self considered as mind is not a fixed point, or grouping of particular states. Nous 
or mind is simply that which allows logos to run its course. Mind allows for thought, and 
thought allows for self-control and a definite course for the good life. We must remember 
that by considering the self most to be mind, we cannot fall into the trap of considering 
                                                
45 We shall discuss wonder in the next chapter. 
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the self something.46 We must simply think of mind as that which allows for thought. 
Likewise, for Heidegger, by calling the self  “care,” we have not thereby made the self 
into something, if we remember what care is—human being is ahead of itself (in its 
projects or toward death), already in a world, alongside entities and with others. This 
dynamic conception of self, like Aristotle’s, moves beyond any common conception of 
self as solely individualized. Let us recall Heidegger’s remark that we should not be 
afraid of considering the self as a way of being. The ontological self is not something 
present-at-hand for Heidegger. Likewise, we should not consider self as mind to be 
something “present-at-hand” and static.  
 We saw that the universality of mind allows for the right kind of self-love, and 
explains how the friend is another self. Each person should love himself insofar as he is 
good, and the self that he loves—nous or mind—is what allows him to fulfill his human 
being. One must be in a right relation with oneself in order to be in right relation to a 
friend. The good person loves that which allows her to remain an ordered, collected 
human being. She does this through acting for the sake of the good, and according to 
right reason. It is in and through this action that she loves herself (mind). In doing so, she 
can now rightly appreciate and love her friend who is, by virtue of his ordering principle 
and the good action it directs, another self. They are each other to the degree that they are 
mind (universal) and good, but they are individuals to the degree that they are embodied, 
particular beings, whose particular desires play a role in how they carry out their 
goodness. 
                                                
46 This corresponds to De Anima III.4. “Thus that in the soul which is called thought [νοῦς] (by thought 
[νοῦν] I mean that whereby the soul thinks and judges) is, before it thinks, not actually any real thing 
[οὐθέν ἐστιν ἐνεργείᾳ τῶν ὄντων πρίν νοεῖν]” (429a23-24). It is difficult for us to refer to the self by any 
name, whether mind or otherwise, without considering it to be something. However, keeping in mind the 
meaning of self as mind, we can perhaps surmount this difficulty. 
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 Similarly for Heidegger, when one has appropriated oneself as care, he is able to 
be authentically with others. That is, people cannot be authentically together if they have 
not first become their own selves. We recall, however, that this means only that one 
appropriates himself as a way of being—one becomes one’s own by dynamically being-
in-the-world. The self is a fluid, dynamic being who is in the world and with others in 
projects and action. Thus, we may here open the way for a friendly being-with—a way of 
being with others that is genuine, since there is no present-at-hand-self obstructing the 
way.  
 As with the previous discussion of the character virtues in the last chapter, we can 
see a way in which the self-lover has already appropriated herself. Since she is excellent, 
then, as we have shown, she will already be fully herself. Moreover, she loves herself via 
her excellent ways of being. She allows herself to be most fully herself by allowing mind 
to exercise its direction of the whole person. She is most fully herself and most fully a 
human being. Her universality and particularity work cooperatively. Because of this, she 
is now able better to love, and be with, her friend. Good friends are of one mind with 
themselves, but also to some degree with each other. They are able authentically to be 
with one another, since they love themselves as mind.  
 Since I share the ontological constitution of care with others, we are each other to 
the degree that we take up our being as care. This is similar to the way in which friends 
are other selves, to the degree that the self is mind. For Aristotle, this is based upon 
virtue. The self as care does not preclude virtue, and could even encourage it. When I 
begin to realize my being as care, I may wish to fulfill this to the best degree possible, 
habituating my own actions and my being-with others to excellence.  The owned or 
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appropriated self is a being already concretely in a world, with others, and shares itself 
with others to the degree that all selves are care.47 Thus, we would have here a genuine 
being-with others based upon mortality and temporality.48 When others also realize the 
fragility of their temporal being, perhaps they will then be ready to be more fully and 
genuinely with each other. 
 In this case, we would not consider authentic being-with an encouragement for 
others to undertake their own projects that will “attest to their individuality,” as Lawrence 
Vogel suggests.49 Rather, we would simply let others to be. We recognize that the other is 
also care, and that we share in that fundamental way of being. We are then able to let the 
other be who she is as care, but also be with the other as a human being, in all the 
dynamic ways this being might play out. We suggested above that this prevents us from 
taking the other as merely a source for pleasure or use. In this way, authentic being-with 
is similar to the highest form of friendship in Aristotle. In a friendship based upon 
character, and especially good character, the friends can be pleasurable or useful to one 
another, but they are not only pleasurable or useful—they are not identified by pleasure 
or use. Since each friend loves himself insofar as he is good, and since the friend is 
                                                
47 King, Guide, 79. King strongly and correctly asserts, “This fundamental constitution [being-in-the-world-
with-others] is not merely a rigid framework, but it itself determines the way in which Da-sein is together 
with others, and even the way in which he himself is a self.” We recall that Dasein is “for the most part” a 
they-self, and this self is determined by its being-with. The authentic or appropriated self is also being-with, 
but not in such a way as to have its being determined by the inauthenticity of das Man. 
48 Lawrence J. Hatab, Ethics and Finitude: Heidegerrian Contributions to Moral Philosophy (Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000), 85-89. Hatab here discusses the ways in which the “finitude 
of ethics” can undo unhelpful, traditional approaches to ethics. More precisely, “in the light of a 
temporal/historical analysis, it is not traditional ethical notions that are lost, but their tendencies toward 
exclusivity or dogmatic disclosure.” While this may be helpful, I am rather suggesting a way of seeing 
ourselves, collectively, as mortals, and how this may affect how we are with each other. Hatab does say, 
“our common finitude can draw us toward each other” (151), but ultimately he thinks that “Heidegger’s 
radically finite ontology calls for certain modifications of Aristotle’s moral philosophy” (103). While 
Heidegger’s ontology may help us draw out otherwise implicit aspects of Aristotle’s ethics, I do not pretend 
to modify the ethics. 
49 Lawrence Vogel, The Fragile We (Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 1994), 79. 
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another self insofar as he is mostly mind, we do not reduce the friend to an object, but 
must let him be himself. Good friends not only let one another be themselves, but each 
loves who the other is.   
Let us now turn to the final chapter to see the ultimate form of Aristotelian self-
appropriation. We will see Heidegger’s interpretation of this, and again bring the two 
thinkers into dialogue.
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Chapter Five 
Let us take stock of where we have been. The first chapter prepared the way for our 
inquiry by revealing the links connecting Heidegger to Aristotle. We saw Heidegger 
interpret Aristotle’s ethics through the lens of his own thought. The second chapter 
fleshed out Heidegger’s authentic-inauthentic binary, showing us what inauthentic and 
authentic selfhood is. In the third chapter, we saw a type of authenticity emerge in 
Aristotle’s account of the character virtues, especially in his account of courage. The 
courageous and otherwise excellent self is collected, gathered, and generally at one with 
himself. The fourth chapter advanced the connection between Heidegger and Aristotle 
through their respective concepts of being-with and friendship. Just as their thought 
remains distinct and individuated, and just as these distinctions are sublimated into a 
common field of thought, so too we saw the ways in which particular selfhood remains 
intact, but also the ways in which the particularized self is taken up (or brought back) into 
something beyond itself. In becoming or being itself, the self is beyond a particularized 
self, and taken up into who it most truly is as mind or care. 
 Here, in the last chapter, we shall revisit Heidegger’s earlier lectures on Aristotle, 
but this time as regards contemplation. Contemplation will come to light as that which is 
not only the apex of the flourishing life, but also, in Heideggerian terms, the way in 
which human being is most itself. We shall begin by addressing Aristotle’s description of 
θεωρεῖν or contemplation. We will then see Heidegger’s interpretation of it, and the ways 
this relates to his concept of authenticity. We shall also address Heidegger’s 
interpretation of wonder in his Basic Questions of Philosophy, since wonder will be 
shown to be the driving force behind the contemplative life. Without wonder, 
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contemplation—or seeing what is before us in thought—is nothing. We will conclude by 
showing how these two thinkers most differ, but also the ways in which their ideas are 
complementary. 
Contemplation 
It is significant that Aristotle begins Book X with a discussion of pleasure. The first five 
chapters are dedicated to pleasure, and the sixth is a transition into a reconsideration of 
the flourishing life. Aristotle seems to be reminding us that we are composite human 
beings, and that pleasure is important. In fact, pleasure is to some degree the impetus for 
action, and pleasure completes action (1175a11-21). Pleasure and the action it completes 
are said to cling to one another, or are wedded (συνῳκειῶσθαι). In this way, pleasures 
intensify (συναύξουσι) actions, and belong at home with, or are proper to (τὰ δὲ 
συναύξοντα οἰκεῖα), the actions. Aristotle’s language clearly shows us the ways in 
which he claims pleasure to be nearly inseparable from the action. He even goes so far as 
to say that pleasures are so close to the activities and are “so hard to distinguish from 
them that it admits of dispute whether the activity is not the same as the pleasure” 
(1175a30-1175b34).  
 It is upon this background that Aristotle reintroduces us to the general 
consideration of his practical science, viz., eudaimonia. True flourishing cannot be 
founded upon bodily pleasures and amusements. To make childish amusements the goal 
of life is characteristic of tyrants. A tyrant’s life tells us nothing about the good life, since 
we judge what is best by looking to the good person. Moreover, the pursuit of bodily 
pleasure should not be thought more desirable just because the powerful tyrant pursues it; 
“for boys, too, think the things that are valued among themselves are the best” (1176b9-
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23). So, we do not exert ourselves for amusement, but we amuse ourselves in order to 
exert ourselves. If we have a genuine concern for the good life, then, we see that it is 
ultimately serious, and that relaxation and amusement allow us to recharge and regain 
strength to work towards or for the good life (1176b35-1177a10).  
 While allowing room for bodily pleasure, Aristotle now puts these pleasures in 
their proper place. This sets up his discussion of contemplation. Bodily pleasures are 
ultimately, in the best life, not pursued for their own sake, but help us in the life of 
contemplation. Happiness is activity in accordance with excellence, and “it is reasonable 
that it should be in accordance with the highest excellence; and this will be that of the 
best thing in us.” The best thing in us is mind, or what we saw to be most properly the 
self. 
Whether [the best thing is mind] or something else that is this element which is 
thought to be our natural ruler and guide and to take thought of things noble and 
divine, whether it be itself also divine or only the most divine element in us, the 
activity of this in accordance with its proper excellence will be complete 
happiness. That this activity is contemplative we have already said. (1177a12-18) 
 
Mind contemplates noble, beautiful and divine things, and is itself the most divine part of 
who we are. To put this into perspective, we can say that the self most properly conceived 
is divine. We saw that the self as mind is beyond particularity. This “beyond 
particularity” is now qualified. Mind is godlike. Aristotle is likely drawing connections 
here between θεῖον and θεωρία, or “godlike” and “contemplation.”1 Mind contemplates 
or theorizes the theion, or godlike. The self as mind is beyond the individual human 
being.  
                                                
1 Heidegger, Plato’s Sophist, 44. Heidegger draws a similar connection, but says this etymological tie does 
not “touch the genuine meaning” of Aristotle’s concept of contemplation. We shall say more of 
Heidegger’s interpretation later. 
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 A life of contemplation offers us a life of complete happiness (ἡ τελεία 
εὐδαιµονία). I have argued that Aristotle allows not only for approximations to 
excellence, but correspondingly, for degrees of happiness or flourishing. One does not 
lead either a completely flourishing life or a debased, wretched life. Rather, there are 
degrees along a continuum of possible lives. One can be vicious or completely happy, 
and these are extremes. Another possibility is that one is not vicious, but incontinent. Yet 
again, one can be continent, but not temperate. One can be moderately happy or 
flourishing, but perhaps external circumstances will not allow for a greater cultivation of 
one’s life. Therefore, the contemplative life does not work to the exclusion of the 
character excellences. The life of character excellence is happy to a lesser degree than the 
life of contemplation. As Aristotle says at the start of the eighth chapter, the life of 
character excellence is happy in a secondary way (δευτέρως). 
 Many commentators have thought there is a tension or inconsistency in Aristotle’s 
account.2 There is no need to recount thoroughly the supposed tension or inconsistency, 
since this has already been done many times. The trouble generally speaking is this: 
Aristotle abruptly asserts the life of contemplation to be the best life, which seems to 
conflict with his earlier and substantial praise of the life of character excellence, and the 
claim that character excellence is enacted for its own sake. Since Aristotle allows for 
                                                
2 Among Aristotle’s detractors here are: J.L. Ackrill, “Aristotle on Eudaimonia,” in Essays on Aristotle’s 
Ethics, ed. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 15-33; A.W.H. 
Adkins, “Theoria versus Praxis in the Nichomachean Ethics and the Republic,” in Classical Philology, Vol. 
73, no. 4 (1978): 297-313; Thomas Nagel, “Aristotle on Eudaimonia,” in Phronesis, Vol. 17, no. 3 (1972): 
252-259; Martha Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 
373-377; and Kathleen Wilkes, “The Good Man and the Good for Man in Aristotle’s Ethics,” in Essays on 
Aristotle’s Ethics, 341-358. Once among these was also John Cooper’s Reason and Human Good in 
Aristotle (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), 144-180. Cooper has since rescinded his criticism 
of Aristotle’s “intellectualism” in his article, “Contemplation and Happiness: A Reconsideration,” in 
Synthese, Vol. 72, no. 2 (1987): 187-216. Cooper here argues for the possibility of a mixed life of 
contemplation and character excellence. 
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degrees of happiness, there is nothing that precludes the life of contemplation mixing 
with the life of character excellence. However, the two lives may at times conflict with 
one another.3 Before we consider properly what contemplation is, let us take a closer look 
at the relationship between contemplation and character excellence. Before doing so, 
however, it is important to note the various ways in which Aristotle intends 
“contemplation.”  
The Ambiguity of θεωρία4 
Outside of Book X, Aristotle uses θεωρία, θεωρεῖν, and their cognates approximately 
twenty-five times in the Nicomachean Ethics, and this is not counting any other words 
sharing a root of θεω-.5 While many of these instances are not always properly translated 
into English as “contemplate,” as they are in Book X, Aristotle was surely aware of the 
connection with the more serious use of the word. As with so many of his important 
terms, Aristotle uses theôria and its cognates ambiguously, depending upon the context. 
The context is ever important in Aristotle, and it must be kept in mind. 
 Often, as at 1100a32, Aristotle uses some version of theôrein to show that 
something is up for consideration. This happens markedly at 1140a24. Aristotle is 
gearing up to discuss phronêsis. “Concerning prudence, we may grasp it in such a way, 
                                                
3 Aristide Tessitore, “Aristotle’s Ambiguous Account of the Best Life,” in Polity, Vol. 25, no. 2 (1992), 
197-215. Tessitore concludes, “It is not that Aristotle is inconsistent, but that he consistently resists the 
temptation to try to reconcile completely two elevated ways of life which cannot be in every respect 
reconciled” (214). The lives of character excellence and contemplation may at some points conflict, but this 
is simply part of who we are as human beings. 
4 For a fascinating account of the historical use of θεωρία before Aristotle and Plato, see Andrea 
Nightingale’s “On Wandering and Wondering: ‘Theôria’ in Greek Philosophy and Culture, in Arion, Third 
Series, vol. 9, no. 2 (Fall, 2001): 23-58. Although her assessment of the word is well done, Nightingale’s 
interpretation of Aristotle will be challenged later in the chapter. 
5 I used the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae word search feature using the root just named, and found at least 
three instances of words sharing that root. My count excludes the mention of the “life of contemplation” at 
1095b19 and 1096a3-4, since these refer to the discussion of contemplation in Book X.  
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contemplating who we call prudent.”6 I have chosen “contemplating” here not because it 
is the best option for translation, but because it allows us to see what is afoot. In light of 
what comes in Book X, and considering that this quote falls in the discussion of 
intellectual virtue, Aristotle must have seen the irony here. That we could contemplate or 
theorize phronêsis, whose sphere is practical life, shows us that “contemplation” need not 
always be of eternal or unchanging things.  
Before this, at 1140a12, Aristotle tells us that all art is concerned with coming 
into being, and contemplates how something comes into being, which is able either to be 
or not be.7 Again, this does not match the strict sort of contemplation mentioned 
sometimes in Book X, where contemplation seems restricted to eternal, unchanging 
things. Also in the context of the intellectual virtues, Aristotle tells us there are two parts 
of the soul having logos: one that contemplates (θεωροῦµεν) things having unchanging 
principles, and another that contemplates changing things (1139a5-9).  
 Outside of the context of the intellectual virtues, there are several examples of a 
loose sense of theôrein or theôria. Although there are several examples of 
“contemplation” being used without reference to eternal or unchanging things, let us 
recall only one.8 We saw earlier that friends can contemplate one another’s actions better 
than their own. To contemplate another’s actions is to contemplate something that could 
have been otherwise. When we contemplate a friend’s actions, we contemplate a 
temporally situated, contingent event. Even if we contemplate the justice or liberality of 
                                                
6 This is my translation of: Περὶ δὲ φρονήσεω; οὕτως ἂν λάβοιµεν, θεωρήσαντες τίνας λέγοµεν τούς 
φρονίµους.  
7 ἔστι δὲ τέχνη πᾶσα περί γένεσιν καὶ τὸ τεχνάζειν καὶ θεωρεῖν ὅπως ἄν γένεταί τι τῶν ἐνδεχοµένων 
καὶ εἶναι καὶ µὴ εἶναι. 
8 For starters, see 1102a23 and 1104a11-12. 
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the action, it is still the justice or liberality as it plays out in this particular action. This 
should suffice to show that Aristotle uses theôria and theôrein ambiguously.  
 There are also instances outside Book X where Aristotle uses “contemplation” to 
refer to eternal or unchanging things. We see this perhaps most readily in Book VI. 
Discussing the differences between wisdom and prudence, Aristotle says, “wisdom will 
contemplate none of the things that will make a man happy (for it is not concerned with 
any coming into being)” (1143b19-20). Here, we seem to have a restricted sense of 
“contemplate” in the context of philosophic wisdom (σοφία). When we are talking about 
contemplation from a strictly philosophic perspective, or from the strict perspective of 
sophia, then specifically unchanging or eternal beings are contemplated. This is the sort 
of contemplation Aristotle seems to have in mind at times in Book X. This is also where a 
possible conflict with the life of character excellence comes into play. As we shall see, 
however, even in Book X Aristotle uses “contemplation” ambiguously. 
Character Excellence and the Contemplative Self 
Aristotle spends the greater part of the Ethics discussing character excellence, and the 
happiness it brings. In Book X, contemplation is said to complete happiness. If so, why 
did we just hear Aristotle say that philosophic wisdom contemplates nothing that would 
bring us happiness? What is it about the strictly contemplative life that is in conflict with 
the flourishing that character excellence brings? Aristotle heightens this tension in Book 
X. Since character excellences play out in circumstances beyond the control of the agent, 
character excellences depend upon these (external) circumstances. For this reason, the 
need to perform the character excellences may even hinder the life of contemplation, 
which depends very little on external circumstances (1178b5). 
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 As mentioned above, Aristide Tessitore claims that Aristotle understood this 
tension, and did not seek to avoid it. Aristotle’s “presentation of the philosophic life is 
alive to the inevitable controversy which accompanies a life of radical inquiry.”9 
Aristotle’s account remains faithful to the phenomena of character excellence, but he is 
also aware of the tension between living the life of character excellence, and the life of 
contemplation. Tessitore’s argument rests upon the idea that Aristotle is addressing an 
audience of well-raised, decent people (“gentlemen”), some of whom will be 
philosophically inclined, without being philosophers.10 Decent people are part of a certain 
social class, but philosophers, as philosophers, are beyond social status, and radically 
question “all conventional beliefs, even praiseworthy ones, with a view to discovering the 
truth.”11 Thus, Arisotle’s audience will be made privy, in a subtle way, to what the 
philosophic life has to offer, and to the tensions between it and the life of character 
excellence.12  While Tessitore’s position is interesting, and while his argument regarding 
the proper audience of the Ethics should be considered, I do not think we need to take 
Aristotle so far in order to make sense of the tension at play.  
 Let us recall that the self is most properly mind. We have seen that this does not 
work to the exclusion of considering the self also to be the composite human being. We 
have also seen that considering self properly as mind does not force selfhood into a lofty, 
intellectualized realm. In fact, in Book VI, Aristotle refers to mind as both practical and 
contemplative. The practical intellect or mind (διάνοια)13 deals with truth in agreement 
                                                
9 Tessitore, “Ambiguous Account,” 214. 
10 Tessitore, “Ambiguous Account,” 201-202. 
11 Tessitore, “Ambiguous Account,” 202. 
12 Tessitore, “Ambiguous Account,” 213-214. 
13 Although this is not explicitly called νοῦς, we may recall from 1166a12-19 that Aristotle calls the self the 
thinking element, or διανοητικός. He soon after refers to the self as mind, or νοῦς, showing these two to be 
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with right desire, and the contemplative side of the intellect or mind deals with truth and 
falsity, outside anything practical or productive (1139a26-31). It is this multilayered 
ambiguity of the self that allows for the ambiguity of contemplation. We can contemplate 
practical things or unchanging things. 
 Mind in Book X is asserted to be the best thing in us, and to take thought of things 
noble and divine. Aristotle now moves on to contemplation as it takes its course in 
wisdom and philosophy.  
The activity of wisdom is admittedly the pleasantest of excellent activities; at all 
events philosophy is thought to offer pleasures marvelous [θαυµαστὰς]14 for their 
purity and their enduringness, and it is to be expected that those who know will 
pass their time more pleasantly than those who inquire. (1177a23-27) 
 
First, activity in accordance with wisdom (κατὰ τὴν σοφίαν) is the most pleasant 
(ἡδίστη) activity. Aristotle does not say it is the only pleasant activity, and so even the 
life of character excellence can be pleasant. Next, we see that wisdom is here associated 
with philosophy, and that philosophy offers wonderfully pure and enduring pleasures. 
Contemplation is here restricted not to inquiry, but merely to being with, or seeing what 
is contemplated.15 One simply beholds what is there for contemplation. Contemplation in 
this sense has nothing to do with inquiry. This is why he goes on to say that nothing 
arises from the contemplating apart from the contemplation itself, and this is why it is 
loved for its own sake (1177b1-2).  
 This is the most restricted use of contemplation, and this is why this sort of life 
would seem “too high for man” (1177b27). This sort of life cannot be continuously or 
                                                                                                                                            
interchangeable. Thus, Adkins is wrong to assert that Aristotle identifies humans with theoretical reason. 
See “Theoria vs. Praxis,” 300. 
14 We shall challenge Nightingale’s position that Aristotle thinks philosophy only begins in wonder, but 
ends in “certainty” (43). 
15 We shall see that this sort of contemplation entails more than mere seeing. 
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perpetually lived, and so we must relax from time to time (1176b35). It is not insofar as 
we are human beings that we will contemplate in this highest sense, but insofar as we are 
divine.  
And by so much as [mind] is superior to our composite nature is its activity 
superior to that which is the exercise of the other kind of excellence. If [mind] is 
divine, then, in comparison with man, the life according to it is divine in 
comparison with human life. (1177b27-31) 
 
It is the ambiguity of the self—not just the word “self,” but the actual self—that allows 
Aristotle to say what he here says. Insofar as we are mind, we are beyond our mortality, 
or our composite nature. Insofar as we are composite, we cannot adhere to the excellence 
of contemplative activity. Aristotle goes on to say that we should, then, not spend our 
time thinking (φρονεῖν) of mortal things, but as much as possible make ourselves 
deathless (ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν), and do everything (καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν) “to live in 
accordance with the best thing in us” (1177b31-34). Living in accordance with the best 
part of us is truly to become who we most are, and not doing so would be like living the 
life of someone or something else (1178a1-5). 
 Already Aristotle is bringing us back to the fact of who we are. We are most 
properly mind, but we are also composite beings. This is why we can only become 
immortal insofar as it is possible for us. If we could become entirely immortal, we would 
no longer be ourselves. By striving to become immortal, we do not become immortal, but 
become most ourselves. We settle down into who we most are by becoming mind, which 
is the most divine part of who we are. Yet, we are still mortal beings, and this is why we 
  156 
have to be vigilant in striving to honor the best part of us. The life of contemplation is 
most proper to us, since we are most properly mind (1178a5-8).16  
 Aristotle has also already begun to use “contemplation” ambiguously. If we are to 
try as much as possible to live in accordance with mind, or to be ourselves, this suggests 
that there may be gradations of contemplation. This is corroborated when he tells us, 
“happiness extends…just so far as contemplation does, and those to whom contemplation 
more fully belongs are more truly happy…” (1178b29-32).17 Aristotle is not here 
suggesting that happiness is impossible without philosophical contemplation. 
“Contemplation” is used here in a looser sense. To the degree that one contemplates or 
thinks, one is happy. The only other way possibly to make sense of this claim, is to say 
that those who are able to contemplate for longer stretches of time are happiest. But 
Aristotle concludes this thought by saying, “happiness, therefore, must be some form of 
contemplation.”18 That happiness must extend as far as some contemplation, shows us 
that Aristotle intends contemplation loosely. While Aristotle may see lofty philosophical 
contemplation as complete or finished happiness, this does not mean that only 
philosophical contemplation can bring any degree of happiness at all. 
 This discussion is surrounded by a larger discussion about our composite, human 
nature. The character excellences belong to our composite nature, “and the excellences of 
our composite [σύνθετον] nature are human; so, therefore, are the life and the happiness 
                                                
16 See Sarah Broadie, “Aristotle and Contemporary Ethics,” in The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics, ed. Richard Kraut (Malden: Blackweel Publishing, 2006), 343; and Wilkes, “Good 
Man,” 348. Contra Broadie and Wilkes, Aristotle does not need any “theological assumption” to establish 
the choice-worthiness of the contemplative life. He is not assuming the gods’ contemplative divinity, and 
then saying that we too ought to be the same. He has already established the goodness of the contemplative 
life. That it happens to be divine need not be part of the overall argument for us to pursue it. 
17 ἐφ᾽ὅσον δὴ διατείνει ἡ θεωρία, καὶ ἡ εὐδαιµονια, καὶ οἷς µᾶλλον ὑπάρχει τὸ θεωρεῖν, καὶ 
εὐδαιµονεῖν… 
18 ὥστ᾽εἴη ἄν ἡ εὐδαιµονία θεωρία τις. 
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which correspond to these” (1178a19-22). This hearkens back to the statement from 
Book VI that philosophic wisdom will not bring human beings to happiness. Now we see 
that it must be the character excellences that bring us happiness qua synthetic, or 
embodied beings, whereas contemplation brings us happiness qua mind. Is there a 
contradiction here? If happiness extends as far as contemplation does, then there must be 
some degree of contemplation in the life of character excellence. If not, there is either no 
happiness, or it is false that happiness extends as far as contemplation. 
 We must understand just how com-posite or syn-thetic we really are. We must be 
ever aware in dealing with the touchy subject of selfhood in Aristotle, that there is no 
separate realm or place of the self. There is no inner citadel. We, as mind, are thoroughly 
interwoven with our bodies. This is why Aristotle, having just told us that happiness is 
some form of contemplation, continues, “but, being a man, one will also need external 
prosperity; for our nature is not self-sufficient for the purpose of contemplation, but our 
body also must be healthy and must have food and other attention” (1178b33-35).  
 It is this synthetic or composite nature that allows mind to be involved in 
“practical” life. It is also our composite nature that allows for the ambiguity of 
“contemplation.” In his discussion of phronêsis in Book VI, Aristotle tells us: καὶ ὁ νοῦς 
τῶν ἑσχάτων ἐπ᾽ἀµφότερα: καὶ γὰρ τῶν πρώτων ὅρων καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων νοῦς 
ἐστί καὶ οὐ λόγος (1143a35-1143b1). We may translate this as follows: “And mind is of 
the ultimate things both ways: for of the primary definitions and of the ultimate 
particulars mind is, and not argument.”19 Aristotle clarifies this by saying that mind 
grasps both the primary and unchangeable definitions, but in practical things (ταῖς 
πρατικαῖς) mind grasps the ultimate particular. Since both universals and ultimate 
                                                
19 This passage was brought to my attention while reading Heidegger, Plato’s Sophist, 108-109. 
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particulars are the starting-points (ἀρχαί) and that for the sake of which (οὗ ἕνεκα), we 
must have some perception (αἴσθησιν) of these, and this is mind (1143b4-5).  
 Mind is activated regarding both concrete particulars and universals.20 Mind 
simply touches the ultimate objects, it does not discursively think them. Just as in 
philosophic contemplation we simply behold and see the first principles or everlasting 
and unchanging things, so too is mind involved in a kind of perception of the ultimate 
particulars, about which we do not reason, but simply see. There is here a different kind 
of contemplation. Let us quote Aristotle at length to finish the thought. 
This is why these seem to be natural. While no one is by nature wise, there is [by 
nature] a means for thought, quick-comprehension, and mind. A sign for this is 
that we think these are consequent upon our time of life, and this time of life has 
mind and a means for thought21…Therefore we ought to attend to the 
undemonstrated sayings and opinions of experienced and older people or of 
people of practical wisdom not less than to demonstrations; for because 
experience has given them an eye they see aright. (1143b7-14) 
 
No one is by nature wise. This takes time and effort. One must know not only what 
follows from first principles, but also the first principles themselves, i.e., the beginnings 
of knowledge (1141a15-19). This wisdom, however, is not of mortal things. “It would be 
strange to think that the art of politics, or practical wisdom, is the best knowledge, since 
man is not the best thing in the world” (1141a20-22). Again, sophia—the undertaking of 
the philosopher—does not think about mortal things. But this is only one particular way 
mind is enacted, even if it is the best. One may even, like Thales or Anaxagoras, know 
things that are wonderful, difficult, and divine, but not have practical wisdom or prudence 
                                                
20 Heidegger says, “Νοῦς is related to the πρῶτοι ὅροι, to the first demarcations, to the ἀρχαί pure and 
simple, to the ultimate elements of that which always is, as well as to the outermost in the sense of the 
momentary individual this-there. The latter is no longer a matter for discourse but instead is grasped simply 
in νοεῖν” (PS, 109). 
21 Everything up to the ellipsis is my translation. 
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at all (1141b4-7). In any case, mind is there whether we are thinking philosophically, or 
simply seeing what is before us in practical life. 
 So, the contemplative life can, in the strict sense, be self-contained and lead to a 
flourishing life. The contemplative life, in a looser sense, can also be flourishing. Let us 
note, however, that even if someone like Thales had no practical wisdom,22 but only 
philosophic wisdom, this does not mean he would be bad or vicious in character. It 
simply means that he cannot always see what is best to do in particular situations. 
Remember, he contemplates wonderful and divine things, and this is good in the sense of 
being complete, or perfect. His life is therefore affected in that he is made happy or 
flourishing in the complete sense, for “wisdom produces happiness” (1144a5).  
 There is nothing precluding the philosophically contemplative life from also being 
a life of character excellence. Even though the circumstances needed for excellent action 
can interfere with the philosophically contemplative life, we need not think this would 
upset the contemplative person. In fact, insofar as she is a human being, she will choose 
to do excellent acts, and may even need such acts to live a human life (1178b2-7). Even 
if, as many commentators seem to suggest,23 Aristotle said that the character excellences 
                                                
22 Whether or not he really did is up to whatever source we choose to trust. Nightingale points out plenty of 
references to a practically wise Thales (25-26). It could be, however, that Aristotle is cornering Thales into 
what he needs him to be for Aristotle’s own enterprise.  
23 Tessitore, “Ambiguous Account,” 214, “The Ethics urges serious attention to the practice of moral virtue 
not as an end in itself or as something which provides the greatest happiness, but as a means to the end of 
contemplation;” and Nagel, “Aristotle on Eudaimonia,” 258, “The other functions, including the practical 
employment of reason itself, provide support for the highest part of ourselves…” See also Wilkes, “The 
Good Man,” 350, “Now to secure all this, so that he has unlimited time for contemplation, the theoretic 
man must apply his own practical reason, or at least assent to and approve the arrangements of others; 
unless he does so, he can have no guarantee of the secure continuance of this background.” Wilkes cites 
1145a6-9 where Aristotle says that phronêsis “sees to the coming into being [ὁρᾷ ὅπως γἐνηται]” of 
sophia. This does not make phronêsis a necessary condition for sophia, but only a sufficient condition. 
Phronêsis may allow for sophia to be put to work (“come into being” or activity), but it need not be 
phronêsis. This is why Thales and Anaxagoras can be said not to have had phronêsis, but sophia.  
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are a means to contemplate better (which he did not in the Nicomachean Ethics),24 then 
there is no problem under my reading. For the person who does not practice philosophic 
contemplation, the character excellences will be ends in themselves, and enacting them 
will produce a happy enough life. For the philosophically contemplative person, the 
enacting of the character excellences may make more room for contemplation, which can 
only be good. Moreover, the philosophically contemplative person is still a human being, 
and may even appreciate and enjoy this humanity, and so wish to enact character 
excellence in order to live well qua human (about which we shall say more).25 In other 
words, the contemplative person need not shirk his humanity or embodiment.26 
 It is then, the multifaceted self, or the ambiguity of selfhood, that allows for a rich 
interplay of theory and praxis. The two are logically separate from one another. Insofar as 
we do contemplate unchanging, divine things, we become most ourselves, and this is 
divine. The best sort of life, then, is one of self-cultivation. This runs its course through 
contemplation. This is also the most divine sort of life we could live. But self-cultivation 
could also entail a life of character excellence, since the self (mind) is operative here as 
well. Let us now move on to Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle’s concept of 
contemplation. This will lead us to our conclusion where we will be best able to compare 
the happy and authentic lives. 
                                                
24 There is a passage in the Eudemian Ethics (1249b5-25) where Aristotle seems to say this more explicitly. 
25 This is contrary to Nagel, “Aristotle believes, in short, that human life is not important enough for 
humans to spend their lives on” (257). That Aristotle encourages us not to think of “mortal things” does not 
mean we cannot appreciate our mortality, which is not a mortal thing at all, but the root of mortal things 
(about which we shall say more later). Suffice it to say for now, Aristotle may well encourage us not to 
think of trifling affairs, and rightly so, but this need not mean that we cannot appreciate and enjoy our 
humanity, i.e., our embodied being.  
26 Wilkes, “The Good Man,” 351. Wilkes asserts, “the ‘philosophic’ life ultimately denies all value to the 
‘political’ one.” This statement is incorrect based upon our above interpretation. In addition, we see that it 
is wrong to say, “Aristotle’s position is thus not consistent; one cannot, and should not try to, juggle with 
the texts so that the conflict of the two lives is resolved.”  
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Heidegger on Contemplation 
Heidegger confronts theôria primarily in his Plato’s Sophist lecture course, and also to 
some extent in his Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy. We will focus on the ways 
in which the life of contemplation affords a completion of human being, and the role that 
wonder plays in contemplation. This will open yet another path for thinking a type of 
self-appropriation in Aristotle.  
Contemplation Arising from Everydayness 
Let us first look at Heidegger’s discussion of the etymology of theôria. Heidegger first 
notes that theôria is similar in meaning to eidos. “The word θεωρεῖν, θεωρία, comes 
from θεωρός, which is composed of θέα, ‘look’, ‘sight’, and ὁράω, ‘to see’” (PS, 44). 
Theôria is most basically a kind of seeing. This way of speaking remains dominant even 
today (at least in English). We say, for example, when coming to an understanding about 
something, “I see.” Or, we ask our interlocuter, “do you see what I mean?” While 
Heidegger restricts his discussion of theôria to its activation in sophia, he does claim that 
Aristotle’s interpretation of these terms is based in the everyday ways in which human 
beings use these terms. “As is the case with all everyday speech, with the expressions in 
question Dasein moves in the indeterminateness of the ‘more or less’; one does not speak 
about σοφός but about µᾶλλον and ἧττον σοφός” (PS, 46). Aristotle takes this everyday 
interpretation of “wisdom” and raises it to self-understanding (PS, 46). Thus, Aristotle 
understands sophia “as the highest possibility of the being of Dasein on the basis of the 
being of Greek Dasein itself. He thinks that which the natural understanding of the life of 
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the Greeks strove for; he thinks this radically and to its end” (PS, 43). The theoretic life 
of wisdom constitutes the most proper and genuine possibility of Dasein (PS, 42).27 
 As Heidegger frames his lecture in his own terminology, we see the possibility of 
authenticity (Eigentlichkeit) emerge in the wise and contemplative life. It becomes, then, 
more significant that Heidegger thought sophia to be taken by Aristotle from everyday, 
indeterminate use, and raised to the level of its utmost possibility and clarity. Just as 
Heidegger indicates the meaning of human being by looking at everyday human being, so 
too the “guiding line for Aristotle is to get ‘information’ from Dasein itself, i.e., from 
what Dasein, which is self-expressive, means when it uses terms like σοφία and σοφός” 
(PS, 45-46). Heidegger claims there are, in Aristotle’s thought, five levels of 
understanding found in “natural Dasein.”28 There is common perception, experience, art, 
art as applicable knowledge, and theôrein (PS, 46). These levels build off of one another, 
up to the most advanced and rigorous way of knowing in sophia.  
 Of these five, of which the fourth seems an extension of technê, contemplation in 
wisdom is the apex. Here is a brief summary of how we get there. First, in perception, we 
see the world in a confused way. But, “over and against the accidental and arbitrary, trial 
and error,” experience brings definition to life—“it is the retaining present of a 
determined connection of occurrences in a single affair” (PS, 49-50). Out of the repetition 
of experience, the “what” emerges, and our understanding of this or that is enhanced. 
This gives rise to art or technê. From experiencing in certain repetitive ways, I become 
accustomed to my world, and thus gradually gain a clearer understanding of it. We 
                                                
27 Daß dieses ἀληθεύειν eine eigene und die eignetliche Möglichkeit des Daseins ausmacht: den βίος 
θεωρητικός, die Existenz des wissenschaflichen Menschen. 
28 Although Heidegger is here drawing from Aristotle’s Metaphysics, he sees his treatment as compatible 
with what is happening in the Ethics. 
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thereby come closer to sophia insofar as the technician is wiser than someone who 
merely has experience. The technician comes to know that upon which he, in practice, 
works. This knowledge prepares the way for wisdom—for a mere seeing of what is, or 
seeing the archê.  
 The wise person does not merely understand this or that particular thing, but 
understands universals, and the beginnings or principles of particular things. “The σοφός 
is the one who is able to disclose that which is difficult to disclose, i.e., that which is not 
easily disclosed by man in his immediate existence, by the πολλοί” (PS, 66). The wise 
person, unlike human beings in their everyday existence, does not see things in “their 
immediate aspect but in their genuine whence and why” (PS, 66). While the wise person 
has gone beyond everyday existence by virtue of his knowledge and what he 
contemplates, the wisdom in which he has a share is a modified version of our everyday 
understanding and interpretive life, according to Heidegger. Heidegger does however 
admit that “this structure is not explicit in Aristotle. But we have to say in general that an 
interpretation must go beyond what can be found in the text at first glance” (PS, 53). The 
advantage of this interpretation for us is that we can perhaps see a window for the 
ambiguity in Aristotle’s use of theôria. It, too, can run its course in the “more or less,” or 
in everyday ways, and more sophisticated ways. 
Wonder as the Basis for Contemplation 
According to Heidegger, there is a tendency, in our very being, toward contemplation. 
This tendency is shown in the phenomenon of wonder. Philosophic contemplation is a 
pure onlooking (betrachten), according to Heidegger. The possibility for this is rooted in 
our natural tendency to wonder, θαυµάζειν. Our understanding confronts the wonderful 
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as something awry, strange, or off kilter (Hier stimmt etwas nicht). “The astonishing, the 
wondrous, is constituted in relation to an onlooking insofar as the understanding at one’s 
disposal does not suffice for this encountered state of affairs. The understanding is 
shocked by what shows itself” (PS, 87). Our general understanding of things, or what 
often seems most obvious and clear to us, is turned on its head. We wonder at small 
things, and then this wonder grows toward greater things, even if we once thought even 
these to be obvious. We wonder about the moon, what happens to the moon, “about the 
remarkable fact that the moon changes…and finally about the genesis of beings as a 
whole” (PS, 87).29 Let us turn to Heidegger’s Basic Questions of Philosophy30 for a 
deeper understanding of wonder. 
 Let us first recall what is at stake. Both Aristotle and Plato claim wonder as the 
beginning of philosophy.31 We can also say that Aristotle thought wonder to be not only 
the beginning of philosophy, but also the end of it. God compels our wonder, since he is 
“always in that good state in which we sometimes are.”32 In the Ethics, too, we recall that 
philosophy offers pleasures wonderful in purity and enduringness. We will see here in 
what way wonder is the beginning of philosophy, and what this “beginning” means. We 
                                                
29 Again, Heidegger draws the examples from Aristotle’s Metaphysics I.2, around which Heidegger’s 
discussion is oriented. However, we shall see that this applies just as well to contemplation in the 
Nicomachean Ethics. 
30 Martin Heidegger, Basic Questions of Philosophy: Selected “Problems” of “Logic,” trans. Richard 
Rojcewicz and André Schuwer (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994). The German used is: 
Grundfragen der Philosophie: Ausgewälte >>Probleme<< der >>Logik>>in Gesamtausgabe, Band 45 
(Frankfurt Am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1984 and 1992).  
31 See Plato’s Theatetus, 155d2-3, and Aristotle’s Metaphysics, 982b11. 
32 Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans. W.D. Ross in The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. 2 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1995), 1072b24-26. Nightingale, in “Wandering and Wondering,” attributes this position 
to Aristotle: “the philosopher ‘escapes’ from perplexity and ignorance by acquiring knowledge or….by 
‘theorizing the causes’. To ‘theorize’ or ‘see’ the cause of something perplexing is to move from a state of 
wonder to a state of certainty” (43). To attribute “certainty” to Aristotle seems out of place and possibly 
anachronistic—it seems more Cartesian than something that concerned the ancients. Moreover, Aristotle, as 
we have cited him in Book XII of the Metaphysics, reaches God as the ultimate end of philosophy (and the 
“beginning” of being, in a sense). This provokes our wonder. Thus, philosophy both begins and ends in 
wonder for Aristotle, contrary to Nightingale’s position. 
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will see what this means for the life of contemplation in the Ethics, and also for the good 
life in general. 
Heidegger begins by analyzing our basic interpretations of “wonder” in order then 
to come to the “pre-eminent content and meaning” (BQP, 136). First and foremost, 
“wonder” is not curiosity (Neugier). Nor is wonder (Erstaunen) the same as astonishment 
(Staunen) or awe (Bestaunen). Heidegger does not differentiate the latter two from one 
another so much as he differentiates them from wonder proper, or Erstaunen.33 
Astonishment is a retreat in the face of the unusual, such that the unusual is allowed to 
grow in its unusualness. The unusual becomes more exciting, and the one who is 
astonished takes no position on the object of astonishment. We might say he can make 
nothing of it. The object of astonishment is the same as the object of awe. “Yet even here 
the astonishment is still in every case an encounter with and a being struck by a 
determinate individual object of awe” (BQP, 143). This will be at least one way in which 
we distinguish astonishment and awe from wonder. 
In wonder, what is most usual becomes unusual. What is it that becomes most 
unusual? Heidegger’s answer is “everything” (Alles). “For the most extreme wonder, 
anything whatsoever as such and everything as everything become the most unusual” 
(BQP, 144). Explanation can make no headway here. One cannot explain away the 
wonderful. We cannot, in wonder, explain what is wonderful, because the wonder is 
driven by the “that it is.” To put it differently than Heidegger, we realize—make real for 
ourselves—the fact that there is being at all, or that there are beings. “In this way, 
wonder now opens up what alone is wondrous in it: namely, the whole as the whole, and 
the whole as beings, beings as a whole, that they are and what they are, beings as beings” 
                                                
33 Nor does Heidegger offer a corresponding set of distinctions for ancient Greek. 
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(BQP, 146). Heidegger emphasizes this “as” (als) to show us the “in-between” that 
wonder opens up for us—“the open of a free space…in which beings come into play as 
such, namely as the beings they are, in the play of their being” (BQP, 146). When we 
wonder, we open up the world in full dis-closure or truth, ἀλήθεια.  
 Wonder, then, as the beginning of philosophy, is what opens up a place for 
philosophical thought.34 It may open up a place for philosophical inquiry or philosophic 
contemplation. We may move beyond Heidegger’s assessment to say that wonder allows 
for the inquiry that gains us knowledge, which we could later contemplate. Or, it allows 
for the mere contemplation of things already known, or things simply seen in 
contemplation, such as first principles. We cannot reason our way to first principles, but 
they instead must be simply grasped or seen. In this way, we do not get beyond the 
beginning. By wondering about and at the things that allow us to have knowledge, or at 
that which allows certain processes of thought (e.g. number), we stand at the beginning of 
thinking. If philosophical inquiry leads us up to a place of contemplation, e.g. to the 
unmoved mover, then we also end with wonder. In this case, the unmoved mover is not 
only the end of philosophical thought, but the beginning of all that is.  
Wonder is the beginning and end of philosophy. We recall our quote above that 
philosophy offers the most pleasant and wonderful things for thought. This runs contrary 
to Andrea Nightingale’s claim that, for Aristotle, philosophy only begins in wonder but 
ends in certainty.35 If contemplation is the apex of human flourishing, and it involves the 
most wondrous pleasures, and there is nothing accomplished outside the contemplation, 
                                                
34 This could be why Heidegger draws such fine distinctions between Erstaunen, Bestaunen, and Staunen. 
The prefix er- could suggest the beginning of an action, or the end or aim of the action. See April Wilson’s 
German Quickly (New York: Peter Lang, 2005), 103. 
35 Nightingale, “Wandering and Wondering,” 43. 
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then philosophy ends in wonder. Inquiry is not involved. We rather behold what there is 
to behold. Even if wonder can drive inquiry, that is not what wonder does here. Wonder 
allows us simply to be there with what we contemplate. 
 Mind is the place of thought and contemplation. Aristotle says further that mind 
is “both beginning and end; for demonstrations are from these and about these” (1143b9-
11).36 Mind is both the beginning, or principle (ἀρχή), and the limit, completion, or end 
(τέλος). Mind is where we come into contact with what allows for demonstration, and 
where we think that which completes demonstrations. But if this happens in conjunction 
with wonder, we see again the tight interweaving of self as mind, and self as the 
composite being. If wonder is a mood or an undergoing (πάθος),37 then wonder is 
characteristic not only of thought, but also of embodiment. If philosophical thought is 
driven by wonder, then philosophical thought or contemplation cannot happen without 
the body. For Aristotle, a mood, attunement, or undergoing would require body.38 So, 
even the highest form of contemplation is done in a human being—not a detached mind 
(more on this later). 
 When we understand contemplation in terms of its basic way of attunement, it is 
clear how “nothing arises from it apart from the contemplating” (1177b2). Kathleen 
Wilkes objects to this by suggesting inquiry to be far more interesting than 
contemplation. “All research is intended to produce some answer, theory, or solution; but 
the point and pleasure of the work does not derive from the passive post factum 
                                                
36 Bywater thinks this phrase is misplaced. Whether or not it is misplaced, or out of context, there is nothing 
un-Aristotelian about it, and it still provides insight into the facets of mind. 
37 Socrates refers to it in just this way in Theaetetus, 155d2. Heidegger refers to wonder as a 
Grundstimmung, a basic mood or attunement of philosophy (literally, a “ground-mood”).  
38 See the discussion of self-love in the previous chapter. 
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contemplation of the result achieved but rather in the work itself and the discoveries.”39 
First, we must understand that contemplation is not a passion, even if it may involve 
wonder. Contemplation itself is an activity. In the activity (energeia) of contemplation, 
we fulfill our function (ergon), and become who we actually and completely are 
(entelecheia). While inquiry may indeed be enjoyable and highly pleasurable—and 
Aristotle would not deny this—the contemplation of what we now know from our inquiry 
offers the purest pleasure, since there is nothing left to do but simply behold it. This sort 
of contemplation would be worthless without wonder. Wonder is what allows for the 
pleasures of contemplation to be satisfying in themselves. 
 The mathematician may find great pleasure in working through and solving a 
formula, but may become bored with the answer once he has gotten it. Yet, to 
contemplate number or the beginning of number—what allowed him to do his work in 
the first place—is a philosophic and wonderful pleasure. This contemplation is driven by 
wonder, and this is what Wilkes’ objection misses. Even to contemplate the answer of the 
formula is driven by wonder. To contemplate the order that necessitated such a solution 
requires wonder. For example, we may contemplate that this step followed that one, and 
had to follow that one. Or, if other steps are available and interchangeable, that they all 
had to lead to the same solution. Wonder allows knowledge to become more than mere 
information. Without wonder, knowledge becomes static and mundane.  
 Wonder may also, as mentioned above, drive inquiry. This may especially be seen 
in the natural sciences. If we merely take for granted that trees, flowers, rivers, insects, 
etc. are there, then it is difficult to find a reason—or more precisely, it is difficult to want 
or desire—to inquire into them and their nature. A genuine inquiry into the natural world 
                                                
39 Wilkes, “The Good Man,” 353. 
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is driven by an implicit or explicit realization of these things as they are, or simply that 
they are at all, and are therefore precious and worth understanding. As Nussbaum puts it 
in her discussion of wonder, “we need philosophy to show us the way back to the 
ordinary and to make it an object of interest and pleasure, rather than contempt and 
evasion.”40 The use of “philosophy” here, in an ancient context, will apply not only to 
abstract contemplation, but also to an inquiry into the natural world. As Aristotle says in 
the Parts of Animals, encouraging us not to think inquiry into such things is too lowly, 
“every realm of nature is wonderful.”41 Thus, as Nussbaum says, “philosophy, inspired 
by wonder, takes us to the world and its ever more precise description.”42 It is wonder 
that drives contemplation of higher beings, and investigations into the world around us.43 
Contemplation and Authenticity According to Heidegger 
For Aristotle, let us recall that philosophic contemplation is where mind reaches its 
fulfillment. It is where human selfhood comes into its own. Heidegger recognized this in 
Aristotle, framing it in his own language. 
Θεωρεῖν is Dasein’s ownmost possibility since in it Dasein reaches its end in 
such a way that it is transposed into its most genuine possibility, into its ownmost 
there, as Θεωρεῖν constitutes the most genuine ἐντελέχεια of the being of human 
beings. (BC, 64) 
 
                                                
40 Nussbaum, Fragility, 260. 
41 Aristotle, Parts of Animals, trans. W. Ogle, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. 1 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1995), 645a17. Nussbaum comments on this passage. Aristotle goes on to tell 
the story of Heraclitus who, when found by visitors warming himself by his stove, said, “there are gods 
here, too.” Nussbaum says, “presumably [the visitors] had expected to find him out contemplating the 
heavens, or lost in reflection—anything but this very ordinary activity” (262). Perhaps the order of this 
ordinariness is that in which Heraclitus found divinity.  
42 Nussbaum, Fragility, 261. 
43 None of this precludes the possibility of seeking knowledge for practical purposes. For example, it is 
good to know about specific ecosystems, so we may learn how they interrelate, or how we relate to them. 
Here, human or self-interest may be the impetus. Yet, if we enjoy knowing for its own sake, and it seems 
we do, then wonder is the impetus for this. 
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Contemplation is the genuine, or authentic (eigenste) possibility of human being. 
Contemplation allows for the most authentic or appropriate (eigenlichste) way that 
human beings can be. In contemplation, we are genuinely there (Da) with what we 
contemplate. In fact, we are this “there.” We have become, to the degree that we are 
mind, what we contemplate. Yet, we could also say that we are most fully here (Da) in 
contemplation. Being there with what we contemplate, we are most fully here in 
presence, in self-fulfillment. Wonder is the way in which we come to behold what we 
contemplate, much as angst is the disposition in which we confront our mortality for 
Heidegger.  
 In addressing the metaphor of contemplation as a healing power over the soul, 
Heidegger says, “Θεωρεῖν is a mode of being [Seinsart] in which man attains his highest 
mode of being, his proper [eigentliches] spiritual health” (PS, 117). Heidegger goes on to 
stake an important claim: the reason that sophia, and not phronêsis, constitutes the most 
proper being of human being hinges upon that to which sophia relates—that which is 
always, or everlasting (PS, 117). Phronêsis cannot fulfill human being to the degree 
philosophic contemplation can because phronêsis depends too much upon circumstances. 
More specifically, “only someone who is already ἀγαθός can be φρόνιµος” (PS, 114). 
Practical wisdom or prudence comes into its own in relation to someone who is already 
good. The highest wisdom—philosophic wisdom—is autonomous (eigenständig). Sophia 
stands on its own. It relates to that which is beyond mere human being. 
 Wisdom stands on its own, and the philosopher that contemplates it must also 
stand on his own. “The philosopher…can be who he is only if and precisely if he is 
καθ᾽αὑτὸν ὤν, alone with himself. And the more he is with himself and strives only to 
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disclose, the less he is in need of others” (PS, 121). Heidegger is drawing here from 
Nicomachean Ethics, 1177a32. Aristotle, in distinguishing the life of character excellence 
and contemplation, says that the wise person does not need others to contemplate. The 
life of character excellence requires certain circumstances, and also other people, but the 
wise person can contemplate “even when by himself” (ὁ δε σοφὸς καὶ καθ᾽αὑτον ὤν 
δύναται θεωρεῖν). Aristotle goes on to say that he can perhaps contemplate better if he 
has others with which to contemplate, but he is still most self-sufficient. Heidegger 
recognizes this by saying that, even when others are with the contemplative, he must still 
see things for himself. “Nobody can see things on behalf of someone else, and no one can 
have things present on account of some other person’s disclosure of them” (PS, 121). We 
cannot force our friends to see the meaning of what we say or contemplate. We can only 
present what is there in the best way we can, and the friend must take it up for himself.  
 Thus far in the Sophist lecture, Heidegger shows us that the flourishing life 
(εὐδαιµονία) makes for the authenticity, or the properness, of the being of human 
Dasein.44 Heidegger then does something surprising with the concept of flourishing as 
activity. 
εὐδαιµονία as man’s proper being, must be reduced to ἐνέργεια. Ἐνέργεια means 
nothing else than presence, pure immediate presence at hand… Εὐδαιµονία is 
thus the presence of the finished state of the living being with regard to its highest 
possibility of being. It is the τελείωσις of the being of the being as being-in. (PS, 
119). 
 
Why must energeia, as the way we come into our own (the way we flourish), be nothing 
but presence at hand (Vorhandensein)? In the context of contemplation, we do indeed 
contemplate what is simply there, and we are there with it in presence. However, 
                                                
44 Sie macht die Eigentlichkeit des Seins des menschlichen Dasein aus. 
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energeia is far richer than a pure, static presence. Energeia is activity. If we stick to the 
etymology, it is the en-working of human being. It is where our ergon, our work or 
function, is enacted. This enacting can take its course according to character or 
intellectual excellence. In either case, it is something that we do, and this doing is never 
divorced from past or future. Nor is this en-acting something we can always do, but must 
be undertaken habitually, and through practice. This is why flourishing, as the completion 
of who we are, does not mean that we are a mere static presence. We are living, flowing 
beings who are constantly engaging our being in excellence. Even if we live up to the 
highest degree of happiness, we do not do so perpetually. We are, after all, as both 
Aristotle and Heidegger recognize, mortals. We cannot always be there with what just is. 
Insofar as we are mortal, “the ultimately appropriate comportment to what always is,” is 
denied us (PS, 118).  
 We see now that Heidegger is not claiming his version of authenticity, or self-
appropriation, to be the same as Aristotle’s. William McNeill has recognized this. In the 
light of what we know from Being and Time, Heidegger has prepared “the terrain for a 
critique of this very prioritizing,” i.e., the prioritizing of theôrein, “as indicative of a 
desire for pure presence.”45 Heidegger, in Being and Time, works contrary to the idea of 
pure presence, which is what he claims Aristotle’s theôria temporally to be. McNeill 
says, “precisely the presencing of, or in, that authentic presence will be increasingly 
problematized; it will be shown to entail the phenomena of concealment and withdrawal, 
of absence and finitude of time that any logos premised on theoretical seeing—at least in 
its post-Aristotelian form—can only occlude.”46 In other words, Heidegger thinks theôria 
                                                
45 William McNeill, The Glance of the Eye (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), 54.  
46 McNeill, Glance, 54.  
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dwells in the purely present-at-hand, and then goes on to critique this privileging of 
presence-at-hand. Although Heidegger interpreted Aristotle as offering us a way into self-
appropriation via contemplation, Heidegger himself apparently did not agree.  
Heidegger did not equate his version of authenticity with what he found in 
Aristotle. We see this even in Being and Time. In his discussion of Befindlichkeit—how 
one finds oneself, or “mood”—Heidegger makes clear that our original way of being in 
the world is not theoretical. In fact: 
By looking at the world theoretically, we have already dimmed it down to the 
uniformity of what is purely present-at-hand…Yet even the purest θεωρία has not 
left all moods behind it; even when we look theoretically at what is just present-
at-hand, it does not show itself purely as it looks unless this θεωρία lets it come 
towards us in a tranquil tarrying alongside…, in ῥαστώνη and διαγωγή. (B&T, 
177) 
 
Heidegger may be here refusing the primacy of a metaphysic of presence. We do not, in 
our everyday way of being-in-the-world, approach the world from a moodless, cool, 
removed height of theoretical observation. But even the purest theôria—and here 
Heidegger must be talking about the kind upon which he commented in his lectures—
does not operate outside of mood. It moves along peacefully, with ease in the way it 
passes its time. Here, Heidegger wants to be sure, as he has time and again in Being and 
Time, to place even the loftiest types of philosophical contemplation on the basis of our 
everyday being-in-the-world. His conception of authenticity, too, emerges directly out of 
this concrete being-in-the-world, so that we do indeed seem to end up with something 
like a phronimos, i.e., someone who is able to see the situation and act resolutely in the 
moment. 
 There is nothing in Aristotle, however, that would seem to preclude in this respect 
Heidegger’s description of human being. That is, Aristotle could grant that our everyday 
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being-in-the-world is not primarily theoretical. Such an admission would not ruin what he 
has to say about contemplation as the best sort of life. Indeed, there seems nothing in 
Heidegger’s work to prevent us from carrying on life in a contemplative way. Even if 
Heidegger might refuse to call theôria the best sort of life for human beings, and we have 
no evidence that he would, the reason for such a refusal would not, and could not, be 
explicitly found in Being and Time. This text purports to give us a fundamental ontology. 
We know that Heidegger repeatedly insists that this text is not ethical or moralistic in 
nature. However, this does not altogether exclude ethics from the realm of human life. In 
short, because he could not say in Being and Time that the life of theôria could be the 
best life for human being, he cannot, for the same reason, deny this possibility. 
 We may recall here Heidegger’s discussion of resoluteness. He says that 
resoluteness does not stand at a remove from its situation, but is rather already in the 
situation. “As resolute, Dasein is already taking action” (B&T, 347). He goes on to tell us 
that he has been purposely avoiding the term “take action.” This term “suggests a 
misunderstanding in the ontology of Dasein, as if resoluteness were a special way of 
behavior belonging to the practical faculty as contrasted with one that is theoretical.” It is 
not that Heidegger refuses to make the theory-praxis distinction, but that this distinction 
is founded upon who we already are as care. It is the way we already are in the world that 
allows for the theory-praxis distinction.  
 Again, there is nothing in Aristotle that would seem to deny this. That the 
Nicomachean Ethics is a practical science presupposes the theory-praxis distinction, but 
Aristotle never insists that human being is fundamentally practical or theoretical. Even 
Aristotle’s “human function” argument does not make such a distinction. That the human 
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function is activity in accordance with, or not without, logos does not presuppose 
“theory” as opposed to the “practical.” As we have seen, Aristotle is merely pointing to 
what allows us to be particularly human beings. It is the richness of logos that opens up 
human being. Logos, interpreted this broadly, would even encompass Heidegger’s pre-
thematic understanding, circumspection, and our being-in-the-world in general.  
 The point here is not to show how Aristotle may have already anticipated 
Heidegger. We especially do not wish to reduce one thinker to the other. Nor is our task 
primarily to see the ways in which Heidegger’s Being and Time may or may not be a 
“radicalized” or an “ontologized” version of Aristotle’s concept of praxis.47 Rather, we 
should see that, despite Heidegger’s eventual and supposed “overcoming” of the 
metaphysics of presence, there is no reason, even in light of Being and Time, to view the 
flourishing and authentic lives as incompatible. We may even come to a better 
understanding of theôria than what Heidegger presented, allowing the two lives to be 
more interactive. Beyond this we can rethink ‘authenticity’ with Aristotle as our starting 
point. This is a starting point Heidegger himself already recognized, and to which he paid 
his homage.   
Conclusion 
We saw with Heidegger that authenticity (Eigentlichkeit) is becoming one’s own (eigen) 
self. We have deemed this self-appropriation, or becoming one’s proper self. We do not 
                                                
47 As Franco Volpi has suggested in, “Dasein as praxis: the Heideggerian assimilation and radicalization of 
the practical philosophy of Aristotle,” in Critical Heidegger, trans. and ed. Christopher Macann (London: 
Routledge, 1996), 27-66. “Ontologization” is Volpi’s term. McNeill, in Glance, also suggests a 
“radicalization” of Aristotle’s praxis. Heidegger’s praxis “shows itself as a coming out of concealment, 
unfolding into presencing, returning back into concealment.” McNeill’s position seems to differ from Volpi 
in this: McNeill does not think we should view Heidegger’s Being and Time to be a “mere reversal of 
Aristotle’s argument, as though Being and Time merely wanted to uphold the practical nous of phronesis as 
opposed to the theoria of sophia” (109). 
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appropriate a self in the sense that we come upon and take ownership of an object. This 
would land us in the difficulty of whether we have two selves, and which one does the 
owning, etc. Rather, in authenticity, one becomes one’s own, proper self. One ap-
propriates oneself. We are thinking of “appropriate” here in its etymological sense: ad-
proprius. In authenticity, the self is appropriated in such a way that we come into our 
own, or we come into who we most properly are. For Heidegger, this involves the self-
knowledge that we are, and that we are already in a world, mortal, and with others. We 
are this way of being. We are most ourselves in taking over who we already are—we 
become who we are.  
 We saw that Aristotle’s life of character virtue involves some version of self-
appropriation, or ownness. In courage, one faces what is most terrible or uncanny, and 
that is death. Death is the end of human being, and nothing is any longer good or bad for 
humans in death. Death removes the being from the human. Despite this threat, even in 
its most imminent shape, the courageous person sees what must be done. The courageous 
person acts in the face of death. The self is here no longer conceived of as a thing. The 
thing-like, particularized self is gotten beyond and is absorbed in the situation. The life of 
character excellence is one where the particularized self is directed away from itself, 
toward being excellent.  
 We saw also that the more excellent the person, the more she knows herself as 
mind. This self-knowledge need not always be explicit. That is, her actions may show 
that reason is already in control, and reason runs its course in mind. As such, she is able 
to transcend her particularity and most genuinely be with her friends. She is of one mind 
with herself, and there is no conflict amongst her desires, or conflict between herself and 
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her desires. What she does, she does wholly and fully. In being at one with herself in her 
goodness, she is able to be one with her friend. The good friend is another self because 
both friends are most mind. In being together and in being good, they indicate that they 
are themselves.  
 Finally, the degree to which we contemplate is the degree to which our lives 
flourish. Contemplation sends us beyond our particularity by sublimating us into what is 
contemplated. Yet, we said contemplation is driven by wonder, and thus cannot happen 
without the body. Contemplation does not allow us to leave our bodies, and thus our 
mortality, behind. This is why in contemplation we make ourselves deathless only as 
much as we are able. However, we may recognize that wonder, even if it is an 
undergoing, is perhaps a more universally directed pathos. Wonder drives the 
contemplation of, and inquiry into, our world. It cannot happen without the body, but 
wonder does not direct us toward our particular bodily desires, emotions, etc. Wonder is 
what drives us beyond ourselves as this, particularized self, and toward the “that it is” of 
beings. This in turn allows us to ask “what” or “why” in inquiry. It also allows us simply 
to be with what it is we contemplate, in the highest form of contemplation. 
 Let us make this point clearer. Wonder is an undergoing, or “passion.” In 
Nicomachean Ethics II.5, Aristotle names several passions—appetite, anger, fear, envy, 
confidence, joy, love, hate, longing, etc.—and says they are in general accompanied by 
pleasure and pain (1105b21-23). Some of these ways of undergoing are self-directed, 
while others, like love, may be directed beyond the self. In loving my friend, I love her 
for her own sake, and this is pleasurable. Wonder, too, is directed beyond the wondering 
self, toward that into which we inquire, and that about which we think or contemplate. 
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Wonder can take place only in a particularized, embodied human being. It involves the 
whole human being, and somehow directs the wonderer away from her particularity. In 
wonder, the wonderer is directed toward what is there for thought, for inquiry, or for 
contemplation. Through wonder, which is an undergoing that happens only insofar as one 
is a particularized this here, the contemplative is directed away from this particularity and 
toward what is to be thought. The activity of contemplation cannot happen without the 
passivity of wonder. The rich interplay of the ambiguous self comes to light in this 
phenomenon. More precisely, the rich interweaving of self as particular and universal 
here shows itself. 
 It is selfhood that Heidegger overlooked in his interpretation of theôria. We have 
seen Heidegger make the etymological connection of theôria and seeing. The etymology 
is correct. Yet, Heidegger may have treated contemplation as though the contemplative 
were at a remove from what she contemplates. Indeed, Heidegger says, “The  θεωρός is 
the one who goes to the festival, the one who is present as a spectator at the great dramas 
and festivals—whence our word ‘theater’” (PS, 44). Again, Heidegger’s etymology may 
help us see the connection to contemplation as a way of seeing, but it fails to let us in on 
what happens to the contemplator in contemplation. We saw that the contemplator 
“tarries alongside,” or spends her while with (Verweilen bei) what she contemplates. 
Contemplation, for Heidegger, operates in a presence-at-hand. What is present-at-hand is 
at a remove from the contemplator. Yet, as we have seen, the contemplative becomes 
what she contemplates. The contemplative self is in some sense absorbed or taken up into 
what is there. The contemplative is not set at a distance from what she contemplates, but 
is there with it, or even in union with it. 
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 In conclusion, we see now that for both Aristotle and Heidegger, self-
appropriation occurs at some sort of limit of human being. For Aristotle, the limits of our 
particularity are pushed, and even in some respect transgressed. Insofar as we are mind, 
we can move beyond our particularity. In contemplation, we are at the furthest remove 
from our particularity since we become what we contemplate. Yet even here, our 
particularity is affirmed, since contemplation is accompanied by the mood of wonder. 
Wonder, whether enthusiastic or sober and calm, needs embodiment to run its course. 
Our particularity is also affirmed by the fact that we cannot always contemplate eternal 
and unchanging things. We are needy beings, and this attests to our finitude. We need 
food, clothing, rest, and even friendship. This is where the character excellences can 
serve as another kind of self-appropriation. Here again, we move beyond the particularity 
of the appetitive self, and are taken up into excellence. But even here we affirm our 
particularity since the character excellences find their proper home in embodiment—the 
excellences deal with pleasures and pains. 
 For Heidegger, too, one transcends the they-self, and returns to who one already is 
as care. The self-definition handed down by das Man is left behind, or passes into 
insignificance in the face of our own death. The call of conscience attests to our being-
guilty, or the fact that we do not have absolute power over or own being. We then settle 
down into who we are as finite beings—ahead of ourselves, already in a world, and 
alongside other beings in the world. Here, the self as “I” or subject is left behind. But just 
as we cannot contemplate forever, the possibility of inauthenticity is ever-present. The 
“situation” cannot always present itself, and one may recede again into the comfort of das 
Man. 
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 For Aristotle, character and intellectual excellence allows us to flourish. This also 
means that the flourishing life entails self-appropriation. For both Aristotle and 
Heidegger, self-appropriation is not “finding oneself” so much as it is a letting go of the 
way we normally conceive of or identify ourselves. In Aristotelian terms, excellence 
allows us to move beyond the particular, appetitive self. In Heideggerian terms, 
authenticity releases us from the they-self. For both thinkers, we see that neither the 
highest sort of self-cultivation nor the most intense authenticity is everlasting. We are 
beings bound by our finitude, and the ways in which we can become who we most are 
attest to this. For Heidegger, authenticity hinges upon mortality and finitude. Moreover, 
authenticity is impossible without inauthenticity. For Aristotle, we can only make 
ourselves deathless as much as possible. This means that we must always return to who 
we are as composite beings. The tension—the movement beyond particularity, and the 
affirmation of it—is a necessary part of who we are. I close with the suggestion that we 
may do well to heed this fact. Moreover, we should understand that the most healthy sort 
of authenticity or self-appropriation is never the finding of a static object called the self, 
but a simultaneous letting-be and cultivation of who we are and can be. 
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